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Dear Reader:

T

his is Old Dominion University’s 22nd annual State of the Region Report. While it represents the work of many people connected in various ways to the university,
the report does not constitute an official viewpoint of Old Dominion, its president, Brian O. Hemphill, Ph.D., the Board of Visitors, the Strome College of Business or
the generous donors who support the activities of the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy.

Over the past year, we have endured the depths of the COVID-19 pandemic, the introduction of vaccines and a return to a semblance of normality in Hampton Roads.
Even as the economy recovers in the region, Virginia and the nation, we cannot forget that some have been left behind. Invigorating growth that raises the fortunes of all is
the challenge that lies before us. This task will involve difficult discussions about how to diversify our economy in the coming years.
Hampton Roads plays a significant role in national security, provides college education to thousands of Virginians and is culturally diverse. Given these realities and the
fact that many residents live in one community and work in another, solutions to our regional challenges will require conversations and policies that span jurisdictional
boundaries. If there is an overarching lesson to be learned from the pandemic, it is simply that we are all in this together.
The 2021 State of the Region Report is divided into seven chapters:
Shock and Awe? COVID-19, Vaccines and the Recovery
The COVID-19 pandemic shook the Hampton Roads economy. One in 10
workers were unemployed at the height of the pandemic, 4 in 10 small
businesses were forced to reduce hours and thousands of residents left the
labor force entirely. Yet, in the midst of the pandemic, housing prices and trade
volumes through the Port of Virginia continued to rise. We explore the economic
recovery and discuss whether Hampton Roads can rely on defense spending in
the coming decade.
Bounce Back? The Pandemic and Tourism in Hampton Roads
Nearly 1 in 5 workers in the Hampton Roads hospitality and leisure sector
lost their jobs in 2020. Even as the sector started to recover, employers found
themselves in need of employees to fill available positions. Now, with tourists
returning to the region, we look at how traditional hotels and short-term rentals
fared over the last 18 months.
Earn While You Learn:
The Apprentice School at Newport News Shipbuilding
The Apprentice School at Newport News Shipbuilding is not only one of the
nation’s premier schools for educating and training workers, but it also stands as
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an example of how 21st-century learning can occur in the region. In this chapter,
we look at the apprenticeship model and delve into the unique aspects of The
Apprentice School that have made it successful.
All In: Casinos, Online Betting and
the Future of Gambling in Hampton Roads
In 1987, Virginia voters approved the state lottery, bringing legalized gambling
to the Commonwealth. Fast forward to 2021: Virginians can now buy lottery
tickets online, place sports bets on their phones and wager in historical horse
racing parlors. Now, with casinos opening soon in Norfolk and Portsmouth, as
well as Bristol, Danville and, likely, Richmond, we discuss the benefits and costs
of casinos in Hampton Roads.
Whither Old Dominion University?
The University of Virginia, Virginia Tech and College of William & Mary
historically have played important roles in the Commonwealth. They have
set impressive records in admitting and graduating talented students who
(predictably) do well after they leave these campuses. Nevertheless, the future
viability and cohesion of the Commonwealth in this century will more likely be
determined on campuses like Old Dominion University, for it is there that the

i

Securing Release: Cash Bail in Hampton Roads
On any given day in 2019, on average, there were more pretrial inmates per
100,000 residents in Hampton Roads than in Virginia or the United States. To
secure their release from jail, many inmates must provide collateral in the form of
a secured bond. Now, with momentum building for reducing or eliminating cash
bail in the Commonwealth, we estimate the costs and benefits of cash bail reform
for cities and counties in Hampton Roads.

critical social mobility challenge is being addressed in a meaningful way. We
explore what the future may hold for ODU.
Bad News: The Decline of Local Journalism
Local journalism is in peril. Newspapers all over the country are reducing
coverage, cutting staff, abandoning physical newsrooms or shuttering operations
altogether. The United States has lost fully one-fourth of its newspapers since
2004, including 70 dailies and more than 2,000 weeklies and other nondaily
papers. Hampton Roads has not escaped these cutbacks. We discuss the future of
local journalism in Hampton Roads.

The Strome College of Business and Old Dominion University continue to provide support for the State of the Region Report. However, it would not appear without the vital
backing of the private donors whose names appear below. They believe in Hampton Roads and the power of rational discussion to improve our circumstances but are not
responsible for the views expressed in the report.
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Dragas Family Foundation
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Hampton Roads Chamber of Commerce
Thomas Lyons
Patricia and J. Douglas Perry
Dr. Jitendra Swarup

The following individuals were instrumental in the writing, editing, design and dissemination of the report:
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Feng Lian

Brendan O’Hallarn

Steve Daniel

Nikki Johnson
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All 22 State of the Region Reports are available at www.ceapodu.com. A limited number of printed copies of the 2021 report are available for purchase for $50 each. If
you have comments or suggestions, please email us at rmcnab@odu.edu.
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Robert M. McNab
Director of the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy
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Shock and Awe?
COVID-19, Vaccines
and the Recovery

SHOCK AND AWE? COVID-19, VACCINES AND THE RECOVERY
I have therefore determined, not only to inoculate all the Troops now here, that have not had it, but shall order Doctor
Shippen to inoculate the Recruits as fast as they come into Philadelphia.
– Gen. George Washington, Feb. 5, 1777

U

pon taking command of the Continental Army in 1775, Gen. George Washington faced two foes: the British and smallpox. As the Continental Army
laid siege to British-held Boston, smallpox ravaged its troops and evidence mounted that the British, who were largely immune due to the endemic nature
of the disease in England, were working to infect soldiers and civilians alike. Washington ordered infected soldiers and civilians be held in quarantine,
but as the battlefield broadened, smallpox continued to spread. At the Battle of Quebec in December 1775, the Continental Army was so weakened

by smallpox that it had to retreat from the field of battle. By February 1777, Washington had seen enough. He wrote to John Hancock, president of the Second
Continental Congress, that he was ordering the inoculation of troops under his command.1 The need was palpable. John Adams estimated in 1777 that for every
soldier killed in battle, disease killed 10.
Washington ordered vaccination preparations to begin in secret because the
political and social climate was not conducive to a public campaign. In 1776,
at the height of the smallpox epidemic, the Continental Congress had passed
an ordinance prohibiting Continental Army surgeons from inoculating soldiers.
A number of states and localities had also passed laws prohibiting vaccination
of soldiers and civilians. As the Washington-ordered inoculations continued in
1777 and into 1778 (almost always in secret, as soldiers required a month of
convalescence), smallpox mortality rates in the Continental Army dropped from
between 10% and 60% to less than 2%. Dr. Benjamin Rush, surgeon general
to the Continental Army and a signer of the Declaration of Independence,
observed in 1781: “The small-pox which once proved equally fatal to
thousands, has been checked in its career, and in a great degree subdued by
the practice of inoculation.”1
Jean-Baptiste Alphonse Karr, a 19th-century French critic, journalist and
novelist, noted, “The more things change, the more they are the same.”
1 S
 mallpox inoculation at the time required a surgeon to lance a smallpox pustule and then insert the infected
blade underneath the skin of an uninfected person. This crude form of inoculation typically resulted in a milder
form of smallpox; however, some inoculated individuals contracted a more severe form of the disease and
died as a result of the inoculation. See: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5463674/.
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COVID-19 vaccinations dramatically reduced infections, hospitalizations
and deaths in Hampton Roads, Virginia and the United States in the first six
months of 2021. Yet, vaccine hesitancy and resistance continue to challenge
public health efforts and the economic recovery. Disinformation, amplified by
social media and certain cable news networks, not only undermines efforts
to improve public health, but also threatens the core tenets of the American
experiment in democracy. Even with these challenges, however, Hampton
Roads is poised to grow faster in 2021 than at any time in the previous
decade, and conditions are favorable for continued growth in 2022.
Over the last 18 months, our region experienced a historical
economic shock that, at its peak, left 1 in 10 workers
unemployed, 4 in 10 small businesses reducing hours and
many schools shifting to virtual instruction. These challenges
sparked difficult conversations about why Hampton Roads
failed to keep pace with the Commonwealth and the nation
over the previous decade. Would a recovery find Hampton
Roads again in envy of its peers?

Now, with an economic recovery before us, will we move
beyond meetings to boost economic growth, or will we return
to the behaviors of the past? As the pandemic has so aptly
shown us, we will rise or fall together.
In this chapter, we examine Hampton Roads’ recovery from the COVID-19
pandemic and the prospects for continued growth in 2022. We highlight the
rebound in labor markets, the benefits of increasing vaccination rates in the
region and the emergence of the COVID-19 delta variant, which has led to
rising infections, primarily among the unvaccinated. We explore the impacts
of COVID-19 on the region’s residents and discuss whether the plans for
recovery are sufficient. Lastly, we consider how changes in the national security
environment may pose the next challenge for growth in Hampton Roads.

The Pandemic, Variants
And Vaccines
In October 2020, Hampton Roads and Virginia appeared to have weathered
the summer surge in COVID-19 infections, hospitalizations and deaths. Within
two months, however, the region, Commonwealth and nation would enter a
dark winter, with deaths surging nationally to an average of 3,000 a day. In
Hampton Roads, the seven-day rolling average of residents testing positive for
COVID-19 peaked at 1,437 on Jan. 20, 2021, more than three times that of
the previous peak observed in July 2020 (Graph 1).
Yet, even as infections surged in the fall of 2020, clinical trials of the Pfizer/
BioNTech and Moderna COVID-19 vaccines provided hope. With emergency
use authorization from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, vaccinations
started in late December 2020, although demand far outstripped initial supply.
An aggressive pivot toward greater production and distribution of these
vaccines (and eventually the Johnson & Johnson vaccine) in early 2021 marked
an inflection point in the course of the pandemic. By late spring, Americans
12 and older could go to pharmacies, doctors’ offices, vaccination clinics and
even public schools to receive a free COVID-19 shot without significant delay.
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In late summer, booster shots were available for the immunocompromised and
would soon be available for those 12 and older.
In Hampton Roads, the seven-day rolling average of positive COVID-19 tests
fell from 1,437 on Jan. 20, 2021, to 65 on June 1, 2021, a decline of 95%.
By the end of June, the seven-day average had fallen further to 36. However,
the good news would not last as the COVID-19 delta variant gained traction
in the region, Commonwealth and nation. By the end of July, the seven-day
rolling average of cases in Hampton Roads had risen to 226.
A continuing (and unfortunate) theme of the COVID-19 pandemic is that
Black residents of Hampton Roads have borne a disproportionate burden of
the public health crisis. While Black residents comprised 30% of the region’s
population in 2019, they accounted for 33.8% of positive COVID-19 tests,
50.9% of hospitalizations and 44.6% of COVID-19 deaths (Graph 2). White
residents, who made up 55% of the Hampton Roads population in 2019,
accounted for approximately 40.8%, 37.6% and 48.4% of the region’s positive
tests, hospitalizations and deaths, respectively, from COVID-19.
Why have we observed a high toll among Black residents in the region
and Commonwealth? First, Black workers are more likely to be employed in
occupations that are at higher risk of exposure. Second, as we note below,
Black vaccination rates through the first eight months of 2021 lagged those of
other races in the region and Virginia. Third, inequities in access and provision
of health care can also negatively influence the course of the disease in Black
residents.2
There was, however, a significant difference from the previous wave that
peaked in January 2021: the availability of safe and effective vaccines.
While COVID-19 vaccines are fiercely debated on social media and have
become conflated in the minds of some with political identity, data provide a
stark picture of the impact of the virus on the vaccinated and unvaccinated
populations.
Data from the Virginia Department of Health illustrate these
stark differences. Between Jan. 17 and Aug. 13, 2021,
2 S
 ee our discussion of vaccinations and employment by race in this chapter. For a national perspective, see
https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/latest-data-on-covid-19-vaccinations-race-ethnicity.
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fully vaccinated individuals accounted for 0.09%, 0.005%
and 0.001% of reported cases, hospitalizations and deaths
in the Commonwealth. In July, the rates of infection and
hospitalization from COVID-19 in Virginia were 35 times lower
among the fully vaccinated. Rates of hospitalization were 20
times lower among the fully vaccinated when compared to the
not fully vaccinated.
While vaccinations can reduce future inequities from COVID-19, there have
been troubling lags in vaccination rates across Hampton Roads. Graph 3
displays the percentage of the population in Virginia and selected Hampton
Roads cities and counties who were fully vaccinated as of March 1, June 1 and
Aug. 1, 2021. Of the 16 cities and counties in the Virginia portion of Hampton
Roads, four (Mathews County, Poquoson, James City County and York County)
had vaccination rates that were higher than the Commonwealth average.
Graph 4 illustrates the share of the population by race in Hampton Roads
and Virginia that were fully vaccinated by Aug. 6, 2021. Asian residents
were more likely to be vaccinated than their counterparts in the region but
lagged the Commonwealth average. White residents of Hampton Roads were
almost as likely to be fully vaccinated as the average for whites across the
Commonwealth, while Black residents of the region were approximately 5
percentage points behind the state’s average. Hispanic residents of the region
were far less likely to be fully vaccinated relative to the share of the Hispanic
population in Virginia.
In the early phases of the vaccination campaign, a likely explanation for the
disparity in vaccination rates had to do with differences in median household
income as well as personal and professional networks. However, given that the
COVID-19 vaccines are free, the lower rates of vaccinations in Hampton Roads
are a matter of concern. If vaccination rates continue to lag among residents,
they remain vulnerable to the scourge of COVID-19.

6
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Given the proven benefits of the vaccines to individual and
public health, working to educate residents and reduce vaccine
hesitancy and resistance is key to sustaining a regional
recovery. Unvaccinated people represent an opportunity for
the virus to mutate and undermine vaccine efficacy, especially
with the rise of more infectious variants of the virus. Those
who remain unvaccinated by choice also present a challenge
to employers, since they pose an undue risk to co-workers and
customers who cannot be vaccinated. One need only recall
the impact of COVID-19 on our tourism industry to understand
how a sustained outbreak among the unvaccinated could
undermine the prospects for a sustained recovery in Hampton
Roads.
The good news is that as the number of vaccinations has
increased, public opinion polls have seen robust declines
in vaccine hesitancy. However, there is a fraction of the
population that has hardened its hostility. Disinformation
persists through social media and certain cable news
networks, which have served as platforms for anti-vaccination
rhetoric. Breaching these walls of mistrust requires concerted
and sustained effort from trusted agents in the community.
Unfortunately, we have ample evidence of Jonathan Swift’s
observation: “Falsehood flies, and truth comes limping
after it.”

ECONOMY CHAPTER GRAPHS
GRAPH 1
GRAPH 1
Seven-Day Rolling Average of Positive Tests for COVID-19: Hampton Roads
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Percentage of Population Fully Vaccinated: Virginia and Selected Cities in Hampton Roads,
GRAPH 3

March 1, 2021, June 1, 2021, and Aug. 1, 2021

PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION FULLY VACCINATED: VIRGINIA AND SELECTED CITIES IN HAMPTON ROADS,
MARCH 1, 2021, JUNE 1, 2021, AND AUG. 1, 2021
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GRAPH 4
GRAPH 4
Share of Population Fully Vaccinated by Race:
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A Weak Recovery? Labor
Force And Employment In
Hampton Roads
The labor market in Hampton Roads is typically seasonal; that is, the number
of people in the labor force looking for work or actively employed peaks in
the summer and reaches its lowest point in the winter. In 2019, however, labor
markets appeared to be gaining steam by the fall and into the winter of 2020.
As illustrated in Graph 5, the civilian labor force and individual employment in
Hampton Roads peaked at 874,900 and 852,600 individuals, respectively, in
February 2020.

The decline in the unemployment rate in Hampton Roads in 2021 is the result
of two factors: an increase in individual employment (good) and a decline
in the civilian labor force (bad). From January to June 2021, unemployment
has fallen by 10,417 individuals but only 4,448 individuals were gainfully
employed. The remaining 5,969 left the labor force. A declining labor force is
not a sign of a robust regional economic recovery.
If the 50,057 workers who left the labor force since February
2020 had remained in it as unemployed individuals, the
region’s unemployment rate in June 2021 would have been
10.9%, 2.2 times higher than the reported unemployment rate.

This positive upswing was soon dashed, however, by the
emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic, social distancing
measures and a rapid decline in domestic and international
tourism. By May 2020, the civilian labor force was 5%
smaller than in February 2020, while individual employment
had declined by approximately 12.2%. The labor force and
employment rebounded to some extent during the summer of
2020, but the recovery plateaued in the fall. At the beginning
of 2021, the civilian labor force and individual employment in
Hampton Roads were 5% and 8.5% lower, respectively, than in
February 2020. Even though economic expectations improved
in the spring of 2021, the civilian labor force continued to
contract – a troubling development.
The headline unemployment rate is equal to the ratio of the number of
unemployed people in the labor force to the overall labor force. The number
of unemployed in Hampton Roads declined from a high of 109,046 in April
2020 to 40,191 in June 2021. Over the same period, the civilian labor force
declined from 853,762 to 824,884. After peaking at 12.8% in April 2020,
the unemployment rate in Hampton Roads steadily declined, falling to 4.9% in
June 2021 (Graph 6).
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GRAPH 5
GRAPH 5
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Headline Unemployment Rate (U3):
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Did Expanded
Unemployment Cause
A Labor Shortage?
Employers in some sectors of the region reported difficulties in finding workers
to fill available positions in the spring and summer of 2020. The leisure and
hospitality sector appeared to be the most challenged by this development.
Nationally, as well as in Virginia, online job postings surged past prepandemic
levels. As more people in the labor force were employed, employers faced
increasing difficulties to fill open positions. The question was: Where were all
the workers?
A confluence of factors likely explains the apparent shortage of workers
in lower-wage sectors. First, some workers left the labor force entirely. The
absence of these individuals meant that employers were competing for a
smaller pool of labor. Second, national evidence suggests that a greater
proportion of women left the labor force or transitioned to part-time
employment. Remote and hybrid schooling, coupled with constraints on the
availability of child care, limited the ability of some to work full time, if at
all. Third, some workers were (and remain) concerned about contracting the
coronavirus.
Finally, expanded unemployment benefits may have influenced some workers
on the margin. Recent findings from the National Bureau of Economic Research
suggest that expanded unemployment benefits played a role in reducing job
applications; a 10% increase in benefits contributed to a 3.6% decline in
applications. For some workers, expanded benefits disincentivized work. Why?
During the first eight months of 2021, full unemployment benefits in Virginia
amounted to $678 a week ($378 regular plus $300 expanded) or $16.95 an
hour.
In the summer of 2021, some states opted out of expanded unemployment
benefits entirely, eliminating any financial incentive to remain on
unemployment. Other states, including Virginia, reimposed job search
stipulations, requiring individuals receiving unemployment to apply for two
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or more jobs a week. As one might have expected, states that discontinued
expanded unemployment saw declines in unemployment insurance claims.
Yet, anecdotal complaints from employers in these states continued regarding
difficulties in attracting and retaining employees in low-wage positions.
Perhaps the only certainty is that this question will generate a large body of
academic research in the coming decade.
As the unemployment rolls continue to shrink, our focus will need to shift to
bringing back workers who have left the labor force entirely. Fully opening
public schools, increasing child care availability and convincing the reluctant
among us to get vaccinated will be necessary for this to occur. The recovery
may be on the way, but it is not complete.

Unemployment Claims In
Hampton Roads
When discussing unemployment claims, it is important to
make the distinction between initial and continued claims.
Initial claims represent the number of people who have filed
a request for unemployment benefits after separation from
an employer. Continued claims, or what is known as insured
unemployment, reflect those who have already filed their
initial claim, had the claim accepted by the government and
continue to file claims to receive benefits for the current week
of unemployment. In other words, continued claims represent
the number of insured unemployed people, while initial claims
reflect the number of initial requests for unemployment
benefits in a given week.
In the spring of 2020, Congress passed, and President
Trump signed into law, the Pandemic Unemployment
Assistance (PUA) and Pandemic Emergency Unemployment
Compensation (PEUC) programs. The PUA program
provided up to 79 weeks of unemployment benefits for the
self-employed, freelancers and independent contractors who
would not typically qualify for regular state unemployment
benefits. The PEUC program provided an additional 13 weeks
of unemployment benefits for those who exhausted their state
benefits. A number of states ended participation in these
programs in the summer of 2021 and authorization for these
programs lapsed in September 2021. Data for PUA and PEUC
filings were only available at the state and federal levels.

SHOCK AND AWE? COVID-19, VACCINES AND THE RECOVERY

In 2007, before the full impact of the Great Recession was felt in Hampton
Roads, an average of 2,733 initial unemployment claims were filed monthly
(Graph 7). Even though the recession was officially over in 2009, average
monthly initial unemployment claims continued to rise in the region, reaching
8,257 in 2010. In retrospect, while the Great Recession was significant, its
economic shock paled in comparison to the COVID-19 pandemic. Average
monthly claims were 3.4 times higher in 2020 than in 2010
and 13.2 times higher than in 2019.
In August 2007, 2,872 initial unemployment claims were filed in Hampton
Roads. Three years later, monthly initial unemployment claims peaked at
10,600. In other words, it took 36 months for the level of initial claims to rise
from its prerecessionary low to its recessionary peak. In February 2020, 1,961
monthly initial unemployment claims were filed in Hampton Roads. Two months
later, monthly initial claims rocketed to 76,723, an increase of 3,812% (Graph
8). The adjectives “unprecedented” and “historic” seem inadequate to describe
the magnitude of the shock this had on labor markets in Hampton Roads.
If there is a modicum of good news, it is that initial claims and continued claims
have generally trended downward in 2021. While one can think of initial
claims as representing “turbulence” in the regional economy, continued claims
represent “slack.” An individual receiving continued unemployed benefits
remains in the labor force and, as of the last week of May in Virginia, must
actively search for employment each week.3
Graph 9 illustrates the change in weekly continued claims for unemployment
benefits in Hampton Roads from March 14, 2020, to July 31, 2021. Continued
claims increased from 4,315 for the week ending March 14, 2020, to 88,436
for the week ending May 16, 2020. At the peak, more than 1 in 10 workers
in the region were receiving unemployment benefits. As Hampton Roads
reopened in the summer of 2020, continued claims fell sharply, dropping
to 13,936 at the end of December 2020. While continued claims remained
above the prepandemic level during the first half of 2021, there has been
measured progress in reducing the number of workers in the region receiving
unemployment benefits.
3 In March 2020, Virginia Gov. Ralph Northam temporarily waived the requirement that unemployed
individuals must actively search for work. This requirement came back into force on June 1, 2021. Virginians
receiving unemployment benefits must apply for two or more jobs a week and report the details to the Virginia
Employment Commission.
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Average Monthly Initial Unemployment Claims:
AVERAGE MONTHLY INITIAL UNEMPLOYMENT CLAIMS:
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Sources: Virginia Employment Commission and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Data are not seasonally adjusted and do not include PUA and PEUC claims.

Sources: Virginia Employment Commission and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Data are not seasonally adjusted and do not include PUA and PEUC claims.
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Monthly Initial Unemployment Claims:
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GRAPH 9
GRAPH 9

Continued Unemployment Claims:

CONTINUED UNEMPLOYMENT CLAIMS:
HAMPTON ROADS, WEEK ENDING MARCH 14, 2020-JULY 31, 2021
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Sources: Virginia Employment Commission and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Data are not seasonally adjusted and do not include PUA and PEUC claims.
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Will The Lost Jobs
Come Back?
In January 2020, there were a record 804,500 jobs in
Hampton Roads (Graph 10). Prospects for the region were
improving: defense spending was projected to increase,
travel and tourism looked forward to another banner year
and global trade volumes were expected to recover from the
effects of ill-conceived trade conflicts with China and Europe.
Three months later, however, employers had cut 1 in 10 jobs in
the region as the COVID-19 pandemic continued to extract its
economic toll.
Thankfully, the region did not remain at the nadir of job losses for long, but
the climb back to the prepandemic peak has been arduous and is not yet
complete. By October 2020, almost 65,000 of the lost jobs had returned, but
progress has been slow in 2021. From January to June 2021, the region shed
jobs while job growth accelerated at the national level. The erosion in payrolls
finally halted in June 2020, but the region still remains 42,100 jobs below the
peak observed in January 2020.
To understand why, we can gain perspective by diving into the numbers. We
ask: Which sectors have grown since 2019 and which have shrunk? We
compare the number of jobs from each sector in Hampton Roads to the same
month in 2019; otherwise, we might bias our conclusions given the significant
declines in nonfarm payrolls in the first half of 2020.
While there were 33,000 fewer jobs in June 2021 than in June
2019, 84.4% (28,100) of the job losses were concentrated in
three sectors: leisure and hospitality, education and health
services, and local government (Graph 11).

in the second half of 2021 as schools reopen fully and hospitals return to
the normal pattern of elective surgeries. While the delta variant may require
masking in public schools and hospitals, limiting outbreaks is key to a
sustained economic recovery. Local government payrolls may lag other sectors
due to the nature of the public budget cycle. Cities and counties typically hold
budget meetings in winter and spring and start the new budget year on July
1. There is a lag between improving economic conditions, tax revenues and
government hiring.
The open question is whether Hampton Roads will better its record from the
previous economic expansion. From February 2010, which represents the
trough in nonfarm payrolls following the Great Recession, to the end of the
expansion in February 2020, the United States increased nonfarm payrolls
by 17.6% (Graph 12). Over the same period, nonfarm payrolls in Hampton
Roads increased by 9.5%. At the lowest point of the COVID-19 recession,
the U.S. had shed almost all the jobs created over the previous economic
expansion. For Hampton Roads, the experience was more traumatic. The
region not only shed all the jobs gained over the previous decade, but it
bottomed out with 5% fewer jobs than at the worst point following the Great
Recession.
It seems that Hampton Roads is playing the same, sad song.
While job growth accelerated at the national level, the region
(again) fell behind. The Hampton Roads economy may pick
up speed in the coming months as travel and tourism and
defense spending increase, but the question remains: Have
we addressed the causes of our relatively tepid growth in the
previous economic expansion, or have we grown increasingly
reliant and complacent, ignoring the real possibility that the
largess of the federal government could one day come to an
end?

Two of the three sectors, leisure and hospitality and education and health
services, should ameliorate the losses in 2021. As domestic travel increases,
demand for hotels, restaurants, bars and other leisure and hospitality services
will rise. We should observe increased hiring in education and health services
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GRAPH 10
GRAPH 10

Nonfarm Payrolls in Hampton Roads,
NONFARM PAYROLLS (JOBS) IN HAMPTON ROADS:
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Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Data are seasonally adjusted.
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Change in Nonfarm Payrolls: Hampton Roads,
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GRAPH 12
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12
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Can Hampton Roads Rely
On Defense Spending?
In an age when investors jump into “meme stocks” like GameStop and AMC or
invest in cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and Dogecoin, the idiom that one should
not put all their eggs in one basket continues to apply. While we may read
about the lucky investor who can now retire thanks to a fortuitous investment
(gamble) in GameStop, we cannot forget that there are two sides to every
trade. When fortunes turn, those who bet their life savings on an unlikely stock
or cleverly named cryptocurrency can suddenly find themselves adrift.
The Department of Defense (DOD) has fueled the Hampton Roads economy for
decades. As illustrated in Graph 13, from 2000 to 2008, DOD spending in the
region increased by almost 73%. It should be no surprise that economic activity
flourished during this period. When the Budget Control Act of 2011 and
subsequent modifications moderated the growth in defense spending, however,
our economy faltered. In the latter half of the last decade, Congress lifted and
finally eliminated the discretionary spending caps that constrained the DOD
base budget. Concurrently, direct DOD spending in the region increased,
powering economic activity and job growth.
We estimate that direct DOD spending in Hampton Roads
will reach almost $25 billion in 2021. If one includes the
ripple effects of this spending, 4 of every 10 dollars spent in
Hampton Roads can be traced back to the DOD. It should be no
surprise that defense spending is one of the pillars (if not the
central pillar) of the regional economy.
President Joe Biden proposed a base DOD budget of $715 billion for FY
2022, a 1.6% increase from FY 2021 (Graph 14).4 In inflation-adjusted terms,
this represents a real decline in the DOD base budget, and that assumes this
modest nominal increase makes it past opposition from some in the president’s
own party in Congress.

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) projects the DOD budget will
grow at (or more likely below) the rate of inflation for the next five years. After
several years of increasing budgets, the base budget is flat in real terms, and
it is likely that future direct spending in Hampton Roads will remain near FY
2022 levels as a result.
Even the relatively modest increases in the DOD budget in the coming years
could well be constrained by the unbridled spending habits of Congress
and the president. The last time the federal government ran a surplus was
FY 2000, and that was quickly undone by tax cuts in 2001 and 2003, as
well as the fiscal impact of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Graph 15). After
the fiscal response to the Great Recession, budget discipline (to some extent)
and economic growth reduced the deficit to $442 billion in FY 2015. By FY
2019, the deficit had reached $984 billion as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of
2017 reduced revenue growth, and the discretionary spending caps were
abandoned. The fiscal response to the COVID-19 pandemic was relatively
swift and large in magnitude and likely staved off an ever-greater economic
shock. However, the deficit rocketed to $3.1 trillion in FY 2020. While the
federal deficit may also approach $3 trillion in FY 2021, the passage of a
large infrastructure bill and proposed increases in nondefense discretionary
spending would certainly yield higher deficits in the future.
While we cannot say for certain when markets will demand
higher rates of return for U.S. treasuries, we do know that the
federal debt exceeded 100% of U.S. gross domestic product in
FY 2020. Even if we exclude holdings of the Federal Reserve,
the federal government owes the public $17 trillion. By middecade, this debt will certainly top $20 trillion. At some point,
the butcher’s bill will come due, and when it does, the federal
government will find itself having to raise taxes and cut
expenditures. The DOD, as the largest discretionary program
in the federal government, is an obvious target in such a
scenario.

4 W
 e note that the DOD now presents the base budget as the combination of what used to be the base budget
and the overseas contingency operations (OCO) budgets.
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GRAPH 13
GRAPH 13

Estimated Direct Department of Defense Spending in Hampton Roads,
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GRAPH 14
GRAPH 14

Department of Defense Discretionary Budget Authority,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DISCRETIONARY BUDGET AUTHORITY,
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Federal Budget Surplus or Deficit in Millions of Nominal Dollars,
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Cybersecurity And Budgets:
Two Immediate Challenges
Even if the Department of Defense budget remains constant in real terms, there
are strategic challenges that, if left unaddressed, will lead to unacceptable
levels of risk. The ransomware infection of Colonial Pipeline on May 7, 2021,
illustrated the vulnerability of critical infrastructure to cyberattack. The U.S.
military is increasingly reliant on networked systems to achieve battlefield
superiority – networks that may be vulnerable to intrusion and attack. Even if
the military networks are secure, if hackers were to attack civilian firms that
supply the DOD, could the U.S. military be rendered impotent and find itself
unable to fight protracted battles? Without aggressive investments in offensive
and defensive cyber capabilities, the nation and its armed forces will remain
vulnerable to cyberattack.
A more immediate challenge that hits closer to home is the rising cost of
weapons systems. The Congressional Research Service noted that the estimated
procurement costs of the Ford-class carriers remain an area of concern.
Relative to the procurement costs of the FY 2008 budget, the estimated
procurement costs of nuclear aircraft carriers CVN 78, CVN 79 and CVN
80 have grown 27%, 29.8% and 15.8%, respectively.5 Even if the carriers
represent a significant leap in capabilities, can the U.S. Navy afford to put
these multibillion-dollar assets at risk in the South China Sea or Persian Gulf?
Or will it have to surround these carriers with an increasing number of other
ships and submarines to lower vulnerability?

Cost and schedule overruns impact current and future capabilities. To pay
for modernization efforts, the Marine Corps is planning to eliminate tanks,
nine helicopter squadrons, three infantry battalions and three military police
battalions, among others. The Army has come to a similar realization that it
can either increase end strength or modernize the force, but not both.
In its FY 2022 budget proposal, the Air Force proposed cutting 200 aircraft
from the current fleet to redirect resources to research and development.8

The Battlefield Is Changing:
Can The DOD Respond?
U.S. forces have long enjoyed air superiority on the battlefield. Air superiority
not only allows soldiers to maneuver without fear of reprisal, but it also
provides them the security to build large bases and operate sophisticated
supply chains, as well as the luxury of planning when and where to strike the
enemy. The Gulf War of 1991 illustrated how air superiority and the ability
to maneuver ground forces in secret can create significant tactical advantage.
While Iraqi forces hunkered down in Kuwait anticipating an amphibious
invasion, the coalition forces used airpower to help ground forces “swing
around” Iraqi defense in Kuwait (see photo on page 28).

The Navy is not the only military service with programs that have run over
schedule and budget. For the Air Force, the F-35 program’s lifecycle program
cost is likely to exceed $1.7 trillion.6 Also, the Air Force’s KC-46 tanker is
restricted in the operations it can perform, has cost Boeing $5 billion in
unanticipated fixes and was characterized as a $226 million “lemon” by Rep.
Rob Wittman, R-Virginia, in a June 2021 Armed Services Committee hearing.7

The 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (2nd ACR) provided the punch to the
campaign against Iraqi forces. During an 82-hour span, the 2nd ACR moved
120 miles and engaged elements of five different Iraqi divisions. At the
Battle of 73 Easting on Feb. 26, 1991, the 2nd ACR fought alongside the 1st
Infantry Division’s (1st ID) two leading brigades against elements of the Iraqi
12th Armored Division and the Tawakalna Division of the Iraqi Republican
Guard. Even though the U.S. forces were outnumbered, the 2nd ACR and 1st
ID destroyed 160 tanks, 180 personnel carriers, 12 artillery pieces and more
than 80 wheeled vehicles, effectively wiping out several Iraqi brigades.

5 Congressional Research Service, “Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and
Issues for Congress,” June 7, 2021.
6 https://www.stripes.com/news/us/pentagon-reportedly-estimates-that-the-f-35-budget-plan-is-running-10billion-short-through-2025-1.644700.
7 https://www.defensenews.com/air/2021/06/17/more-cost-overruns-are-coming-down-the-line-for-boeingas-the-kc-46-program-logs-another-two-technical-deficiencies/.

8 https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/the-commandant-of-the-marine-corps-is-charging-into-the-future-butsome-arent-ready-for-change/ar-AAMpBsS.
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air defense systems and military personnel. The widespread use of drones
allowed Azerbaijan to attack Armenia’s command and control and supply
elements, which were positioned behind the front lines. Armenian forces found
themselves unable to resupply, limited in maneuver and exposed to attacks on
a constant basis. Azerbaijani forces secured a decisive victory, in part due to
the widespread use of unmanned aircraft.
The list of countries and nonstate actors using drones continues to grow,
increasing the threat to U.S. forces around the globe. The Iranian Revolutionary
Guard aptly demonstrated this potential threat when it claimed it had
overflown the USS Nimitz with an unmanned aircraft as it passed through the
Strait of Hormuz in 2020 (see photo on page 29).9 It’s not much of a leap to
envision a future where the battlefield is dominated by unmanned aircraft and
vehicles, and large manned platforms represent targets of opportunity.

M-1A1 ABRAMS FROM THE 3RD ARMORED DIVISION: OPERATION DESERT STORM, 1991.
U.S. NATIONAL ARCHIVES

The Battle of 73 Easting may well have been the last time that U.S. forces fight
a major tank-on-tank battle. The Gulf War demonstrated the foolishness of
engaging the U.S. military in force-on-force combat. While the U.S. continued
to wield advanced weaponry on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan into
this century, the enemy had learned that direct engagement was an unwise,
if not deadly, decision. During these conflicts, our forces found themselves
engaged in a low-intensity conflict where the enemy often used cheap
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to counter the technological advantages of
the U.S. military.
A seismic shift is now underway on the modern battlefield. In the fall of 2020,
Armenia and Azerbaijan engaged in an armed conflict over the territory of
Nagorno-Karabakh. What differentiated this conflict was Azerbaijan’s heavy
use of drones against Armenian forces (see photo below). The Azerbaijanis
procured drones from Israel and Turkey and also converted older manned
aircraft to unmanned aircraft. This drone-centric strategy included the use
of “kamikaze drones,” which dove into targets with an explosive load.
These drone strikes inflicted serious losses among Armenian tanks, artillery,
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AZERBAIJAN DRONE STRIKE ON AN ARMENIAN TANK. AZERBAIJAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, SEPTEMBER
2020. HTTPS://WWW.YOUTUBE.COM/WATCH?V=0Y7IUN8UQ-U

9 h
 ttps://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1426268/World-War-3-fears-iran-drone-footage-aircraft-carrierUS-warship-video-vn.

Hampton Roads has long built and maintained large ships and
submarines, platforms that are increasingly vulnerable to the
cybersecurity and drone revolutions on the modern battlefield.
As costs rise, the DOD is faced with the choice of maintaining
current weapons systems or investing in modernization
efforts. Currently, many of our “new” weapons programs are
evolutions of existing platforms: a newer carrier, submarine,
fighter aircraft, bomber or wheeled vehicle.

IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD DRONE PHOTO OF THE USS NIMITZ, JULY 2020. HTTPS://WWW.
THEGUARDIAN.COM/WORLD/2020/SEP/23/IRAN-DRONE-US-AIRCRAFT-CARRIER-REPORT

The U.S. military is facing asymmetries in warfare and cost structure. Tanks
and armored personnel carriers require long supply chains and are vulnerable
to IEDs and drone attacks. The F-35 costs $36,000 an hour to operate and
requires sophisticated supply chains, as well as large air bases. The Navy’s
carriers are increasingly expensive to procure, test and, eventually, operate
at sea. The Air Force’s MQ-9 Reaper drone is more capable than the Turkish
Bayraktar TB2 (used by an increasing number of countries) but is also
estimated to be six times more expensive than the Turkish drone.
While history generally does not repeat, when it comes to weapons systems,
the current U.S. warfare strategy echoes that of battleship-centric countries
after World War I. Once considered crucial to naval power, battleships were
soon outdated due to the rise of naval aviation. Innovation diminished the
utility of these large warships; the last one commissioned by the United States
was the USS Missouri in 1944. By 1960, the last battleship ever built, the HMS
Vanguard, was sold for scrap.
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We are at an inflection point in military affairs. Unmanned
combat aircraft will be followed by unmanned ships and
submarines. The Turkish Bayraktar TB2 can loiter above the
battlefield for 27 hours without refueling and at a fraction
of the cost of a manned aircraft. The DOD, at some point,
will have to pivot toward newer weapons systems that are
cheaper, quicker to build and more autonomous. When this
happens, our military services will need fewer soldiers,
sailors, airmen and Marines. Instead of an aircraft carrier with
5,000 sailors, imagine a drone cargo carrier with hundreds
of unmanned (and expendable) aircraft and only hundreds
of sailors. Hampton Roads would not fare well in such a
transition.
Change is coming. It may not be today or tomorrow, but within
years the force structure of the U.S. military will need to adapt
to the advances in technology or have change forced upon it
on a future battlefield. The question for us in Hampton Roads
is whether we will realize early enough that diversification of
the economic base is no longer a luxury but a necessity for the
continued vitality of the region.
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Home Is Where The Heart Is
(If You Can Afford It)
Five years ago, the tale of the Hampton Roads real estate market was spun
around the lasting impact of the Great Recession. Foreclosures continued
to retard growth in single-family home prices, and while sales of previously
owned homes were increasing, there was nostalgia for the “good years” prior
to the recession. The onset of the pandemic brought a measure of worry, but
this was quickly set aside as sales and valuations continued to increase in
2020. Now, with 2021 drawing to a close, the losses of the Great Recession
have been cast aside as the housing market continues to surge to new heights.
Graph 16 illustrates the seasonal nature of the Hampton Roads housing market
and the transitory impact of the COVID-19 economic shock. Sales of existing
single-family homes increased from 2,810 in July 2019 to 3,175 in July 2020,
a jump of 13%. In 2021, sales continued to bound upward, with the number of
homes sold rising by 30.6% from April 2020 to April 2021, 38.2% from May
2020 to May 2021 and 28.9% from June 2020 to June 2021. There were
numerous reports of sellers receiving multiple offers above the asking price and
entering into sales contracts within days of listing their homes.
There are, as economists are fond of saying, two sides of a market. Low
interest rates, coupled with a K-shaped economic shock that left salaried
workers largely unaffected, meant that demand for single-family homes
continued to rise during a global pandemic. On the other hand, the supply
side of the housing market contracted as the inventory of homes for sale fell
precipitously in 2020 and into 2021 (Graph 17). The inventory of existing
homes declined by more than half (53.5%) between June 2019 and June
2021. Falling inventories were largely due to brisk sales relative to new listings
coming on the market. With demand increasing and supply falling, there was
only one direction for median housing prices to go, and that was up.
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As shown in Graph 18, the median sales price climbed from $237,300 (June
2018) to $245,000 (June 2019) to $254,900 (June 2020) to $289,900 (June
2021). We remind the reader that Hampton Roads was just emerging from the
trough of the pandemic shock in May 2020, yet the real estate market barely
seemed to notice the economic turmoil. The first half of 2021 was a seller’s
market, with prices climbing through the spring and into summer.
While the real estate market has been, to borrow a term from ESPN, “en
fuego” for the last three years, we must also avoid recency bias. We need only
return to 2007, when real estate and equities were a “sure thing” and one
could “never lose.” Rising inflation and deficits will likely lead to increasing
interest rates sooner rather than later. As capital becomes more expensive, the
market for homes will cool and the rapid gains of recent times will retreat into
memory. It may be time to be more, rather than less, cautious about how the
real estate market will perform over the coming 24 months.

GRAPH 16
GRAPH 16

Number of Existing Single-Family Homes Sold:
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GRAPH 17
GRAPH 17

Inventory of Existing Single-Family Residential Homes:
INVENTORY OF EXISTING SINGLE-FAMILY RESIDENTIAL HOMES:
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Sources: Real Estate Information Network and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Data are not seasonally adjusted.
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Median Price of Existing Single-Family Homes Sold:
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The Port: Fair Winds
But Troubled Seas
The Port of Virginia’s performance over the last decade illustrates the
importance of effective management even as the Port struggled to retain market
share. A return to profitability and increasing levels of cargo traffic boded
well for the Port prior to the pandemic. The Port was not without challenges,
however, as the Trump administration’s ill-advised trade conflicts undermined
trade with China and Europe. At the start of 2020, even with these challenges,
the Port could look forward to another year of growth.
By May 2020, however, traffic at the Port of Virginia had plummeted, with
loaded 20-foot equivalent container units (TEUs) falling 23% from May 2019
(Graph 19). Yet, the Port proved markedly resilient. By September 2020,
loaded TEU traffic had eclipsed 2019 levels, and approximately 24,000
more TEUs crossed through the Port in December 2020 than December 2019.
Loaded TEU flows through the Port continued to increase in 2021, and it set
a record for total loaded TEUs in May 2021. Empty TEUs (which are, as the
name suggests, empty) also set a record in May 2021, as these containers
were shipped from the Port to other locations.
Import and export loaded TEU flows have increased in 2021 (Graph 20).
Compared to May 2019, loaded TEU export traffic in May 2021 increased
by 13.2%. Loaded TEU import flows, on the other hand, increased by 21.2%
from May 2019 to May 2021. The sustained increases in imports are another
signal of the ongoing economic recovery in the United States, as American
consumers’ demand for imported goods continues to increase.
Graph 21 displays the share of total loaded TEUs for four major East Coast
ports from 2006 to 2021. Two phenomena are readily observable: the rise of
the Port of Savannah and the relative decline of the Port of New York/New
Jersey. As for the Port of Virginia, its market share in 2020 was the same as it
was in 2011; the Port’s market share has varied somewhat year to year, but it
has not managed to grab a larger share of the market over time.
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This is the challenge the Port must address in the coming years, since its
competitors are not standing still.
To its credit, the Port of Virginia has invested in facilities and technology
to handle more cargo. The Commonwealth and the federal government
are putting money into dredging the port channel to accommodate more
traffic. These efforts are indeed laudable. Improving the infrastructure in and
surrounding the Port is crucial to attracting cargo traffic.
Undoubtedly, the Port of Virginia provides fuel for the region’s economic
engine. The challenge now facing the Port is to ward off the rise of competitors
and to gain and sustain market share. What is beyond the Port’s control is
whether economic activity in Virginia and surrounding states will be sufficiently
robust to enable it to achieve this goal.

GRAPH 19
GRAPH 19

Total and Loaded 20-Foot Equivalent Container Units (TEUs):
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GRAPH 20
GRAPH 20

Export and Import Loaded 20-Foot Equivalent Container Units (TEUs):
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Sources: Virginia Port Authority and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Data are not seasonally adjusted.

20

36

THE STATE OF THE REGION | HAMPTON ROADS 2021

May/21

Apr/21

Mar/21

Feb/21

Jan/21

Dec/20

Nov/20

Oct/20

Jul/20

Jun/20

May/20

Apr/20

-

Mar/20

Feb/20

Jan/20

Dec/19

Nov/19

Oct/19

Sep/19

Aug/19

Jul/19

Jun/19

May/19

Apr/19

Mar/19

Feb/19

Jan/19

-

Sep/20

68,594

60,000

Aug/20

70,000

GRAPH 21
GRAPH 21

Share of Total Loaded TEUs for Selected East Coast Ports,*
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A Recession For Some, A
Recovery For Others
Much of the economic news in 2021 has been good. Retail sales are up,
employers are hiring, unemployment rolls are declining and trade volumes
are up. Inflation remains a concern, given the trillions of dollars of fiscal and
monetary stimulus pumped into the national economy over the past 18 months.
America may be on the road to recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, but
for some, the economic shock continues to linger.
Graph 22 illustrates that the shock in 2020 was concentrated among hourly
workers. While average employment for salaried workers dipped nationally
by approximately 500,000 from 2019 to 2020, hourly employment declined
by 9 million Americans. Among salaried workers, male employment declined
by about 500,000 (1.5%) while female employment slipped by approximately
100,000 (0.4%). For salaried workers, the pandemic, in general, created a bit
of mild economic turbulence.
National data reveal the economic damage wrought on
hourly workers. One in 10 hourly workers lost employment
in 2020; male employment fell by 4.1 million (10%) and
female employment dropped by 4.9 million (11.8%). While
salaried workers encountered only mild economic turbulence
in 2020, hourly workers found themselves on a plane with
pilots suffering from food poisoning, an engine on fire and all
nearby airports unavailable due to heavy fog. This economic
trauma may help explain why workers quit their jobs at
record rates in early summer 2021.
Who was affected by the economic shock is more than an academic question.
It has implications for both those who will experience income and wealth gains
during the recovery and those who will face continued economic hardship.
Diving into the data, we unearth two observations, one surprising and one
familiar. Our first observation is that while the number of Asian Americans in
the labor force declined by 1.4% from February 2020 to June 2021, Asian
American employment fell by 4.7% (Graph 23). The decline in employment

38

THE STATE OF THE REGION | HAMPTON ROADS 2021

among Asian American workers was similar to that for Blacks, whites and
Hispanics, but it was relatively larger when compared to the decline in the
labor force. Two factors appeared to contribute to this ahistorical rise in
unemployment. First, many Asian American workers were more likely to be
employed by businesses engaged in person-to-person services (restaurants,
bars, small stores) that experienced the greatest shock from the pandemic.10
Second, unemployed Asian American workers were more likely to be among
the ranks of the long-term unemployed (27 weeks of unemployment or longer).
A third (and perhaps not entirely surprising) observation is that even though
Black and white workers left the labor force at roughly the same rate, Black
employment fell more than white employment.
Graph 24 provides data on the change in the labor force and employment by
race and gender. The number of white men in the labor force declined by 2.3%
from February 2020 to June 2021. Over the same period, the number of Black
men in the labor force increased by 1.4%. However, employment dropped by
4.8% and 2.9% for white and Black men, respectively. For women, the declines
were more pronounced. The number of Black and white women in the labor
force declined by 3.5% and 2.6%, respectively, over the same period. While
employment of white women declined by 4.8% from February 2020 to June
2021, Black women’s employment dropped by 7.2%.
Even when the pandemic recedes in the rearview mirror, there will be lasting
economic damage. For hourly workers, especially those in the leisure and
hospitality, education and public health, and local government sectors, the last
18 months have not been kind. For some of these employees, scant savings
have been depleted, housing has been lost and remote schooling has left many
minority children further behind their peers. The challenge will be to remember
those who suffered the most even as the good times roll on for many of us.

10 h
 ttps://www.marketwatch.com/story/asian-american-businesses-are-dealing-with-two-viruses-reeling-fromracist-incidents-many-are-hurting-financially-during-covid-19-11613610159.
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Wage and Salaried Workers:
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GRAPH 23
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Change in Civilian Labor Force and Employment by Race:
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Change in Civilian Labor Force and Employment by Selected Race and Gender:
CHANGE IN CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE AND EMPLOYMENT BY SELECTED RACE AND GENDER:
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Final Thoughts
Over the past 18 months, Hampton Roads residents have experienced school
closures, widespread job loss, restrictions on social activities and, more
recently, some semblance of a return to normality. The COVID-19 pandemic
and economic shock exposed the impact of disinformation on our social
discourse, politics and public health. Now, as economic activity picks up, we
can look forward to a brighter future if we decide to work together to diversify
the regional economy, combat those who would undermine our efforts to
improve public health and leverage our existing strengths to remind the nation
of our engineering mettle, scientific prowess and efforts to lead in renewable
energy.
A return to the prepandemic status quo is both attractive and
dangerous. Hampton Roads will undoubtedly continue to
play a vital role in the nation’s defense. However, we have
seen over the last decade how dependence on decisions in
Washington, D.C., can sink even the best efforts to promote
regional economic development.
It is time to move beyond quiet discussions of the “D” word:
that is, diversification of the region’s economic base. We can be
an asset to the national defense and work to seek additional
sources of economic vitality. However, we must escape the pull
of inertia and history. Too often, talk of reform has ebbed as
budgetary conditions have improved in Congress. Now, as we
emerge from a historic economic shock, is the time to be bold.
One effort to encourage conversations on diversification has appeared in the
form of the 757 Recovery and Resilience Action Framework, self-described
as “a game plan created by and for the 757’s business community to help
accelerate the region’s economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic.”
We applaud the private and public discussions on how to not only recover
from the pandemic’s economic shock, but also how to foster coordination and
cooperation among the cities and counties in Hampton Roads. If there is one
lesson of the pandemic, it is that we are all in this together.
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A focus on key industries (renewable energy, advanced manufacturing,
cybersecurity, health services) is important. The question is whether this effort
will survive as economic growth accelerates and the immediate need for crisis
response fades. Cynics will note that the dustbin of history in Hampton Roads is
littered with attempts to improve collaboration among its cities and counties.
To paraphrase Ronald Reagan, we will trust the region’s leaders to keep
pushing forward, but will also objectively verify whether their efforts bear fruit
over time.
One recommendation for enhancing our economic outlook is to encourage
the region’s high-quality medical institutions to foster the development of an
“education-medical” center. Hampton Roads is fortunate to be home to Eastern
Virginia Medical School (EVMS) and several institutions of higher education.
EVMS and Old Dominion University bring in approximately $100 million in
federally funded research annually; to put this in context, that’s about 10% of
the federal research funding awarded to Johns Hopkins University each year.
Merely wishing that we could double or triple our federal research funds will
bear no fruit. We must realize that an education-medical complex is only
possible if all the major players agree to set aside their parochial interests and
come together. This effort will be a heavy lift, but in its favor is the fact that
Sentara Healthcare brings financial resources and know-how to the table to
complement the capabilities of EVMS and ODU. We believe that an educationmedical center built around Sentara-EVMS-ODU and other higher education
institutions is not only necessary, but also central to the region’s growth.
We need only look north to Richmond to see how the battle
over the merger of Medical College of Virginia and Richmond
Professional Institute to form Virginia Commonwealth
University (VCU) played out. There was such opposition to
this merger that the General Assembly stipulated the Medical
College of Virginia would retain its name in perpetuity.
Today, VCU is the Richmond area’s only Level 1 trauma center.
Newsweek recently ranked VCU third best among all Virginia
hospitals and in the Top 100 of all U.S. hospitals.

VCU’s efforts in creating an education-medical center are
illustrated in its ability to attract research funding. VCU
reached $310 million in sponsored research funding in FY
2019, of which $90 million came from the National Institutes
of Health. Building an education-medical center in Hampton
Roads will not take place overnight, but, unlike other gambles
to spur growth, it is more likely to lead to higher-paying jobs
and economic expansion in the long term.
Another recommendation (which has been made before but is worth repeating)
is to consolidate public services across the cities and counties of Hampton
Roads. How many library systems, fire departments, and police and sheriff
departments are necessary for a region of 1.7 million people? Each local
system requires an administrative support structure. As Parkinson’s law notes,
“work expands so as to fill the time available for its completion,” and the
numerous, duplicative administrative structures in our region are no exception.
If a trip to the General Assembly is needed to obtain the appropriate legal
authorities, taxpayers would surely be supportive of such an effort to lower
costs and increase efficiency.
None of these proposals is easy. If they were, they would already be
undertaken. They will require time, consensus and concerted effort. In 2020,
the COVID-19 pandemic spurred many discussions and calls for action. Now,
as we approach 2022, we must avoid the sense that we have done enough,
that we have endured, and that is sufficient. Benjamin E. Mays, who is credited
with laying the intellectual foundations of the civil rights movement in this
country, aptly observed: “The tragedy of life is often not in our failure, but
rather in our complacency; not in our doing too much, but rather in our doing
too little; not in our living above our ability, but rather in our living below our
capacities.”
Now is the time for Hampton Roads to strive to do too much, rather than too
little. Yes, there is a chance we may fail, but if we do not resolve to be bold,
our only success will be measured by the degree of our timidity.
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Bounce Back?
The Pandemic and
Tourism in Hampton Roads

BOUNCE BACK? THE PANDEMIC AND
TOURISM IN HAMPTON ROADS
It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the
epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of light, it was the season of darkness, it was the
spring of hope, it was the winter of despair.
– Charles Dickens, “A Tale of Two Cities”

O

ver the last 24 months, the Hampton Roads tourism industry has set several records. In 2019, traditional hoteliers reported a record $892 million in
revenue. Monthly Airbnb revenue in the region reached $17 million in August 2019. Tens of thousands of visitors flocked to events such as Something
in the Water, the Virginia International Tattoo and the North American Sand Soccer Championships, among others. Occupancy, revenue and revenue
per available room (RevPAR) were all on the rise in early 2020, and a sense of optimism infused the industry.

Within months, more records were set, although these records were not ones to
be announced with fanfare. Monthly hotel revenue in Hampton Roads declined
by an astonishing 76.6%, from $78.1 million in April 2019 to $18.3 million
in April 2020. In Williamsburg, monthly hotel revenue disappeared almost
completely. Williamsburg hotels generated $18.1 million in revenue in April
2019, but a year later, revenue fell precipitously to $846,743, a collapse
of 95.3%. Reported occupancy rates fell below 40% in many of the region’s
cities, domestic and international travel plummeted to record lows and layoffs
rocketed upward. Optimism, unlike hotel rooms, was in short supply.
Now, in the second half of 2021, we find ourselves in a markedly different
environment. Heightened consumer and business expectations have increased
interest in domestic travel and tourism. Hotels in Hampton Roads have fared
well in this recovery compared to the nation. While hotel revenue in the
region for June 2021 was 10% higher compared to the same month in 2019,
nationally, hotel revenue was down by 12%. The region’s tourism recovery has
been relatively strong and thus far sustained.
As with other sectors of the regional economy, the COVID-19 pandemic
continues to linger over prospects for an even more robust recovery. The rise
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in infections, hospitalizations and deaths among the unvaccinated compared
to the fully vaccinated underscores the question of whether employers should
require vaccinations for employees working in the tourism sector. Difficulties
in attracting and retaining talent will also likely persist in the coming months,
and it is unknown whether international workers will return in large numbers
in 2022. Yet, even with these headwinds, prospects for the coming year
are continuing to improve barring another virulent COVID-19 variant or
unexpected economic shock.
In this chapter, we explore the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the
Hampton Roads tourism industry. We delve into how traditional hoteliers
were affected and compare their performance with that of short-term renters
(Airbnb, VRBO and others). While the pace of recovery has not been uniform,
hotels and short-term rentals outperformed the overall economy in Hampton
Roads in the first half of 2021.

Years To Remember:
2019 And 2020
2019 and 2020 were years for the history books when it comes to the
Hampton Roads tourism industry, albeit for dramatically different reasons.
In 2019, hotel revenue set a new record. It was the year that saw the debut
of Something in the Water, a music festival that garnered national attention,
and a period when a number of traditional hotels continued to move upscale.
Conversely, 2020 was a year many in the hotel industry would like to forget,
marked by record declines in revenue, occupancy and staffing.
Graph 1 presents the shares of each of the Hampton Roads hotel markets in
2019. Virginia Beach claimed the greatest share of hotel revenue (38.3%),
followed by Williamsburg (19.2%). The other markets each comprised roughly
14% of the regional market.
Graph 2 displays nominal and real (inflation-adjusted) hotel revenue for
Hampton Roads from 2000 to 2020. Nominal hotel revenue had climbed from
the post-Great Recession low of $658 million in 2013 to $892 million in 2019.
In 2020, nominal and real revenues both fell by more than 33%. The level of
nominal revenue reverted to a level not seen since 2002, while real revenue
declined to a point not observed this century.
While the declines in hotel revenue, rooms rented and revenue per available
room (RevPAR) were broad-based in Hampton Roads, Virginia and the United
States, most of the markets in our region fared better than the state or nation
in 2020. Hotel revenue declined by almost half in the Commonwealth and the
U.S., but most markets in Hampton Roads observed declines of 30% or less
(Graph 3). Exceptions were the Norfolk-Portsmouth market, where revenue
declined by 32.7%, and the Williamsburg market, where it dropped an
astounding 64%.
The annual data mask the collapse of hotel revenue in Williamsburg during
the depths of the pandemic’s economic shock. In August 2019, monthly hotel
revenue peaked at $21.5 million (Graph 4). With the onset of the pandemic,
monthly revenue declined to $7.5 million (February 2020), $4.7 million

(March 2020) and $846,423 (April 2020). In the span of only three months,
hotel revenue in the Williamsburg market declined 88.8%. While revenue has
increased from the low of April 2020, it remains well below 2019 levels. In
June 2021, monthly hotel revenue reached $17.7 million. While this was a
514% increase from June 2020, it hides the fact that June 2021 revenue was
6% lower than in June 2019.
Why did many of the markets in Hampton Roads fare relatively better in 2020
than Virginia and the United States, and why did Williamsburg fare significantly
worse? In the case of Williamsburg, the number of hotel rooms rented fell by
more than 50% and, in some months, occupancy rates dropped below 20%
(Graph 5). The declines in revenue occurred primarily because hoteliers had
to lower prices in the face of slumping demand; higher-end hotels were more
severely impacted. Compared to other markets, the Hampton Roads hotel
industry relies more on leisure and transient guests and is not as dependent on
large events, such as conventions, conferences, concerts and the like.
RevPAR is a key measure of performance in the hotel industry,
as it represents both the demand (revenue) and supply
(available rooms) sides of the market. As shown in Graph 6,
RevPAR declined by almost 35% from 2019 to 2020 in Hampton
Roads. It must be pointed out that the actual decline in RevPAR
was likely higher, since some hotels either significantly reduced
the supply of rooms or closed temporarily during the depths
of the pandemic. In any case, in 2020, Hampton Roads hotels
earned about a third less than they did in 2019.
We would be remiss if we did not point out the large and
negative influence of the Williamsburg market on this
measure. RevPAR in Williamsburg declined an astonishing
60.6% from 2019 to 2020. Simply put, the COVID-19 pandemic
had a devastating impact on the city’s hotel industry. Major
attractions, like Busch Gardens and Water Country USA,
were closed due to the pandemic. With Colonial Williamsburg
already experiencing a downturn in visits prior to the
pandemic, this latest economic shock is likely to reverberate
throughout Hampton Roads for years to come.
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GRAPH 1
GRAPH 1

Estimated Shares of Hotel Room Revenue:
ESTIMATED SHARES OF HOTEL ROOM REVENUE:
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Sources: STR Trend Report, January 2021, and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University

Sources: STR Trend Report, January 2021, and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University
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GRAPH 2
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Nominal and Real Hotel Revenue:
NOMINAL AND REAL HOTEL REVENUE:
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BOUNCE BACK GRAPHS
GRAPH 3
GRAPH 3
Percentage Change in Hotel Revenue in Selected Markets:
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2021: A Recovery Coming
Into Sight
Hoteliers in Hampton Roads fared better (mostly) than their counterparts
elsewhere in the United States and experienced a more robust recovery
through early summer 2021. Graph 7 highlights the percentage change in
monthly hotel revenue for selected months from 2019 to 2021. We chose 2019
as the basis of comparison, as the shock in 2020 would bias our conclusions
about the recovery progress. While hotel revenue was still 33% below 2019
levels in June 2021 among the nation’s top 25 hotel markets, monthly revenue
was up 10% in Hampton Roads compared to the same month in 2019.
By the summer of 2021, conditions had improved markedly at the local level
in Hampton Roads. Graph 8 displays the percentage change in RevPAR for the
region’s markets. While RevPAR through June 2021 was down by more than
30% for the United States and Virginia, it was down by only 2.1% for Hampton
Roads. The Williamsburg market was starting to rebound but still down 15.3%
when compared to 2019, Newport News-Hampton was down by 12.2% and
Norfolk-Portsmouth was down by nearly 10%. On the other hand, RevPAR in
the Virginia Beach market was 7.3% higher than for the same time period in
2019. In the Chesapeake-Suffolk market, RevPAR increased by 5% through
June 2021.
The Hampton Roads hotel industry recovered faster from the
COVID-19 pandemic than almost any other market in the
United States. While regional economic performance lagged
that of Virginia and the nation in the first half of 2021, the
regional hotel industry proved markedly resilient in most
Hampton Roads cities. This recovery is even more striking
considering the numerous reports of staffing challenges in the
industry.
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The rapid recovery in the Virginia Beach and ChesapeakeSuffolk markets bodes well for Hampton Roads. Most of
the other markets in the region should fully recover by the
summer of 2022 (if not earlier). The obvious concern is the
Williamsburg market. The overall performance of this market
may have more to do with structural issues within Colonial
Williamsburg than recovery from the COVID-19 economic
shock. If so, Williamsburg may face a longer recovery period
than the rest of Hampton Roads.
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GRAPH 8
GRAPH 8
Percentage Change in Revenue Per Available Room in Selected Markets:
PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN REVENUE PER AVAILABLE ROOM IN SELECTED MARKETS:
Hampton Roads, Virginia and the United States, YTD June 2019-YTD June 2021
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Airbnb Navigates Its Way
Through The Pandemic
The rise of Airbnb from its humble beginnings is a remarkable story. Starting in
2008 with the rental of an air mattress in San Francisco, Airbnb has become
one of the largest (if not the largest) short-term rental companies in terms of
listings, funding and name recognition. It continues to expand its business
model, offering “experiences” (hosted tours) and an increasing number of
connections to travel websites. To track Airbnb business in Hampton Roads,
we use data from AirDNA (a private company not associated with Airbnb) to
examine listings, revenue and occupancy of Airbnb-hosted properties.1
Graph 9 illustrates the meteoric rise of Airbnb in Hampton Roads. In October
2014, the first month for which data are available, monthly Airbnb revenue in
the region was approximately $61,000. By July 2016, peak monthly revenue
reached $2.16 million. In October 2018, peak monthly revenue had jumped
to $13 million, and another monthly record was set in July 2019, with monthly
revenue of $16.7 million. Airbnb revenue in July 2020 set yet another record,
coinciding with the “reopening” of the regional economy.
Graph 10 presents the shares of each of the markets in Hampton Roads for
2019. Virginia Beach dominated Airbnb listings and revenue in the region,
accounting for 66.1% of revenue in 2019. Williamsburg (14.6%) and NorfolkPortsmouth (12.3%) were the next largest markets in the region. Newport
News-Hampton (5%) and Chesapeake-Suffolk (2%) had relatively few Airbnb
listings and low revenue in 2019.

$35.8 million in 2020. Off-peak revenue, however, was lower, and this trend
continued into 2021. Comparing the first five months of the year for Airbnb in
Virginia Beach, revenue was $23.7 million, $17.4 million and $10.5 million in
2019, 2020 and 2021, respectively. If there is a modicum of good news, it is
that the percentage decline in revenue relative to 2019 steadily decreased by
the spring of 2021.
While the COVID-19 economic shock to the traditional hotel
industry in Hampton Roads led to double-digit declines in
occupancy, revenue and RevPAR, the impact on the short-term
rental industry was decidedly less pronounced. Annual Airbnb
revenue in the region fell from $100.3 million in 2019 to $92.9
million in 2020. This 7.4% decline paled in comparison to the
35.2% decline in hotel revenue across the region.
Airbnb experienced a rough start in 2021, however. Monthly
revenue for January was down approximately 50% when
compared to 2019. The short-term rental market has
recovered, but not as quickly as that for traditional hotels in
the region. By May 2021, monthly Airbnb revenue was only
20% lower than for the same month in 2019. If all goes well,
the short-term rental industry should be back on track by the
spring of 2022.

Virginia Beach, accounting for approximately 6 of every 10 dollars in 2019
Airbnb revenue, has been the focal point of short-term rentals in Hampton
Roads. Graph 11 provides insight into monthly Airbnb revenue from
Virginia Beach listings, January 2019 to May 2021. Revenues in 2020 were
approximately $8.1 million less than in 2019. However, these losses were not
spread evenly throughout the year. Revenue for the peak vacation months (May
through September) was essentially the same – $36.9 million in 2019 and
1 A
 irbnb does not provide open access to its data. We rely on data from AirDNA, which tracks the performance
of listings and predicts whether or not properties are booked. For more information, see www.airdna.co/
methodology.
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GRAPH 9
GRAPH 9

Airbnb Revenue in Hampton Roads,
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Sources: AirDNA (2021) and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University

Sources: AirDNA (2021) and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University
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GRAPH 10
GRAPH 10

Estimated Shares of Airbnb Revenue:
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GRAPH 11
GRAPH 11

Airbnb Revenue:
AIRBNB REVENUE:
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Risk, Comfort And Airbnb
Recent research suggests that tourists’ risk perceptions increased significantly
during the pandemic. Tourists, hotel staff and short-term hosts all expressed
concern about the possibility of contracting the coronavirus. It should have
been no surprise when hotels and short-term rental companies announced new
cleaning protocols and other measures to mitigate the risk of transmission.2
These measures, however, imposed additional costs at the same time
reservations and revenue were under significant pressure. Short-term rental
hosts noted that, unlike traditional hoteliers, they were unlikely to qualify for
government aid, and some short-term hosts left the industry.3 As listings and
revenues declined worldwide, Airbnb laid off 1,900 of its 7,500 employees.4
Yet, in Hampton Roads, the percentage decline in Airbnb revenue for 2020
was markedly less than that experienced by the traditional hotel sector.
What factors might explain why Airbnb outperformed its more established
competitors in our region as well as other areas of the country?
One possible explanation is that, unlike traditional hotels, Airbnb listings
offered more opportunities for social distancing. Also, over time, the trend in
Airbnb listings has shifted toward multiroom, entire-place properties. Airbnb
no longer should be thought of primarily in terms of empty nesters renting
spare rooms in the back of the house. Despite the decline in revenue last year,
the Hampton Roads share of Airbnb revenue originating from entire-place
properties increased from 90.5% in 2019 to 92.8% in 2020. During the
pandemic, if someone was going to travel, they were likely more comfortable
in having an entire property to themselves than staying in a traditional hotel.
Another explanation for Airbnb’s relative success is that Hampton Roads likely
benefited from the near shutdown of international travel and the significant
reduction in domestic tourism. Instead of traveling to other parts of the country
or internationally, those who did take vacations found themselves traveling to
their “backyard.” Strong defense spending in the region also may have helped
offset some of the losses from domestic and international tourism.

Yet another factor to be considered is that Airbnb supply is sensitive to market
conditions. Unlike traditional hoteliers, Airbnb property owners can bring
their properties on market (or take them off market) with little notice. During
the pandemic, highly desirable properties that commanded a premium were
more likely to remain listed, while less-desirable properties that may have been
listed previously for large events fell by the wayside. Knowing this, higher-end
property owners may have been able to command a premium for their rentals
during the pandemic, unlike hoteliers, who had to reduce room rates in the
face of slumping demand.

Final Thoughts
The tourism industry is one of the three pillars of the Hampton Roads economy.
As evidenced by the shock to the hotel industry, COVID-19 clearly was
responsible for fewer people visiting and spending money in our region. The
leisure and hospitality sector accounted for the largest number of layoffs in
Hampton Roads in 2020, and while demand has increased in 2021, some
of the region’s markets still face an uphill climb. Inoculations have contributed
to a measure of economic resurgence, but overcoming vaccine hesitancy and
resistance among the unvaccinated adult population is key to a sustained
recovery.
Surprisingly, amid the pandemic, Airbnb properties fared relatively well in
Hampton Roads. Explanations abound as to why Airbnb revenues did not
decline as much as those in the traditional hotel sector, or at the same pace
seen in other U.S. metropolitan areas. Perhaps the simplest explanation is best:
Airbnb listings in Hampton Roads offered a respite to those traveling during
the pandemic. Whether these properties were safer than traditional hotels
is a matter of debate. What cannot be debated is the performance of these
short-term rental properties in 2020. Now, with the traditional hotel sector on
the rebound, the question is whether the short-term rental sector will lag as
vaccinations increase and consumer confidence grows. Time will tell.

2 h
 ttps://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/JTF-02-2020-0014/full/html.
3 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0278431920302152#bib0250.
4 https://news.airbnb.com/a-message-from-co-founder-and-ceo-brian-chesky/.
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Earn While You Learn:
The Apprentice School at
Newport News Shipbuilding

EARN WHILE YOU LEARN: THE APPRENTICE SCHOOL
AT NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING
Young people learn through observation, imitation, trial and error, and reiteration; in other words, through force of
experience. Though professionalism and care are expected, perfection is not. Adult mentors hold the discipline for the
apprentice, sequencing and controlling task demands to keep them on the constructive side of difficulty. They direct
apprentices’ attention, demonstrate and sometimes collaborate.
– Robert Halpern, “The Means to Grow Up: Reinventing Apprenticeship as a
Developmental Support in Adolescence”

P

ublications like Forbes and The Wall Street Journal increasingly highlight a conundrum facing companies and the education system in the United States.
Firms are complaining that they have plenty of job openings, but the education system is failing to train students in the skills needed to fill them. Hampton
Roads, like other regions, suffers from this “skill mismatch” – the divergence between the skills students are taught and employers’ needs in the job
market. According to a recent report,1 firms in Hampton Roads are struggling to find entry-level and middle-skill employees in key growth sectors, such

as advanced manufacturing. Other positions that are difficult to fill locally include trades, such as technician, mechatronics/repair technician, welder, shipbuilder,
pipefitter and machinist, along with warehouse and packing personnel. These jobs are not only high paying, but also critical to the economic vitality of the region.
Several recent presidential administrations have pushed to solve this
problem by increasing the number of apprenticeships. An age-old practice,
apprenticeships allow individuals to earn a paycheck while receiving
supervised training and work-based learning in conjunction with academic
instruction. Indeed, apprentices are both student-employees and employeestudents. The apprenticeship model has been a mainstream route to career
success in many European countries; however, it has struggled to gain a
foothold in the United States.1

There is a lot to like about apprenticeships. They provide
benefits to both employers and workers. Workers experience
a smoother transition from school to career, compared to most
school-based preparation. Furthermore, apprenticeships can
1 “ Hampton Roads Talent Alignment Strategy Initiative: Supply and Demand Gap Analysis,” (2019), commissioned by the Hampton Roads Community Foundation in partnership with the Hampton Roads Workforce
Council.
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provide a lucrative path to meaningful work for those who
complete them. The average starting salary for an apprentice
who completes a program in this country is $72,000, which is
35% higher than the median wage in Hampton Roads. Also,
apprentices tend not to struggle with student loan debt, unlike
many traditional college graduates. For the apprentice, earning
an income while learning an occupational skill confers a sense of pride and
identity, along with the confidence in knowing their investment and effort will
pay off. Employers benefit by gaining loyal, skilled employees. According to
the U.S. Department of Labor, employers retain 92% of employees who have
completed an apprenticeship.
As it turns out, Hampton Roads is home to the gold standard for the
apprenticeship model in this country: Newport News Shipbuilding’s (NNS)
Apprentice School. Founded in 1919, The Apprentice School has trained more

than 10,000 apprentices and evolved into a full-service academic institution. In
2020, the State Council of Higher Education for Virginia granted approval for
The Apprentice School to award academic degrees, and the school now offers
associate degrees in several applied sciences disciplines. Today, over 700
apprentices are enrolled. They spend two days a week in academic classes,
with their remaining time in on-the-job training, learning leadership skills and
a trade such as electrician or machinist. Apprentices earn while they learn,
making almost $18 per hour when they start and up to $30 per hour by the
completion of their program. The $18 hourly wage is $6 per hour higher than
the median hourly wage in Hampton Roads. Further, they receive a myriad of
other benefits, including health and life insurance, a 401(k) savings plan and
paid leave. In this chapter, we look at the apprenticeship model and delve
into the unique aspects of the NNS Apprentice School that have made it so
successful.

The Apprenticeship Model
A BRIEF LOOK AT APPRENTICESHIPS THROUGH HISTORY
The master-apprentice relationship dates back to the 18th century B.C. in Egypt
and Babylon. Nearly 4,000 years ago, these ancient civilizations understood
the need for skilled craftsmen and codified rules that required artisans
to teach their skills to the next generation. Over the course of the Roman
Empire, craftsmen went from primarily being slaves to forming independent
professional organizations, or “collegia,” such as the trade guilds “collegia
opificum.”
Craft guilds would become a hallmark of medieval Europe. The guild system,
made up of masters, journeymen and apprentices, oversaw production quality
and working conditions for each trade group in a town. Similar to modern-day
apprenticeships, they involved a collaborative relationship between a skilled
adult and a younger pupil. Apprentices developed skills through imitation and
guided experimentation under the watchful eyes of a mentor. As Bert De Munck
and Hugo Soly put it in a 2007 book they co-edited with Steven L. Kaplan,

apprentices “learned on the shop room floor.”2 Apprentices would often train
for up to seven years before graduating to journeymen and travel between
towns to learn and teach new techniques.
Scholars point to the apprenticeship system as an important impetus to
Europe’s rise in the Industrial Revolution. When this system worked well, it led
to the transfer of information and knowledge. It resulted in innovation through
thoughtful and well-trained artisans who advanced the frontiers of knowledge.
Historians have attributed major advances in European craft production – in
areas as diverse as shipbuilding, textiles, lens grinding, metalworking, printing,
mining, clockmaking, millwrighting, carpentry, ceramics and painting, among
others – to the apprenticeship system.3 European settlers also leveraged the
apprenticeship system in Colonial America. In fact, several of our Founding
Fathers, including George Washington (surveyor), Benjamin Franklin (printer)
and Paul Revere (silversmith), trained as apprentices.
Despite having similar roots, the apprenticeship system that flourished in
several European countries, including Austria, Switzerland and Germany,
floundered in the United States. There are many reasons why. After World
War II, the U.S. became obsessed with the idea that college was the primary
pathway to the middle class and upward mobility. Furthermore, there was
a strong desire to avoid creating curricula that grouped students based on
perceived ability, IQ or achievement levels – known as “tracking” in education.
There were also political complications that involved class, culture and unions.
In contrast, after the fascist uprising following World War I, some European
countries saw the need to connect their education system to the economy in
order to ensure employment, especially for young men. To accomplish this,
these countries introduced apprenticeships, job training and other programs.

THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS
Apprenticeship programs around the world today are as diverse as the
countries that have them. In fact, in some European nations, they offer a
mainstream route to career success. In Germany, Austria and Switzerland,
2 B
 ert De Munck and Hugo Soly, “Learning on the Shop Floor in Historical Perspective,” in Learning on the Shop
Floor: Historical Perspectives on Apprenticeship, Steven L. Kaplan, Bert De Munck and Hugo Soly, eds. (New
York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 3-32.
3 D
 avid de la Croix, Matthias Doepke and Joel Mokyr, “Clans, Guilds, and Markets: Apprenticeship Institutions
and Growth in the Preindustrial Economy,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics (2018), 133(1), 1-70.
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50% to 70% of young people filter through the apprenticeship system. The
apprenticeship models in these countries are often viewed as the gold standard
for vocational learning.
For instance, many have praised the German system for the country’s
low youth unemployment rate; ability to maintain a vibrant, high-quality
manufacturing sector; and role in helping it weather economic downturns. In
Germany, the system that regulates vocational training emerged formally in
1969. However, its historical roots run deep. Over the years, arrangements
between unions and management have reinforced the system through strict
certification standards. The certifications cover more than 300 occupations
that range from blue-collar trades to an increasing collection of white-collar
professions, such as information technology and engineering. Young people
start taking either the apprenticeship or academic track as early as fourth
grade. The track ultimately chosen is based on discussions among the school,
child and parents, and takes into consideration grades, abilities and aptitude.
Upon completion of compulsory schooling, apprentices spend three to four
days a week devoted to workplace learning and the remainder of the week
in government-funded schools for academic learning. This model creates a
smooth transition from school to work, one of the German system’s major
benefits. In 2017, apprentices accounted for 52.9% of students in Germany’s
dual-track education system. A total of 427,227 companies participated,
amounting to 20% of all German employers.
Apprenticeships in the United States look more like a patchwork quilt of
state and federal policies compared to the highly regulated model that is
integrated into the fabric of the German education system. Both the Obama
and Trump administrations tried to bolster apprenticeships, albeit in different
ways. For instance, in 2014, President Obama hosted the first-ever White
House Summit on American Apprenticeships and set a goal of doubling the
number of apprentices over five years. To accomplish this, the administration
made $175 million in federal public-private partnership grants available to
“increase apprenticeships in high-growth fields; align apprenticeships with
further learning and career advancement opportunities; and take successful
apprenticeship models to scale.”4 In contrast, President Trump signed a 2019
4 h
 ttps://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2014/07/14/first-ever-white-house-summit-americanapprenticeship-helping-american-workers-punch.
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executive order creating a new “industry-recognized” apprenticeship program
outside of the Department of Labor. Groups such as trade associations,
educational institutions, nonprofits or labor unions could become the entities
that set the training and curriculum standards relevant to their industry. Despite
this renewed interest, neither policy appears to have moved the needle on
apprenticeships.
With the oscillating policies of the last two administrations, how have
apprenticeships fared? Graph 1 includes data from the Department of
Labor on the number of new apprentices starting each year, while Graph
2 displays the percentage of new apprentices for a cohort’s entrance
into the workforce. The trajectory was clearly positive over
the last decade. The total number of new student workers
entering apprenticeships grew by 129% from 2010 to 2019.
Furthermore, apprenticeships made up 5.7% of the average
20-24-age cohort, up from 2.6% a decade earlier. Despite
the growth in the number of new apprentices, the number of
active programs has fluctuated and was lower in 2019 than a
decade earlier (Graph 3).
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GRAPH 2
PERCENT OF A COHORT IN APPRENTICESHIPS:
UNITED STATES, 2008-2019
GRAPH 2
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GRAPH 3
ACTIVE APPRENTICESHIP PROGRAMS:
GRAPH 3 UNITED STATES, 2008-2019
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A Closer Look At The
Newport News Shipbuilding
Apprentice School
In 2019, The Apprentice School at Newport News Shipbuilding (NNS)
celebrated its 100th birthday. Since its inception, it has employed, educated
and trained more than 10,000 tradespeople and evolved from a small trade
school with three faculty members into a full-service academic institution
housed in an 85,000-square-foot cutting-edge facility. It also serves as part of
NNS’s “leadership factory,” with 14 alumni rising to the vice president level.
William R. “Pat” Phillips Jr., a 1954 pipe designer graduate, became the 14th
president of NNS in 1992, the first Apprentice School graduate who became
CEO and president of Newport News Shipbuilding. He retired in 1995, after
46 years with NNS.
As we delve deeper into The Apprentice School, we will look at several features
that make it unique. But first, we start with a general overview, highlighting
some distinctive features before moving on to the school’s culture and its vision
for the future.

OVERVIEW OF THE APPRENTICE SCHOOL
Similar to many higher education institutions, The Apprentice School offers
athletics (six varsity teams in baseball, men’s and women’s basketball, football,
golf and wrestling) and various student organizations as a complement to
its academic instruction in the classroom. Recruiting takes place over a wide
geographic area at both high schools and career fairs.
Peeling back the layers reveals several unique features in how the school
operates. First, starting cohorts are small, typically around 25 to
30 students each quarter. The number of apprentices ebbs and
flows over time since enrollment depends on the employment
needs at NNS. Graph 4 gives a broad picture of enrollment and retention
over the last decade. The total number enrolled has hovered around 800
annually. The number of terminations, an average of 80 per year, indicates
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that advancing through the program isn’t a cakewalk. Math is the most
significant barrier to success on the academic side. Terminations due to math
course failures, however, have been falling in recent years, owing to math
remediation efforts and the introduction of night school.
Second, the small cohort sizes also highlight another unique
feature – small classes and close relationships with faculty.
Graph 5 shows the breakdown of faculty and staff in 2019. The Apprentice
School has 71 craft and 15 academic instructors, creating a close-knit learning
environment. The academic instructors all have graduate degrees in their field,
while the craft instructors are all Apprentice School graduates themselves.
Third, admission to The Apprentice School is competitive – as
competitive as the most elite Ivy League schools. The school
receives upwards of 4,000 applications each year. Over the
last decade, the largest number of new students to enroll each
year was 330, while the low was 86, yielding acceptance rates
between 2% and 8%. The varsity athletic teams account for around 55 of
the open spots each year. To be considered for admission to The Apprentice
School, applicants must be 18 or older and have a high school education. The
admission process focuses on students with a hybrid of success in math and
science courses as well as hands-on technical training experience. This tends
to winnow down the applicant pool. Nonetheless, applicants with promise who
are not admitted to The Apprentice School are encouraged to apply with NNS
for general employment.
Similar to many community college student bodies, the average age of
apprentices, 25, is older than that of typical undergraduates. This is due to
many students entering the school after becoming unsatisfied with their early
career trajectory. Graph 6 shows the student body makeup by race and
gender. The Apprentice School student body reflects the demographics of many
apprenticeship programs – primarily male (81%) and white (64%). However,
those within the school note their continued efforts to diversify the student body.
In 2020, 51 of the 767 (6.6%) students enrolled in The Apprentice School were
veterans. Some even started out in the Navy on the waters near NNS and
transitioned to school after separating from the military.

GRAPH 4
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GRAPH 5
FACULTY AND STAFF ATGRAPH
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Apprentice School
GRAPH 6
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Fourth, The Apprentice School seamlessly ties theory to practice
and practice to theory. As a part of the school’s World Class Shipbuilder
Curriculum (WCSC), students spend two days per week in the classroom,
ultimately receiving approximately 1,000 hours of academic instruction
(comparable to the requirements of many associate degree programs). This is
coupled with 7,000 hours of hands-on training in various trades. As of April
2019, apprentices earn a Maritime Studies Certificate for completing the
WCSC. Table 1 displays the academic portion of the training. Cynthia Lear,
WCSC manager, highlights the practical applications of the classroom material
and how it differs from that offered in traditional higher education:

things they are going to see in the shipyard. This helps solidify the
content in the apprentice’s mind.
“In the Technical Mathematics II course, they are actually finding, for
instance, volumes and surface areas of spherical tanks, which are
shapes they would see in the shipyard. They may look at flow rates to
see how long it takes to drain the tank or fill the tank using a certainsize pipe.”
Table 2 shows the range of trade disciplines offered at The Apprentice
School. There are 19 shipbuilding disciplines with on-the-job training and
mentoring. Apprentices who excel in the WCSC have the opportunity to pursue
one of nine advanced fields. The advanced disciplines range from supply
chain management apprentice to nuclear test technician. These disciplines
couple on-the-job training with academic coursework in partnership with
local higher education institutions. Apprentices can take classes at Thomas
Nelson Community College toward an associate degree and at Old Dominion
University for a bachelor’s degree in either engineering or modeling and
simulation.

“If you took a college geometry or trigonometry course you would
be doing proofs, where ours is applied to what they are going to be
seeing in the shipyard environment. So we make that relevant. A lot of
our students are hands-on, so they need to know the relevancy of what
they are learning in the classroom . . . when we start to look at and
introduce mechanics and do statics and we look at forces on cranes,

TABLE 1
WORLD-CLASS SHIPBUILDER CURRICULUM
AT THE APPRENTICE SCHOOL
Academic Terms
Subject
Technical Mathematics

1

2

Technical Mathematics I (3)

Technical Mathematics II (3)

Drafting, Engineering and Design

Drafting (3)

Marine Engineering and
Naval Architecture

Ship Construction I (2)

Physical Science
Technical Communications
Business Processes

Ship Construction II (3)

Technical Communications I (3)

Safestart (2)

Introduction to Computers (3)

Business Operations and
Leadership (3)
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Mechanics (3)

Physical Science I (3)

Source: The Apprentice School
Note: Credit hours are in parentheses.
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3

Physical Science II (4)

Problem Solving (4)

TABLE 2
TRADE DISCIPLINES AT THE APPRENTICE SCHOOL
Shipbuilding Disciplines
Coatings Specialist

Electrician

Heating and Air Conditioning Worker

Heavy Metal Fabricator

Insulator

Machinist

Maintenance Electrician

Maintenance Pipefitter

Millwright

Molder

Non-Destructive Tester

Outside Machinist

Patternmaker

Pipefitter

Rigger

Sheet Metal Worker

Shipfitter

Welder

Welding Equipment Repair

Advanced Shipyard Operations

Cost Estimator

Metrology Technician

Marine Designer

Modeling and Simulation

Nuclear Test Technician

Production Planner

Marine Engineer

Advanced Disciplines

Supply Chain Management
Source: The Apprentice School

APPRENTICE CULTURE
“What’s different here?” trade instructor and 1988 Apprentice
School graduate Stan Best asked rhetorically during a
discussion about The Apprentice School. “We have 100 years
of history. We get to stand on [many] shoulders, and it is really
our job not to ruin it.” Latitia McCane, who came to The Apprentice
School in 2018 as director of education after holding several community
college leadership positions, also pointed to the importance of the school’s
values in its overall success. Best and McCane are both referring to the culture
and mindset that permeate the school. It’s a mindset of asking, “How I can
help you?” – and one that values collaboration over competition, while also
improving the bottom line.
School traditions transcend the age of the institution. One of them, says
McCane, has to do with legacy. There are generations of families that send
their children to train and learn there. It is not unheard of to have three
generations of Apprentice School alumni working at NNS all at the same time.
With that kind of legacy, one can easily see how loyalty runs deep.

This culture seems to be the driving force in the instructor-apprentice
relationship. David Blunt, shipfitter craft instructor and 2008 graduate,
commented, “My apprenticeship experience caused me to mature faster, put
me in positions outside of my comfort zone and challenged me to make the
best decisions possible. I have created lifelong bonds with other employees at
The Apprentice School and throughout NNS who took me under their wing
and showed me a multitude of ways to be successful while meeting customer
demands.”5
Trade instructor Jacob Johnston, welder/non-destructive test inspector/craft
instructor, class of 2006, notes: “Being a craft instructor allows me to train and
pass on my knowledge to apprentices in Welding School and trade theory
courses. The role also allows me to watch them grow as individuals and
become successful in their trade and with the company. By developing trade
and leadership skills in apprentices, we demonstrate our commitment to the
company while continuing to help the school grow.”6
According to James Adkins, a Frontline FAST electrician apprentice,
apprentices experience the benefits of collaboration firsthand – a departure
5 From the 2016 Apprentice School Annual Report.
6 From the 2016 Apprentice School Annual Report.
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from the survival-of-the fittest-style competition endemic in higher education.
“Apprentices often collaborate through the sharing of ideas and previous
experiences while working together on jobs,” he said. “This promotes growth
among apprentices and helps the company save money by reducing manhours spent on rework and downtime. This same collaboration helps to
increase the quality of our product delivered to the U.S. Navy.”7
Retaining graduates is one of the key ways the culture
cultivated at The Apprentice School helps the bottom line.
Apprentices are compensated for their work in the trades as
well as their time in the classroom. However, they do not have
an obligation to stay with NNS after graduation. Nevertheless,
80% of Apprentice School graduates remain with the company
for at least 10 years.

INNOVATION AND THE FUTURE OF THE APPRENTICE SCHOOL
Despite The Apprentice School’s long history and prominence at NNS, it is
not resting on its laurels. Instead, it is pushing forward on several initiatives to
help keep its future bright. For instance, the school has recently made strides
in virtual delivery. The COVID-19 pandemic served to accelerate a process
underway to bring academic training online. Furthermore, through two
different grants, the school created a virtual technical training lab, dubbed the
Innovation Room, for welding, machine tool technology and other disciplines.
The aim is to take the Innovation Room to career fairs and give prospective
students a hands-on feel for the apprentice training experience.
Since receiving approval last year to grant academic degrees,
the school will soon be awarding Associate of Applied
Science degrees in maritime technology in 26 disciplines,
including maintenance electrician, marine designer, nuclear
test technician, and modeling and simulation program
analyst. Granting academic degrees is a significant move
for the school as an educational institution and enhances its
national reputation as a model apprenticeship program.

7 From the 2016 Apprentice School Annual Report.
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Historically, The Apprentice School offered a hybrid program. Approximately
20% of apprentices qualified to earn an associate degree from Thomas
Nelson Community College. Some of these students then transitioned to ODU
to complete studies for a bachelor’s degree in engineering or modeling and
simulation. However, the remaining 80% of the apprentices struggled to
move into leadership positions that require at least an associate degree. The
Apprentice School’s recent authorization to award associate degrees as a part
of its curriculum provides an avenue for upward mobility, as graduates embark
on their careers.
Xavier Beale, Newport News Shipbuilding’s vice president of
trades, puts it best: “Our ability to offer academic degrees
deepens our commitment to workforce development and will
open new opportunities for our company to help to meet the
ever-growing demand for skilled workers in our region.”8
While the move to confer academic degrees pushes The Apprentice School
further down the educational pipeline, it is also reaching back with its preapprenticeship program. The idea underpinning this program is to provide
mentoring, math enrichment and an introduction to soft job skills, like
leadership, while also exposing students to the craft trades. The program
started in fall 2019 with 11 students at the New Horizons Career and Technical
Education Center. Of the 11 students in the program, seven went on to The
Apprentice School, three took jobs at NNS (a division of Huntington Ingalls
Industries) due to insufficient math skills, and one student opted to enroll at a
traditional four-year college.
After the pilot program’s success at New Horizons, The Apprentice School
is expanding its pre-apprenticeship program to more schools. It’s part of
a broader effort to build a pipeline of talent for skilled-trade jobs, and the
program is open to high school students whether or not they plan to go on
to The Apprentice School. The long-term goal is admirable: take
students starting ninth grade and let them finish the academic
portion of the WCSC while in high school, then follow up with
on-the-job craft training, and ultimately award an associate
degree.
8 h
 ttps://newsroom.huntingtoningalls.com/releases/photo-release-the-apprentice-school-at-newport-newsshipbuilding-approved-as-an-institution-of-higher-education.

The Apprentice School at NNS holds a unique place at the intersection
of higher education and the workplace. The school often touts how it is
“accelerating the time to talent” for its students. For example, Apprentice
School alumni are helping spearhead the shipyard’s transition to high-tech
initiatives, like integrated digital shipbuilding. Furthermore, many graduates
are quickly moving up the ranks to become foremen. This is particularly
important because the shipyard, flush with both young employees and
longtime workers, has developed a gap in the middle of the workforce
pipeline. Despite its many successes, however, The Apprentice School still faces
challenges in some areas. For example, it has struggled to recruit and train
women. However, the school is taking steps to change this. With the help of
a U.S. Department of Labor grant, The Apprentice School is partnering with
education, research, business and advocacy groups to come up with practical
tools to increase enrollment among minorities and women. The school also
plans to use its pre-apprenticeship program to engage females early in the
trades.

Summing Up
The Apprentice School clearly operates at a high level, which prompts us to
ask: What lessons can we learn from its success? Can its model be replicated
and scaled? In light of these questions, we provide some final thoughts on
expanding apprenticeship opportunities in Hampton Roads.
The Apprentice School provides a local “proof of concept” that
apprenticeship programs can work well, especially if there is
a strong relationship with an employer. When a program is done
right, it yields a host of benefits to both employers and employees. However,
sometimes the net benefits are difficult to quantify. Newport News Shipbuilding
strongly believes in the efficacy of The Apprentice School, despite not having
a rigorous, formal cost-benefit evaluation process in place. A recent report
by researchers at Case Western Reserve University and the U.S. Department
of Commerce provides some insight as to why they are so confident. The
researchers looked carefully at several employer-led apprenticeship programs,
including health care system Dartmouth-Hitchcock and manufacturing firm

Siemens USA, and found an internal rate of return of an astoundingly high
40% to 50%.9
The Apprentice School’s track record spans a century. It has
survived the test of time because of its ability to adapt and
evolve. This is both a promising and cautionary tale for others. Both policy
makers and firms should develop apprenticeship programs that are nimble and
can adjust to a changing economic environment.
Apprenticeships, especially those in the trades, can help
address workforce gaps by supplying young employees. The
Apprentice Institute at Tidewater Community College is a useful step forward
for Hampton Roads. Linking apprenticeship programs with high schools also
holds significant promise, but would require regional collaboration regarding
workforce needs. Further, there are promising opportunities as well outside the
trades, as the service sector continues to grow. For example, Hampton Roads’
medical institutions could establish an apprenticeship program for health care
workers.
Unfortunately, expanding apprenticeship opportunities likely won’t come easy.
As the saying goes, “Culture eats strategy (and policy) for breakfast.” At the
firm level, The Apprentice School has a 100-year legacy and a culture that
has evolved and strengthened over time. Huntington Ingalls’ sister shipyard in
Pascagoula, Mississippi, which also has an apprenticeship program, would
love to have the same level of success.
The broader culture around apprenticeships can also act as a stumbling block
to both future applicants and firms. There is a perception that apprenticeships
are only for the trades. Parents often view apprenticeship programs as a lessdesired option for their children, when compared to a college education, and
are unaware that many such programs provide a pathway to a baccalaureate
degree. Meanwhile, inexperienced firms are wary of taking on the regulatory
burden of registering an apprenticeship program. Finding ways to change
some of these cultural attitudes is crucial to expanding apprenticeships in the
region. We believe making such an effort is worthwhile.
9 S
 usan Helper, Ryan Noonan, Jessica R. Nicholson and David Langdon, “The Benefits and Costs of
Apprenticeships: A Business Perspective,” U.S. Department of Commerce (2016), https://files.eric.ed.gov/
fulltext/ED572260.pdf.
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All In: Casinos, Online
Betting and the Future of
Gambling in Hampton Roads

ALL IN: CASINOS, ONLINE BETTING AND THE FUTURE OF
GAMBLING IN HAMPTON ROADS
You’ve got to know when to hold ’em
Know when to fold ’em
Know when to walk away
And know when to run
– From “The Gambler,” as sung by Kenny Rogers

G

ambling is not new to the Commonwealth of Virginia. In 1612, the Virginia Company of London held a lottery to fund ships bound for the Jamestown
Colony. After King William III and Queen Mary II of England signed the royal charter in 1693 to establish what is now known as the College of
William & Mary, lottery funds helped fuel construction of the campus. Not only were lotteries a means of funding public infrastructure projects in the
Colonies, they also were used to purchase supplies for Continental Army soldiers in the field during the Revolutionary War.1 Over the next 200 years,

the popularity and legality of lotteries and other forms of gambling in Virginia waxed and waned until the passage of a public referendum to create the Virginia
Lottery in 1987. For a state that once cast a suspicious eye on gambling, Virginia is now all in on gambling.
With the sale of the first scratch ticket in September 1998, the Virginia Lottery
marked an inflection point in public attitudes and policies about gambling
in the Commonwealth. Now, Hampton Roads residents can play the lottery
in person or online, place bets with online sportsbooks such as FanDuel,
DraftKings and BetMGM, and play historical horse racing machines in
Hampton. Soon to enter this increasingly competitive arena of gambling will be
the Rivers Casino Portsmouth (late 2022) and HeadWaters Resort & Casino in
Norfolk (2023).1

When it comes to gambling, it’s all about winners and losers. Success, whether
in the lottery or at a gaming establishment, is often celebrated in the media,
while gambling losses and costs to society are rarely mentioned. In January
2021, a Newport News resident won a record-breaking $914,000 jackpot
at Rosie’s Gaming Emporium in Hampton.2 In March 2021, a Virginia Beach
1 C
 harles T. Clotfelter and Philip J. Cook, Selling Hope: State Lotteries in America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1989), p. 20.
2 https://www.wavy.com/news/local-news/hampton/newport-news-man-hits-914k-record-breaking-jackpotat-rosies-in-hampton/.

80

THE STATE OF THE REGION | HAMPTON ROADS 2021

woman won $1 million playing the Virginia Lottery.3 In April 2021, a local
shipyard worker walked away with $2 million following a Powerball lottery
drawing.4 We learned about these lucky individuals from TV and newspaper
stories.
One is much harder pressed, however, to hear and read stories
about local residents who lose money gambling, who suffer
from gambling addiction or who were victims of crime due to
increased gambling activities. The same holds true for stories
about the associated costs of gambling to city and county
budgets. As President John F. Kennedy once told a reporter,
“Victory has a hundred fathers and defeat is an orphan.”
3 h
 ttps://www.13newsnow.com/article/news/lottery/i-cant-stop-smiling-virginia-beach-woman-wins-1-millionin-virginia-lottery/291-3e3078e4-3a6e-40d1-b78d-bd0318f88c89.
4 h
 ttps://www.wavy.com/news/local-shipyard-electrician-wins-2-million-in-powerballdrawing/#:~:text=Local%20shipyard%20electrician%20wins%20%242%20million%20in%20Powerball%20drawing,-News&text=SUFFOLK%2C%20Va.

While Norfolk and Portsmouth are likely to benefit from the construction and
operation of the new casinos, the overall impact of this bet on the Virginia
Beach-Norfolk-Newport News metropolitan statistical area (Hampton Roads) is
likely to be small. Why? As residents begin to frequent these casinos, they will,
in effect, be moving their money from one form of entertainment to another in
the region. In other words, instead of spending their hard-earned dollars at
bars, restaurants and movie theaters, consumers will be “voting with their feet”
and spending some of their money at these new venues.
We estimate that the Norfolk and Portsmouth casinos will
lift regional gross domestic product (GDP) between $100
million and $400 million annually. This expected impact
equates roughly to 0.1% to 0.3% of regional GDP. However,
the casinos will also shift spending within the two cities and
across the region, as consumers decide to spend some of their
entertainment dollars at these gaming establishments instead
of other entertainment, hospitality and leisure businesses in
the region. We applaud the fact that these developments are
not receiving direct public subsidies, a departure from some
previous projects in the region and the Commonwealth. Finally,
we note that if competition proves fiercer than expected or
patrons tire of casino gaming at some point, our estimates
likely represent an optimistic economic outcome. Given the
unfulfilled promise of casinos in many communities, it is
perhaps best to enter this discussion with clear eyes, even if
we hope with full hearts for a resounding success.
In this chapter, we examine the evolution of gambling in the United States
and Virginia, and the future of gambling in Hampton Roads. We estimate the
impact of the Norfolk and Portsmouth casinos and discuss how displacement
may alter the projected economic effects of these new venues. We also look
at the social costs of gambling and pay particular attention to gambling
addiction. We conclude with some thoughts on whether betting on gambling
will spur innovation and growth in the region.

Gambling In The United
States: From The Rat Pack
To Your Phone
If the only constant is change, then the state of gambling in the United States
embodies this saying. In the 1960s, Frank Sinatra, Dean Martin, Sammy
Davis Jr., Peter Lawford and Joey Bishop, collectively known as the “Rat Pack,”
helped transform the image of Las Vegas, Nevada, from a place to gamble to
a highly popular entertainment destination where one could not only legally
gamble in a casino, but also enjoy shows and concerts. In the United States,
casino gambling was legal only in Nevada until New Jersey voters approved
casino gambling for Atlantic City in 1974. While sports track betting was also
legal in a number of states, most communities were relatively distant from an
establishment where one could place a legal bet.
To say that times have changed would be an understatement. Since the 1970s,
attitudes and policies toward gambling have shifted dramatically. Forty-five
states and the District of Columbia now operate state lotteries. In 2018, the
U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection
Act of 1992, which effectively granted Nevada a monopoly on legal sports
betting, was unconstitutional. A number of states, including Virginia, rapidly
moved to create the legal and regulatory frameworks necessary for residents
to place sports bets via computer or their phone. By 2019, 18 states had landbased commercial casinos and another six states were operating riverboat
casinos (which, curiously, rarely venture beyond their designated pier).
Americans’ views on gambling as a morally acceptable activity have continued
to shift over the last two decades. In the most recent Gallup survey of American
moral values, 68% of respondents replied that gambling was “morally
acceptable.”5 This represents an 8% increase from when the question was first
asked in 2003. Drinking alcohol, smoking marijuana and gambling were all
viewed as morally acceptable by at least 7 in 10 respondents to the 2020
survey. The push for more legalized forms of gambling is not only driven by
states and localities in search of revenue, but also by citizens’ preferences.
5 G
 allup (2021), “Moral Issues,” available at: https://news.gallup.com/poll/1681/moral-issues.aspx.
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When one hears the word “gambling,” thoughts of casinos and horse tracks
may come to mind. The commercial casino, with its blackjack tables, roulette
wheels and slot-style machines, has occupied a place in the American
consciousness for decades. However, the number of commercial casinos in
operation has waxed and waned over the last decade. As illustrated in Graph
1, the number peaked at 524 in 2016, before falling sharply the following
year. The number of casinos in operation in 2020 was roughly equivalent to
the level seen in 2007.
The COVID-19 pandemic and associated restrictions on economic and social
activity negatively affected the financial performance of commercial casinos.
Casino revenues declined in 2020 to approximately $30 billion, a level
not seen since 2003. For the first quarter of 2021, the American Gaming
Association (AGA) reported that casino revenues were $11.1 billion, a 17.7%
increase compared to the same quarter in 2020.6 With an increasing number
of Americans vaccinated and demand for leisure and hospitality services on
the rise, we are likely to observe a sharp rebound in casino revenues in 2021.
Whether these revenues can be sustained in the face of increasing competition
for gambling dollars remains to be seen.

in another 10 states.9 Intrastate mobile sports betting had been implemented
or authorized, at the time of this writing, in 14 states and the District of
Columbia. While some states require in-person registration for mobile betting,
this requirement appears to limit revenue growth and is likely to fall by the
wayside. In 2018, total sports betting revenue in the United
States amounted to $430.7 million. In 2019, it more than
doubled, jumping to $908.9 million. Sports betting revenue is
forecast to reach $2.5 billion in 2021 and could hit $8 billion
by 2025.10 Every dollar wagered by phone or computer is one
less dollar that could have been spent on a lottery ticket or
gambled in a casino.

State and local lotteries have grown considerably over the last three decades.
In the late 1970s, state and local lottery revenues amounted to less than $1
billion. By 2019, revenues approached $29 billion.7 Growth in some states,
however, slowed (if not declined outright) as consumer fatigue set in and
competition in other sources of gambling intensified over the last decade.
In Virginia, the launch of the mobile lottery and larger jackpots lifted lottery
revenues to $1.43 billion and profits to $350 million (a record) in just the
second half of 2020.8
Competition is likely to only increase for casinos and lotteries in the coming
years. Since the U.S. Supreme Court struck down Nevada’s legal monopoly
on sports betting in 2018, this particular form of gambling is now offered in
21 states and the District of Columbia and is legal, but not yet operational,
6 A
 GA Commercial Gaming Revenue Tracker, https://www.americangaming.org/resources/aga-commercialgaming-revenue-tracker/.
7 Statista, state and local lottery revenue in the United States from 1977 to 2019, https://www.statista.com/
statistics/249128/us-state-and-local-lottery-revenue/
8 https://richmond.com/news/state-and-regional/govt-and-politics/big-jackpots-online-gambling-lift-virginialottery-revenue-37-in-late-2020/article_98743ed5-de36-567a-90e6-22b7fd4033d8.html.
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9 h
 ttps://www.actionnetwork.com/news/legal-sports-betting-united-states-projections. The state data are
current as of August 2021.
10 S
 . Lock (2021), “Forecast revenue from sports betting in the U.S. 2021-2025,” at: https://www.statista.com/
statistics/1117369/sports-betting-revenue-forecast-us.
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Virginia Rolls The Dice
For decades, the attractiveness of casinos for some Virginia stakeholders
has been the lure of additional tax revenue without having to levy new taxes
or increase existing tax rates, the creation of new jobs and the addition of
new venues to attract more visitors (and their dollars) to the Commonwealth.
Legalizing casinos in Virginia could also stem the flow of Virginians to other
states in search of gambling opportunities. It is, as the rapper Puff Daddy sang
in 1997, “all about the Benjamins.”

The bill authorized casinos in five cities – Bristol, Danville,
Norfolk, Portsmouth and Richmond – but only if citizens
approved the casinos. Residents in Bristol (71.1%),
Danville (68.7%), Norfolk (65.1%) and Portsmouth (66.8%)
resoundingly voted in favor of having a commercial casino in
their cities. Richmond has scheduled a vote on its proposed
casino for November 2021.12
In 2019, Richmond was among five cities in the
Commonwealth authorized to build and operate a casino.

Over the last five years, there has been a rapid shift in public policy toward
gambling in Virginia. In 2015, legal gambling consisted primarily of the
Virginia Lottery, historical horse racing and games associated with charitable
giving. By 2021, Virginians could gamble via online lotteries, wager bets
with mobile sportsbooks, visit expanded historical horse racing sites and
look forward to frequenting commercial casinos in the near future.11 Table
1 provides descriptions of the types of gambling that are currently legal in
Virginia.

Unlike the other four cities that debuted their casino

One might argue that the demarcation line for this change in public policy
was drawn in March 2019 when Gov. Ralph Northam signed Senate Bill
1126, establishing a broad framework for expanding commercial casinos and
authorizing casino gaming to be regulated by the Virginia Lottery Board. The
bill included a reenactment clause, which meant it would need to be passed
again for it to take effect. The clause directed the Joint Legislative Audit and
Review Commission (JLARC) to conduct a review of gaming laws in other
states and approximate what would occur in Virginia if casino gambling were
authorized in the Commonwealth. The findings from JLARC’s report prompted
the re-signing of the bill in 2020.

over $50,000 annually. With five casinos being built in

proposals during the November 2020 general election,
Richmond decided to postpone its referendum until
November 2021. Council members whittled six proposals
to two and then selected the One Casino + Resort in
May 2021. The developers have said that the proposed
casino will create more than 1,000 jobs, with salaries of
the Commonwealth, assuming the Richmond referendum
passes, one must question whether all of them can survive
in the long run. Opponents argue that the casinos will
likely increase problem gambling and primarily attract
lower-income customers, serving in essence as a regressive
form of taxation. While voters will determine the fate
of the proposed Richmond casino in the fall, given the
success of the other four casino referenda, it is likely the
Richmond referendum will also be approved. For Norfolk
and Portsmouth, this would mean another competitor, just
90 minutes up the road.

11 Games of skill were legal for a short period but were effectively banned on July 1, 2021.
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12 “ Richmond city postpones casino application and calls for citizen input in 2021” (December 2020), https://
www.rva.gov/sites/default/files/2020-12/Casino%20RFQ%20RFP%20-%20Final.pdf; “Pamunkey Indian
Tribe out of Richmond casino race following city rejection” (March 2021), https://www.wric.com/news/
local-news/richmond/pamunkey-indian-tribe-out-of-richmond-casino-race-following-city-rejection/

TABLE 1
GAMBLING BY TYPE IN VIRGINIA, 2021
Type

Definition

Casino gaming

Table games (such as craps, roulette, baccarat, poker, etc.) and wagering played with cards and electronic gaming
devices where players wager money. Video lottery machines (slot machines) have become one of the most popular
forms of gambling in casinos.

Charitable gaming

Bingo, charity game tickets, raffles and charity fundraising permitted by the Office of Charitable and Regulatory
Programs throughout Virginia. There were 37 charitable gaming permits operating in Hampton Roads as of March
2021.*

Fantasy sports betting

Players create a fantasy sports team and compete against other teams to win money. Virginia introduced legal fantasy
sports betting regulation in 2016.

Games of skill

Games of skill are slot-like machines that appeared in restaurants, bars and convenience stores. The outcome of these
games is determined by a player’s mental or physical skills rather than by chance. These machines operated in a “grey
area” of the law until they were banned in 2020 but were then granted a reprieve in return for tax collections. Skill
games were banned again on July 1, 2021.

Historical horse racing machines

Electronic gambling system that allows players to bet on the outcome of horse races that have already been run. These
machines appear very similar to a traditional slot machine. Users can select their horse “winners” with each wager or
use an auto cap feature for random horse selection.

Live horse race betting

Individuals place in-person bets on the outcome of a live horse race.

Lottery (scratchers, state lottery)

Prize drawings where entrants pay for a chance to win a large jackpot or instant prizes by scratch “reveal” tickets

Online horse race betting

Individuals place bets on live horse races via an online website or a smartphone app from the comfort of their own
home.

Sports betting

Placing bets on a particular outcome or winner of a domestic or international sports event (including straight, total line,
money line, parlay and teaser bets)

Sweepstakes sites

A contest in which participants enter for a chance to win a range of prizes (from houses to cars to money), and winners
are drawn at random

Source: Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University
Note: *Online Directory of Bingo Sessions in Virginia, https://www.vdacs.virginia.gov/pdf/bingo_events.pdf
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The Rise Of Mobile Betting

TABLE 2
ONLINE AND MOBILE SPORTSBOOK APPS IN VIRGINIA

When Virginia launched, it was our most successful
launch to date, with more users on the first weekend
than any state before it.
– Kevin Hennessy, FanDuel Director of Publicity13
The bet on casinos by Bristol, Danville, Norfolk and Portsmouth (and, we
expect, Richmond after the November election) is being made at a time when
the gambling industry is experiencing a period of profound change. Two
decades ago, the thought of sitting on your couch and placing real-time bets
on whether the next football pass will be completed, a basketball game beats
the over/under or an MMA boxer lands more punches than an opponent in
a particular round was just a glimmer in the eyes of entrepreneurs. Today,
not only does this technology exist, but also consumers are embracing it
enthusiastically. While the number of casinos remains relatively stable and
lottery revenue growth has slowed, sports betting revenue nationally is
projected to increase from $2.5 billion in 2021 to $8 billion in 2025.
Virginia legalized sports betting in April 2020 with the passage of Senate
Bill 384, which allows for up to 12 online sports-betting providers in the
Commonwealth.14 Table 2 lists the online and mobile sportsbook applications
that have already launched or will launch in Virginia. FanDuel was the first,
followed quickly by DraftKings, BetRivers, BetMGM and William Hill. Currently,
nine providers are either operating or have been approved to operate a
mobile sportsbook in the state. Physical sportsbook locations are anticipated
to open in spring 2022. JLARC estimates that the mobile sports-betting market
will generate between $22 million and $55 million annually in tax revenue for
the Commonwealth.

13 h
 ttps://www.13newsnow.com/article/news/local/mycity/norfolk/virginia-leading-the-way-for-popularsports-betting-platform-fanduel/291-888e7fff-3a1a-4433-8c6c-0920e4951d89.
14 https://www.americangaming.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/AGAGamingRegulatoryFactSheet_
Virginia-2021.pdf.
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Launch Date

Partner
Casino/
Organization

Probable
Physical
Sportsbook
Location

FanDuel
Sportsbook

Jan. 21, 2021

Washington
Football Team

TBD

DraftKings
Sportsbook

Jan. 24, 2021

Stand-Alone
License

TBD

BetRivers

Jan. 27, 2021

Rush Street
Gaming

Portsmouth

BetMGM

Jan. 27, 2021

Stand-Alone
License

TBD

Caesars
Sportsbook
(formerly
William Hill)

Feb. 3, 2021

Caesars

Danville

WynnBET

March 11, 2021

NASCAR

Martinsville,
Richmond

Unibet

April 28, 2021

Stand-Alone
License

TBD

PointsBet

TBD

TBD

TBD

bet365

TBD

Hard Rock

Bristol

Online
Sportsbook

Source: Sports Handle, https://sportshandle.com/virginia/, updated as of Aug. 30, 2021

Games Of Skill Or
Games Of Chance?
While Virginia was debating whether to approve commercial casinos, gaming
machines began appearing in restaurants, bars, convenience stores and truck
stops throughout the state. These machines – actually, electronic, computerized
terminals – were played by inserting money in hopes of winning a cash prize.
On the outside, there appeared to be no fundamental difference between a
virtual slot machine and these games; however, operators argued that these
machines required skill, rather than chance, to win.
The distinction between skill and chance is important from a legal perspective.
If the outcome of a game is determined by the player’s ability, then it is not
a random event. A popular game of skill mimics the Simon memory game,
whereby a player must remember color combinations of increasing complexity.
Another version requires a player to identify patterns among nine different
pictures, much like a pictorial tic-tac-toe game, but with time limits and “wild
cards.” These games of skill differ considerably from a slot machine where the
player’s only input is a bet and the push of a button to start the gamble.

HB 881 defines a skill game as an “electronic, computerized,
or mechanical contrivance, terminal, machine, or other
device that requires the insertion of a coin, currency,
ticket, token, or similar object to operate, activate, or play a
game, the outcome of which is determined by any element
of skill of the player and that may deliver or entitle the
person playing or operating the device to receive cash; cash
equivalents, gift cards, vouchers, billets, tickets, tokens, or
electronic credits to be exchanged for cash; merchandise; or
anything of value whether the payoff is made automatically
from the device or manually.”

A GAMBLER PLAYS A SKILL GAME AT A LOCAL CONVENIENCE STORE IN HAMPTON.

Games of skill occupied what one could consider an ill-defined legal space.
The machines were not taxed or regulated and, while some were skills-based,
others appeared to cross the line into games of chance. Virginia planned to
ban these games in 2020, even though many small-business owners argued
that the revenue from these machines allowed them to make capital investments
and expand staff. Dave Willis, a restaurant/bar owner in Norfolk, introduced
the gaming machines around 2018 when his business was struggling, and that
decision proved to be invaluable. After adding these games, Willis was able to
afford a small remodel and increase his employees’ wages. In Virginia Beach,
a similar story was told by Melody Weekly, owner of Mel’s place, a bar and
grill. Weekly found that the gaming machines not only provided additional
revenue, but also contributed to an increase in food and beverage sales. The
extra money allowed her to upgrade the building and hire more staff.15
As the COVID-19 pandemic rolled across Virginia in spring 2020, however,
social distancing and restrictions on economic activity threatened to overwhelm
many of these same businesses. Legislators, fearing a significant downturn
in state revenues, decided to allow these machines to operate legally in the
Commonwealth and to use the tax revenues and license fees for COVID-19
relief, problem gambling and local community support. The tax was $1,200
15 h
 ttps://www.pilotonline.com/business/vp-nw-games-of-skill-ban-rally-20200301rct4toj7xzcnjgd3ktiy3uke2u-story.html.
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per machine every month a machine was operated in Virginia, and game
distributors were subject to the tax. With over 10,000 machines and $198.4
million in wagers placed in May 2021, the legalization of these machines was
welcomed by many small-business owners and their patrons (Table 3). The
Commonwealth collected over $100 million in taxes while the machines were
legal in Virginia.16
Even though these machines produced a boon for the state and business
owners, the Commonwealth banned games of skill on July 1, 2021. One
argument was that these games bring gambling and its associated social
costs into local neighborhoods, though, curiously, the same argument could
be made about lotteries and mobile betting. In all likelihood, the primary
rationale was the fear that these machines competed with lottery sales and
also posed a threat to the state’s nascent casino industry. A 2019 presentation
by the Virginia Lottery Board attributed slowing growth in lottery sales to
the prevalence of gray market machines.17 However, in a December 2020
presentation to the Virginia House Appropriations Committee, Dan Timberlake,
director of the Virginia Department of Planning and Budget, noted that graymachine revenue had fallen short of expectations. When asked why, he
replied: “One reason we believe the gray-machine revenue is not what was
originally forecasted is because people weren’t going into the stores (to play
them). But what they were doing, to our surprise, is that they were buying
lottery tickets. The lottery is not seeing the loss of revenue from the fact that the
gray machines are still out there.”18
If the state reaped revenues from both games of skill and
lottery sales, it should have been indifferent to where the
money originates. The short-lived experiment with games of
skill generated revenue for businesses and the Commonwealth
and was obviously welcomed by many Virginians. Arguments
that one form of gambling displaces another should fall
on deaf ears, as it should not be the responsibility of the
Commonwealth to choose winners and losers.
16 h
 ttps://www.fox5dc.com/news/some-va-business-owners-fight-against-ban-on-skill-games
17 Virginia Lottery briefing for House Appropriations and Senate Finance committees, September 2019,
https://ihodvirginiageneralassembly.s3.amazonaws.com/agenda_block_docs/attaches/000/000/428/
original/III_-_Lottery.pdf?1568640091.
18 https://www.playvirginia.com/virginia-gray-machines-lottery-sales/.
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TABLE 3
MONTHLY REPORT OF SKILL GAME MACHINES IN THE COMMONWEALTH, MAY 2021
Region

Total Wagered

Total Awarded

In Play

Warehoused

Total Machines

Region 1 (Roanoke)

$20,697,585

$15,240,639

1,065

13

1,078

Region 2 (Lynchburg)

$32,046,065

$26,841,343

1,056

47

1,103

Region 3 (Staunton)

$10,660,184

$8,177,235

557

8

565

Region 4 (Alexandria)

$24,862,133

$19,137,080

994

38

1,032

Region 5 (Fredericksburg)

$10,708,016

$7,877,868

542

27

569

Region 6 (Richmond)

$40,456,679

$32,056,971

1,666

104

1,770

Region 7 (Hampton)

$21,251,730

$17,414,045

922

38

960

Region 8 (Chesapeake)

$29,829,243

$22,337,921

1,539

36

1,575

Region 9 (Charlottesville)

$7,889,460

$5,936,468

369

11

380

$0

$0

18

1,163

1,181

$198,401,095

$155,019,571

8,728

1,485

10,213

Other*
Grand Total

Source: https://rga.lis.virginia.gov/Published/2021/RD162/PDF
*Eighteen machines were improperly reported by the distributors as being warehoused, but according to ABC’s records they were still subject to the monthly tax.
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Bright Lights, Big Gamble?
Casinos In Hampton Roads
With the legal framework now in place for five casinos to operate throughout
the Commonwealth, how will the casinos in Hampton Roads fare? They
will face increasing competition from a variety of sources. First, the rise of
mobile and online gambling, as well as the existence of established forms
of gambling (lotteries, historical horse racing), means that the casinos will
enter an increasingly competitive marketplace. Second, Hampton Roads will
be the only region in Virginia (for now) with two casinos in relatively close
proximity. Third, there are a growing number of alternatives for one who wants
to gamble within 250 miles of Hampton Roads, a fact that poses a challenge
to casinos attempting to attract new visitors to the region for the purpose of
gambling (Table 4). These factors may lead to a casino “arms race,” where
“more casinos are expected to be increasingly dependent on local patrons or
convenience gamblers to support their operations and will likely use proven
marketing approaches to attract potential gamblers who live near their
facilities” (e.g., frequent player incentives, free/discounted dining and drinking
programs, and entertainment discounts).19
Increasing competition, discounts and reliance on local
patrons would diminish the economic impact of the casinos
on Hampton Roads over time. Competitive pressures would
reduce demand for casino gambling, while incentives
and discounts would diminish the revenue per patron. An
increasing reliance on local residents would merely recycle
spending in the regional economy, diminishing the casinos’
contribution. With these proverbial headwinds in mind, we
turn to the task of estimating the potential economic impact of
these projects on the region.

19 J ulia M. Camp, Carol A. Hartley and Patrick T. Kelly, “The Expansion of Casino Gambling in the United
States – State Revenues and Public Interest Implications,” Accounting and the Public Interest (2018) 18 (1):
96, https://doi.org/10.2308/apin-52199.
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TABLE 4
CASINOS AND RACETRACKS/CASINOS WITHIN 250 MILES OF HAMPTON ROADS
Name

Location

Type

Racing Type

Gaming Machines

Table Games

Baltimore, MD

Casino

-

2,200

168

Ocean Downs Casino
and Racetrack

Berlin, MD

Horse Track/Casino

Harness

900

10

Hollywood Casino at
Charles Town Races

Charles Town, WV

Horse Track/Casino

Thoroughbred

1,300

90

Danville, VA

Casino (Proposed)

-

2,000

75

Dover, DE

Horse Track/Casino

Harness

2,600

58

Rosie's Gaming
Emporium

Dumfries, VA

Gaming Emporium

-

150

-

Rosie's Gaming
Emporium

Hampton, VA

Gaming Emporium

-

700

-

Live! Casino & Hotel

Hanover, MD

Hotel and Casino

-

4,000

250

Harrington Raceway and
Casino

Harrington, DE

Horse Track/Casino

Harness

1,800

51

Colonial Downs

New Kent, VA

Horse Track

Harness and
Thoroughbred

-

-

Rosie’s Gaming
Emporium

New Kent, VA

Gaming Emporium

-

600

-

HeadWaters Resort and
Casino

Norfolk, VA

Casino (Proposed)

-

3,000

150

MGM National Harbor

Oxon Hill, MD

Casino

-

2,900

170

Rivers Casino

Portsmouth, VA

Casino (Proposed)

-

TBD

TBD

Rosie's Gaming
Emporium

Richmond, VA

Gaming Emporium

-

700

-

One Casino + Resort

Richmond, VA

Casino (Proposed)

-

1,800

100

Horseshoe Casino

Horseshoe Casino
Dover Downs Hotel &
Casino

Source: Casino City, an independent directory and information service free of any gaming operator’s control, www.casinocity.com
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HEADWATERS RESORT AND CASINO IN NORFOLK
In September 2019, Norfolk’s City Council initially authorized a land deal
with the Pamunkey Indian Tribe that included a hotel, restaurants and an
entertainment venue.20 The proposal would have designated the land as
sovereign to the Pamunkey, not subject to taxation, and outside the jurisdiction
of Norfolk. In November 2019, after complaints of a lack of transparency,
doubts about the benefits of the deal and a signature petition that forced
the council to schedule public hearings, a new vote was scheduled on the
proposal. Two months later, Norfolk Mayor Kenny Alexander announced the
Pamunkey Tribe would go through the Commonwealth of Virginia. This change
reduced the initial investment plans from approximately $700 million to about
$500 million, although these estimates continue to evolve. Tennessee billionaire
and casino-gaming mogul Jon Yarbrough teamed up with Golden Eagle, the
tribe’s development partner, on the project.
In 2020, the city of Norfolk and the Pamunkey Indian Tribe came to a final
agreement, and the tribe signed a deal to purchase land to build the casino
resort. The new deal ensures the land will not become sovereign land and
Norfolk will receive tax revenue. The tribe has also been confirmed as a
preferred casino partner and will construct the HeadWaters Resort and Casino
near Harbor Park, home of the Norfolk Tides minor league baseball team.

projected to be between $26 million and $31 million annually.21 Press releases
from Capital Results, the firm that handles media relations for the Pamunkey
Indian Tribe, suggest that the opening could occur as early as 2022.

As of May 2021, the HeadWaters Resort and Casino was projected to have
3,000 slot machines, 150 table games and a sportsbook. Additionally, the
casino resort will have 300 hotel rooms, live music and entertainment venues,
bars and restaurants, indoor and outdoor pools, and a spa and fitness center.
City officials project total annual revenues to be between $415 million and
$485 million on a stabilized basis, with annual gaming revenues estimated
to be between $350 million and $400 million. Nongaming revenues, which
include profits from the hotel, food and beverage, and other amenities, are
estimated to be between $65 million and $85 million on a stabilized basis.
Payments to the city of Norfolk in the form of direct payments and taxes are

Portsmouth’s road to casino gambling has been much smoother than that of its
across-the-river neighbor. On Nov. 3, 2020, Portsmouth residents resoundingly
voted in favor of a casino – a proposal state Sen. Louise Lucas has supported
for more than 20 years. The hotel-casino, Rivers Casino Portsmouth, will
be built by Rush Street Gaming, just off Victory Boulevard near Tidewater
Community College, and eventually grow to include restaurants, a sportsbook
and other entertainment amenities. “For Portsmouth, this means $16.3
million in tax generation … [where] $16.3 million is an additional 7% of our
GDP,” said Robert Moore, director of economic development for the city of

20 T he Pamunkey were the first Virginia tribe to receive official sanction from the U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs
in July 2015. The reservation is located near the Chesapeake Bay on the north side of the James River,
approximately 90 miles northwest of downtown Norfolk. It is one of two original reservation lands assigned
from a treaty with the English colonial government.
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RIVERS CASINO PORTSMOUTH

21 P rojections assume stabilized operations in year three of the project, as well as the third year of operation of
all planned properties in the competitive market, https://www.norfolk.gov/DocumentCenter/View/61651/
Criteria-For-Selection-of-Gaming-Operator.

It’s All Good – Until It Isn’t

THE PROPOSED RIVERS CASINO PORTSMOUTH WILL BE BUILT AT I-264 AND VICTORY BOULEVARD, NEXT
TO TIDEWATER COMMUNITY COLLEGE. IT WILL BE DEVELOPED AND OPERATED BY CHICAGO-BASED RUSH
STREET GAMING.

Portsmouth. In addition to tax generation, the casino promises to create 1,400
temporary construction jobs, as well as 1,300 permanent jobs.22
Before work can begin on either the Norfolk or Portsmouth casino, licensing
must be obtained through the Commonwealth of Virginia, as well as the
Virginia Lottery Board. Once licenses have been granted, construction can
begin. Originally, the timeline called for shovels to break ground in November
2021, with the Portsmouth casino opening scheduled for 2023. More recently,
however, a spokesperson for the casino said the plans have been pushed
forward. Construction is currently expected to last 18 to 24 months, with the
venue opening its doors in late 2022.

We caution that survivorship bias tends to cloud the perceptions of casino
projects. We often hear of success stories but rarely learn about casinos that
fail to meet expectations. Presentations to city councils and state governments
highlight potential jobs and tax revenues, leading one to believe that a
casino (or most any gambling venture) is a sure bet. Experience has shown
(repeatedly) that, as the novelty wears off, gambling revenues plateau, if
not decline outright. Graph 2 illustrates how, after accounting for inflation,
casino revenues in Detroit declined from a peak in 2006 ($1.65 billion) to a
prepandemic low in 2019 ($1.41 billion). Locally, we need only point to the
performance of the Virginia Lottery at the end of the most recent decade, and
its push to introduce mobile betting as a means of addressing the stagnation in
sales, to highlight how consumer fatigue can lead to an ever-widening search
for gambling options to sustain revenues.
For Norfolk and Portsmouth, several questions and concerns arise from the
public-facing announcements. First, have the cities sufficiently accounted for
the operation of two casinos in relatively close proximity? Second, the expected
approval and operation of the Richmond casino likely will limit the gains from
repatriation by Virginia gamblers to Hampton Roads (the return of gambling
expenditures from other states to the Commonwealth). Will the cities and state
government revisit their revenue projections for the Norfolk and Portsmouth
casinos? Third, the rapid rise in mobile betting may not bode well for more
traditional, location-based forms of gambling. We ask whether the projections
account for the disruptive impact of technology on gambling preferences
and revenue. While we recognize that these questions are not
likely to win one accolades at city council or General Assembly
meetings, it is better to ask now rather than face questions in
the future of why revenue projections have fallen short.

22 h
 ttps://www.krem.com/article/news/local/casinos-are-on-their-way-to-norfolk-portsmouth-heres-whentheyll-be-completed/291-58cfae8e-aa50-4617-a1ab-728901d33cad.
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GRAPH 4
GRAPH 2

Real (Inflation-Adjusted) Detroit Casino Revenue, 2000-2019
REAL (INFLATION-ADJUSTED) DETROIT CASINO REVENUE, 2000-2019
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Who’s Coming To The
Casinos In Hampton Roads?
The promise of the casinos in Norfolk and Portsmouth (and elsewhere in the
Commonwealth) is that these gambling establishments will attract visitors,
create jobs, increase incomes and contribute to their respective city coffers.
Yet, there are other impacts to consider, especially when one draws back to the
regional level. A dollar spent in a casino in Norfolk or Portsmouth is one less
dollar spent in a restaurant, bar or movie theater in Hampton, Newport News,
Chesapeake, Suffolk or Virginia Beach. While Norfolk or Portsmouth
might “win” by attracting more dollars from other cities in
Hampton Roads, the displacement of spending from other
forms of entertainment to the casinos means that the economic
impact of the casinos on the region is likely to be small, not
transformative.
To gauge the potential economic impact of the casinos on the Hampton Roads
economy, we first need to ask from whence the casino patrons will come. The
more customers that come from outside the region, the greater the potential
economic impact of the casinos. Much like tourists visiting the Oceanfront who
“inject” money into the regional economy, nonresidents traveling to Hampton
Roads to gamble at the casinos will bring “new money” with them, adding to
the impact of the gambling establishments.

Who, then, will frequent the casinos in Norfolk and
Portsmouth? According to JLARC and the consulting firm The
Innovation Group (TIG), only 4% to 10% of casino revenue
is generated by customers who live outside the local market
area (within two hours’ driving distance). Only the Las Vegas
and Atlantic City markets have sustained higher proportions
of gaming revenue from out-of-market visits. For Hampton
Roads, this means that the revenue from out-of-state customers
would come from North Carolina, rather than states to the
north, due to the projected casino development in Richmond.
In other words, because of the geographical limitations of the
Hampton Roads market and the projected development of
casinos in Richmond and other areas of the Commonwealth,
most of the Norfolk and Portsmouth casino patrons will
come from within our metropolitan area. It would be difficult
to attract customers from Northern Virginia and Richmond
to Hampton Roads with a casino in Richmond occupying a
blocking position. While some might argue that summer
visitors to the Oceanfront will visit the casinos, this argument
also recognizes that some spending will be displaced from
restaurants, bars and other venues to the casinos.

Graph 3 illustrates JLARC’s 2019 estimates of the percentage of net gaming
revenue that will derive from spending by out-of-state customers. These
estimates suggest that the Hampton Roads casinos are unlikely to generate
a significant amount of revenue from out-of-state visitors. While there is a
possibility for the repatriation of spending from other states (i.e., Virginians
gambling in other states returning to gamble in the Commonwealth), the
proposed casino in Richmond would most likely stand to benefit substantially
from repatriated spending due to its closer proximity to casinos in Maryland
and West Virginia.
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GRAPH 5
GRAPH 3

Percentage of Net Gaming Revenue from Out-of-State Customers
PERCENTAGE OF NET GAMING REVENUE FROM OUT-OF-STATE CUSTOMERS
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Source: 2019 JLARC casinos report, http://jlarc.virginia.gov/pdfs/reports/Rpt527-5.pdf
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A Short Primer On Economic
Impact Analysis
When considering the economic impact of a policy, economists focus on two
broad effects: displacement and additionality. Changes in public policy may
cause economic agents (consumers and businesses) to alter their behavior. The
question is whether the policy change results in spending that is additional or
whether it displaces economic activity from one sector to another.
Additionality occurs when a policy change causes economic agents to
engage in behavior that they would not have taken in absence of the policy.
Economic agents do not shift expenditures from elsewhere in this case. If a
new advertising campaign, for example, influences a family from Pennsylvania
to come to Virginia Beach for a vacation that they otherwise would not have
taken, then the expenditures associated with the visit and the consequent
economic activity are additional to the economy.
Displacement, on the other hand, occurs when a policy change causes
economic agents to shift their behavior such that they reduce spending in one
area to increase spending in another area. The additional spending as a result
of the updated policy must be balanced against the reductions in spending
elsewhere to determine the economic impact. For example, if a consumer shifts
spending from going to a movie theater instead of a restaurant, the consumer
is merely “moving” spending from one form of entertainment to another. If one
fails to make allowances for displacement, the overall economic impact of a
project will be overstated.
To visualize how the economy reacts to a change in investment or employment,
imagine a pebble dropped in a puddle. The direct impact on employment,
sales and employee compensation ripples through the rest of the economy
like the waves moving outward through the puddle. These ripples represent
the indirect and induced impacts that come about through the
interconnectedness of the local economy.
The indirect impact comes from economic activity at companies frequented
by casino employees and companies that provide services to the casinos. The

induced impact comes via additional spending due to increases in income
generated by companies directly and indirectly affected by casino employment
or spending. These spillovers create a total economic impact that is larger than
the direct impact.
The notion of an economic multiplier summarizes the total economic impact
of a change in economic activity. If a firm invests $1 million (direct impact)
that in turn generates $300,000 in indirect economic impacts and $200,000
in induced economic impacts, then the economic impact multiplier effect is
($1,000,000 + $300,000 + $200,000) / $1,000,000 = 1.5.
From this perspective, consider the impact of going to the gym. If you usually
use the elliptical machine but switch to the treadmill for the same amount
effort and time, the marginal impact on your fitness is negligible. On the other
hand, if you were only working out two days a week and increase to five days
a week, there will be a discernable impact on your fitness. Our question is
whether the casinos attract “new” money or recycle “old” money within the
region.
Analysts’ estimates of economic impact can often seem
confusing. We explain below some of the more common
terms they use:
• Compensation – the total payroll cost of employees,
including wages, salaries and all benefits.
• Employment – the annual average of full-time, part-time
and seasonal employment in an industry or region.
• Output – the measure of the total value of goods produced
in an industry. However, output from one industry utilizes
output from other industries, so the measure overstates the
contribution of an industry to GDP.
• Value Added – the total market value of all final goods and
services produced in a region in a given period of time. Value
added is the measure of the increase or decrease in GDP.
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Estimating The Economic
Impact Of Casinos In
Hampton Roads
To estimate the economic impact of each casino, we use projections of three
economic inputs: capital investment (buildings, furnishings, equipment and
so on), direct employment and annual casino revenue (Table 5). Of course,
our estimates depend on the accuracy of the projections of these economic
inputs. Given the continued evolution of the scale and scope of the casinos in
Norfolk and Portsmouth, our estimates should be viewed as informative rather
than authoritative. For these assumptions, we draw upon JLARC analysis,
news reports and staff analyses from the cities of Norfolk and Portsmouth. We
estimate aggregate economic impacts of the casinos on Hampton Roads.23

recognize that not all the expenditures on these projects will stay in the region.
Some building supplies, furnishings, machines and services will be sourced
from outside Hampton Roads, so it would not be appropriate to act as if all
these expenditures were occurring in the region. We conservatively estimate
that 40% of capital investment expenditures will occur within Hampton Roads,
while the remaining spending will take place outside the region. This means
that of the $800 million in projected capital investments in the two casinos,
approximately $320 million will be spent within Hampton Roads.
We estimate that construction of the two casinos will temporarily lift
employment in Hampton Roads by approximately 4,200 jobs and add $291.9
million to nominal GDP (Table 6). These jobs and increases in GDP are
transitory; that is, once the construction is complete, the jobs and increases in
output will largely dissipate. To place these estimates in context, the increase in
output, if it occurred within one year, would amount to approximately 0.3% of
Hampton Roads’ 2019 GDP.

TABLE 5
ECONOMIC IMPACT ANALYSIS ASSUMPTIONS
Capital
Investment

Gambling
Revenues

Nongambling
Revenues

Norfolk

$500 million

$350 million

$45 million

Portsmouth

$300 million

$150 million

$20 million

Sources: City of Norfolk (2020), “Staff Report – Impacts of a Casino Hotel on the City of Norfolk”; WAVY.
com (2021), “Portsmouth Casino Developer Commits to Building Hotel, but Won’t Say When”; and the Dragas
Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University

ESTIMATED IMPACT OF CONSTRUCTION
Unlike some other recent projects in Hampton Roads, the
construction of the two casinos will not receive any state or
local government tax incentives or grants. Instead, private
funds will be used to fund construction. The injection of new capital
into Hampton Roads for the building of the casinos and associated properties
will temporarily boost jobs and output in the region. However, one must also
23 W
 e use IMPLAN from the IMPLAN Group and JOBSEQ from Chmura Economics and Analytics to model the
economic impacts. The results presented in this chapter were generated using IMPLAN.
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TABLE 6
ECONOMIC IMPACT: PROPOSED INVESTMENTS IN
CASINOS IN NORFOLK AND PORTSMOUTH
Direct

Indirect

Induced

Total

Employment

2,875

424

908

4,207

Value Added
(Millions)

$171.0

$42.3

$78.6

$291.9

Compensation
(Millions)

$166.5

$25.2

$39.1

$230.8

Sources: Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University, and IMPLAN Group.
Estimates may not sum due to rounding.

IMPACT OF SUSTAINED OPERATIONS
To estimate the annual economic impact of the fully operational
casinos, we must first consider the question of displacement. If,
as noted by JLARC and TIG, the casinos in Norfolk and Portsmouth generate
about 10% of net gaming revenues from out-of-state customers, and the
casino in Richmond is approved, then the pool from which the casinos will
draw will be limited compared to the casinos in Bristol, Danville or Richmond.
Furthermore, the literature and practice show that casinos tend to draw
customers predominantly from their local market area. This means that much
of the revenue generated by the Norfolk and Portsmouth casinos will be the
result of spending that is reallocated by Hampton Roads residents. While
one might quibble about the extent of displacement, it will clearly occur, and
will invariably reduce the overall impact of the casinos on regional economic
activity.
Graphs 4 and 5 illustrate the projected annual economic impact of spending
in the Hampton Roads casinos. If one completely ignores displacement and
assumes (unrealistically) that all spending in the casinos will come from outside
the region, then the industry output would increase by about $868 million.
However, since we want to avoid double counting (a flaw in some projections
of the impacts of casinos), we focus on the impact on regional GDP measured
by value added, which would be approximately $462.2 million. Completely
ignoring displacement would lead one to conclude that the casinos would
create almost 7,300 jobs in Hampton Roads.
We cannot ignore displacement, of course, and studies that
shrug displacement effects aside or provide estimates of
economic impact based on industry output alone should be
viewed with a healthy dose of skepticism.24 For example,
if the casinos generated $500 million annually in gambling
revenue, but 50% of that revenue originated from within
Hampton Roads, then only the impact of the “new” spending
24 If displacement occurs, where displacement occurs, and the magnitude of displacement by casinos remain
a matter of debate in the economics literature. Leven and Phares (1998) estimated that about half of casino
revenues in Missouri were the result of displacement spending. Siegel and Anders (1999) found that
casino spending displaced other forms of entertainment spending in 11 Missouri counties. Chhadra (2007)
estimated that about 30% of Iowa gamblers would have participated in other entertainment activities if
casinos were not locally available. Wiley and Walker (2009), on the other hand, found a complementary
effect between casinos and retail property values in the Detroit urban area.

($250 million) should be considered. To do otherwise ignores
the impact of consumers shifting dollars away from local
restaurants, bars, movie theaters and other establishments to
spend on gambling, rooms, and food and drink in the casinos.
Using value added (the addition to regional GDP) and
accounting for displacement yields more realistic estimates
of the casinos’ impact. If 50% of spending is from outside
the region (an optimistic estimate), the casinos will add $231
million to regional GDP and create more than 3,600 jobs.
However, if only 10% of casino patrons are from outside the
region, the net annual economic impact of the casinos shrinks
to only $46 million and 730 jobs.
The fiscal impact of the casinos depends on where one stands. While
projections vary, the casinos in Norfolk and Portsmouth are expected to
generate about $350 million and $150 million, respectively, in revenue
annually. The budgets of Norfolk and Portsmouth will undoubtedly benefit from
the spending at the casinos. In September 2020, the city of Norfolk projected
that the Norfolk casino would generate between $24.8 million and $44.5
million annually.25 A November 2020 release from the city of Portsmouth stated
that the Portsmouth casino would generate more than $16 million annually.26
We do not argue that the cities where the casinos are located will benefit from
increases in tax revenue; however, we need to point out that as displacement
rises, the revenues of other cities and counties in Hampton Roads may decline
as consumers shift some of their spending to Norfolk and Portsmouth.

25 h
 ttps://www.norfolk.gov/DocumentCenter/View/62929/Casino-Hotel-Staff-Report-Final.
26 https://www.accessportsmouthva.com/news-and-press/rush-street-gaming-casino-approved-by-voters-inportsmouth-virginia.
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GRAPH 6
GRAPH 4

Estimated Annual Economic Impact of Casinos on Output and GDP: Hampton Roads, Net of Displacement
ESTIMATED ANNUAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CASINOS ON OUTPUT AND GDP: HAMPTON ROADS,
NET OF DISPLACEMENT
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GRAPH 7
GRAPH 5

Estimated Annual Economic Impact of Casinos on Employment: Hampton Roads, Net of Displacement
ESTIMATED ANNUAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CASINOS ON EMPLOYMENT: HAMPTON ROADS,
NET OF DISPLACEMENT
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Problem Gambling
According to The Recovery Village Drug and Alcohol Rehab treatment facility,
an estimated 10 million Americans struggle with gambling addiction in the
United States. The social costs attributed to gambling vary, depending on the
type of gambler. Gambling addiction can affect anyone of any age or gender,
and it impacts not only the individual with the problem but also close family
and friends. This addiction is more common in adults than in adolescents, but
the exposure to and participation in gambling at a younger age increases the
risk of developing a gambling problem later in life. Approximately 1 in 20
college students are said to exhibit signs of compulsive gambling, a rate that is
higher than that for the overall adult population.27 Table 7 lists local programs
that specialize in gambling addiction.
For many people, addiction to gambling isn’t an isolated problem. Individuals
who are most at risk of developing gambling problems typically have
preexisting addictions or disorders. A correlational link exists between
gambling and depression, and one study found suicidal ideation in nearly
half of its respondents.28 Substance abuse is also prevalent among these
individuals, with the connection to alcoholism being most common. Although
little data exist on gambling addiction among adults in Virginia, research
suggests the estimated percentage of Virginia adults with a gambling problem
is between 5% and 10%.29 Previous estimates of the general public afflicted
with a gambling disorder range from approximately 0.5% to 2%. Hampton
Roads is home to approximately 1.8 million people, so there may be between
9,000 and 36,000 problem gamblers in the region. Yet, with the advent of the
mobile lottery, online sportsbooks and games of skill, the argument that casinos
will be the impetus for problem gambling seems to have lost some steam.
The challenge for cities and counties in Hampton Roads will likely be meeting
the rising demand for mental health services due to the increasing range of
gambling choices available to the public. It may be appropriate to allocate
more funds to behavioral health services in order to meet this demand.
27 T he Recovery Village, Gambling Addiction Facts and Statistics, https://www.therecoveryvillage.com/
process-addiction/compulsive-gambling/related/gambling-statistics/, and the National Center for
Responsible Gaming, https://www.icrg.org/sites/default/files/oec/pdfs/ncrg_fact_sheet_gambling_
disorders.pdf.
28 https://preventionlane.org/gambling-vulnerable-populations.
29 https://www.virginiamercury.com/2020/02/24/as-virginia-preps-for-casinos-and-sports-betting-expertssay-state-needs-sharper-focus-on-problem-gambling/
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TABLE 7
GAMBLING ADDICTION TREATMENT PROVIDERS:
HAMPTON ROADS, 2019
Name

Location

Middle Peninsula Northern Neck
Counseling Center

9228 George Washington
Memorial Highway
Gloucester, Virginia 23061

Norfolk Community Services Board

7460 Tidewater Drive
Norfolk, Virginia 23505

Sentara Norfolk General Hospital
Gambling Addiction Treatment

600 Gresham Drive
Norfolk, Virginia 23507

Virginia Beach Mental Health
Substance Abuse Division

289 Independence Blvd.,
Pembroke 3, Suite 245
Virginia Beach, Virginia 23462

Hampton Veterans Affairs Medical
Center/Mental Health SATP

100 Emancipation Drive, Unit 116-A
Hampton, Virginia 23667

Mental Health Support Services
Alpha Counseling

2278 Executive Drive
Hampton, Virginia 23666

Gordon Wellness LLC

610 Thimble Shoals Blvd., Suite 403
Newport News, Virginia 23606

A. Richards Counseling and
Psychotherapy

720 Rodman Ave.
Portsmouth, Virginia 23707

Virginia Beach Department of DHS
MHSA Div Adult Day Treatment

1045 Lynnhaven Parkway
Virginia Beach, Virginia 23452

Western Tidewater Community
Services Board

7025 Harbour View Blvd., Suite 119
Suffolk, Virginia 23435

Source: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Administration (2019)

Do Casinos Increase Crime?
Opponents of casinos rely on a straightforward argument:
Casinos attract people with money to spend, and criminals,
being profit-maximizing individuals, are quick to offer illicit
services (drugs and prostitution, for example) or prey on
those with money (confidence scams, robbery and the like).
Proponents of casinos argue that the evidence supporting
the casino-crime hypothesis is overstated. It turns out the
evidence, depending on how one looks at it, can support either
perspective.
Since the 1980s, more than 30 peer-reviewed studies have examined the
influence of commercial casinos on criminal activity and public safety. A
2019 review of these studies found that some of them concluded criminal
activity increased after casinos opened; other studies reported that some
crimes increased and some decreased (a mixed effect); and still others saw
no statistical evidence to support the hypothesis that casinos influence criminal
activity (Table 8). Yet, as with academic studies, one must read past the
abstract to discern the nuance of the findings.
TABLE 8
FINDINGS OF 32 CASINO-CRIMINAL ACTIVITY STUDIES
Total Number
of Studies

Percentage
of Studies

Increase in crime

4

13%

Mixed effect (increases
and decreases in crime)

9

28%

No impact on crime

19

59%

Finding

Source: Jay Albanese (2019), “Casino gambling impacts on crime and public safety: A review of 30 years of
research,” International Journal of Criminal Justice Sciences 14 (2), 320-338

First, the demographics of casino patrons indicate that they are less likely to
be involved in crimes typically measured by these studies. Crime statistics show
that, on average, younger individuals are more likely to perpetrate and be
victims of crime than older individuals, especially street crimes. Casinos attract

an older and higher-income clientele, who are more likely to go out less often,
go home earlier and visit less desirable places than younger people. Casino
patrons who are in their 40s and 50s are likely to behave much differently
than theme park, bar and beach visitors in their 20s and 30s.
Second, revenue from casinos may fund the growth of public safety services,
which, in turn, uncover more criminal activity. Most studies fail to account
for the level and composition of public safety resources prior to and after the
introduction of a commercial casino. This is not to say the area surrounding the
casino is safer or less safe, just that there are more public safety resources. This
leads to more interactions with the public, which, in turn, leads to more reports
of criminal activity.
Third, many studies are geographically limited and cannot be extended to
other locations. A 2019 study of casinos in Southern California found that
perceived staff friendliness and casino popularity on Yelp were significantly
related to higher crime rates. However, the nature of the study meant that its
results were only specific to the area being examined.
A 2021 study suggested that criminal activity around a casino may “behave”
much like casino revenues – increasing at opening and then returning to preopening levels.30 The JACK Casino opened in Cincinnati’s central business
district in 2013. Within the casino’s neighboring area, criminal activity
decreased during construction (2012) and the year of opening. Criminal
activity increased from 2014 to 2016, even while the city experienced an
overall decline in property crimes. Criminal activity then dropped to the preopening level.
The latest findings in the literature suggest that psychology
may play an important role in the casino-crime hypothesis.
Increases in crime appear to occur after casinos open, but
these increases may subside after the initial surge. Upticks in
crime tend to be frequently reported (one need only watch
the evening newscast or read the morning paper to see how
criminal activity is often featured), while statistics that show
decreases in crime rarely make the news.
30 M
 inxuan Lan, Lin Liu and John Eck (2021), “A spatial analytical approach to assess the impact of a casino
on crime: An example of JACK Casino in downtown Cincinnati,” Cities 111, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
cities.2020.103003.
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Both sides appear to be partially correct; there is evidence that
casinos do result in more criminal activity, and there is also
a lack of evidence that casinos result in more crime. The risk
for decision makers in Norfolk and Portsmouth is to assume
that all will turn out well. It would be better to be prepared
by investing now in public safety resources rather than to be
surprised when criminal activity increases after the casinos
open. Being optimistic about crime is not a tenable policy
position.

Final Thoughts
Over the last decade, Virginia has doubled down on its bet on legalized
gambling. Today, a resident of Hampton Roads can place a bet through an
online or mobile sportsbook, buy a physical or virtual lottery ticket, visit a
historical horse racing establishment and look forward to gambling at a casino
in Norfolk or Portsmouth in the near future. This is a marked change from three
decades ago when Virginia did not even have a state lottery.
With this in mind, we offer some final observations about the expansion
of gambling and the opening of casinos in Hampton Roads and across the
Commonwealth.
Governments in Virginia are increasing their reliance on taxes
that are more sensitive to economic conditions. Proponents of
casinos and other forms of gambling invariably point to the contributions to
local and state budgets to support these projects. While we do not deny that
gambling will enhance the bottom lines of Norfolk and Portsmouth, we also
note that casinos are sensitive to changes in economic conditions. Given that
the casinos in these cities will primarily attract patrons from Hampton Roads,
their fortunes may rise and fall in relation to decisions made in Washington,
D.C., regarding the size and composition of the federal budget. As most of us
are aware, the strength – or lack thereof – of our regional economy is closely
tied to federal defense spending.
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Casinos will create jobs and increase output in Hampton
Roads, but the impact across the region is likely to be small.
An increase in the number of jobs in the region would be welcome news,
especially given the relatively anemic job growth over the decade prior to the
COVID-19 pandemic. However, these jobs are likely to be concentrated in the
leisure and hospitality sector, which continues to struggle to attract workers in
the aftermath of the pandemic. Even our most optimistic estimates suggest that
the casinos might lift output by 0.4% on an annual basis, an incremental rather
than monumental gain. Experience in the gambling industry shows that, after
the novelty has worn off, revenues tend to plateau, if not outright decline. We
caution readers to view promises of sustained, fulsome impacts over time with
a wary, informed eye.
Displacement effects should not be cast aside in the
conversation about casinos or other projects. The majority of
benefits from the casinos are likely to accrue to Norfolk and Portsmouth. With
about half of workers in Hampton Roads living in one community and working
in another, there are likely to be some spillovers across the region in terms of
spending and employment. However, the economic impact of the two Hampton
Roads casinos is likely to be lower than that produced by casinos in other
Virginia regions where the proportion of out-of-state visitors is expected to
be higher. Hampton Roads would need visitors to the region to increase their
spending rather than substitute casino patronage for other forms of leisure
activity. One dollar cannot be spent at the same time in different places.
Gambling is here, thus we should plan accordingly for the
social costs. We know that problem gambling and criminal activity are
likely to occur at higher rates as gambling opportunities increase, so we should
act now. Enhancing our investment in behavioral and mental health services
is not only a wise course of action to help residents cope with gambling
addiction, but also to address other economic and social shocks. Investing
more in policing, including community-based approaches to nonviolent crimes,
appears to be a sensible response to the projected increases in visitors to the
casinos. Finally, working across jurisdictional boundaries will be necessary,
given that many local residents will travel to the casinos to work or gamble. As
with other challenges and opportunities in Hampton Roads, collaboration can
help increase the gains for the entire region.
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Whither
Old Dominion University?

WHITHER OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY?
I don’t get no respect.
– Comedian Rodney Dangerfield’s iconic catchphrase

I

n August 2020, the respected Times Higher Education Impact Rankings placed Old Dominion University among the Top 100 institutions in the world in terms of its
ability to reduce economic inequality and provide students with upward social and economic mobility. The ranking reflected the large number of first-generation
college students at ODU and their subsequent social and economic success. ODU was the only university in Virginia to crack the Top 100 and one of only 12 from
the United States within this group.1

The reaction to this news? Underwhelming, to say the least. This achievement
received scant coverage by regional media and zero mentions in the Richmond
Times-Dispatch and The Washington Post.

However, when U.S. News & World Report subsequently issued its annual
rankings of institutions, there were headlines and stories galore. Much was
made of the number of highly ranked Virginia campuses, which included the
University of Virginia at No. 26 among national universities, William & Mary
at No. 39 and Virginia Tech at No. 74. The slightly improved rankings of
institutions such as Tech were noted in the media and trumpeted by the favored
institutions.2 Independently, in 2018, SmartAsset, a financial technology
company, proclaimed that Virginia had the best higher education system in the
nation.3
Because they have an impact on ODU, it is instructive to take a closer look at
ranking systems such as those used by SmartAsset and U.S. News & World
Report. These are narrowly tailored metrics that pay almost no attention
1 “ Impact Rankings 2020 by SDG: Reduced Inequalities,” Times Higher Education, www.timeshighereducation.
com/rankings/impact/2020/reducing-inequalities#!/page/3/length/25/sort_by/rank/sort_order/asc/
cols/undefined.
2 For example, Virginia Tech moved up from No. 76 to No. 74 in the national university rankings and proudly
made note of this: https://vtnews.vt.edu/articles/2019/09/provost-usnewsrankings-2020.html. In the same
rankings, the University of Virginia fell out of the Top 25: Justin Mattingly, “University of Virginia Falls Out of
the Top 25 in College Rankings List,” Richmond Times-Dispatch (Sept. 9, 2019), https://richmond.com/news/
local/university-of-virginia-falls-out-of-top-25-in-college-rankings-list/article_cab477eb-8e2e-5708-81a26203e8fc2394.html.
3 “Top Ten States for Higher Education,” SmartAsset (May 7, 2018), https://smartasset.com/student-loans/topstates-for-higher-education-2018-edition.
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to the distinctive needs of part-time students, distance learning students or
more mature students. But in fall 2020, 35.3% of students at public four-year
institutions attended part time.4 Further, in fall 2017, 42% of students attending
public institutions were age 25 or older5 and in fall 2018, 35.3% were taking
at least one distance learning course.6
Nor do the most popular of today’s campus ranking systems give more than
passing attention to the racial and ethnic makeup of student bodies. U.S. News
& World Report does not seem to care that only 7% of undergraduates at UVA
self-identified as being Black in fall 2019 (the comparable percentage at ODU
was 32%). Indeed, since 2012, ODU has enrolled more Black students than
Norfolk State University, but this is of no consequence to the magazine.
U.S. News & World Report’s ranking system does assign a 5% weight to the
six-year graduation rate of each institution’s Pell Grant recipients – students
who come to campuses from lower-income households. The other 95% of the
magazine weights, however, focus on traditional high school graduates who
proceed to college immediately after graduation and the quantity of resources
each institution devotes to its mission.
4 “ Total Fall Enrollment in Degree-Granting Postsecondary Institutions,” Table 303.40, College Navigator,
National Center for Education Statistics, https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d19/tables/dt19_303.40.
asp.
5 “ Characteristics of Postsecondary Students” (April 2020), National Center for Education Statistics,
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_csb.asp.
6 “ Distance Learning,” College Navigator, National Center for Education Statistics, https://nces.ed.gov/
fastfacts/display.asp?id=80. One-sixth of all students were taking only distance learning courses. Doubtless
COVID-19 has increased this percentage.

Even though it has been well established that household
income is an important determinant of whether students can
attend college and subsequently persist and graduate, ranking
systems like those of U.S. News & World Report pay scant
attention to this. This matters in the Commonwealth of Virginia. Consider
that in 2015 the average undergraduate student at W&M came from a
household whose annual income ranked it in the 81.8th percentile nationally,
while at ODU, the comparable statistic was the 61.4th percentile.7
The bottom line is that the established ranking systems place ODU in
a quandary. The University has evolved into an institution that not only
champions access and mobility, but as the Times Higher Education ranking
reveals, also has experienced substantial success in providing such. The
problem is that, historically, these principles and activities have not been valued
highly – either in Virginia or nationally. Lip service may be given to access and
affordability, but these are campus characteristics that have remarkably little to
do with elevated rankings or institutional prestige.
Institutions such as UVA, Virginia Tech and W&M historically
have filled important roles in the Commonwealth. They have
assembled impressive records in admitting and graduating
talented students who (predictably) do well after they leave
these campuses. Their graduates perennially play important
roles in society. Nevertheless, the future viability and cohesion
of the Commonwealth in the 21st century more likely will
be determined on campuses like ODU, for it is there that
the critical societal mobility task is being addressed in a
meaningful way.
The relevant societal test with respect to Virginia’s public colleges and
universities is not whether highly intelligent students who come to those
campuses from wealthy households can succeed. They nearly always do,
even if they do not graduate (Bill Gates, Steve Jobs, Larry Ellison and
Mark Zuckerberg, for example). Instead, the pertinent challenge facing the
Commonwealth is whether less well-situated students coming from less-wealthy
7 R
 aj Chetty, John Friedman, Emmanuel Saez, Nicholas Turner and Danny Yagan, “Mobility Report Cards:
The Role of Colleges in Intergenerational Mobility,” Opportunity Insights, https://opportunityinsights.org/
education.
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households also can ultimately climb the ladder of success. It is the fate of these
graduates that will indicate whether the American dream is still alive and well.
If higher education institutions similar to ODU succeed in
moving students upward, then our society will be opportunitybased, optimistic and stable. However, if the ODUs of
the world fail or their efforts are sidetracked, then the
possibility that we will experience societal upheaval increases
significantly. Those who pooh-pooh this assessment should
recall certain pre-COVID-19 public events and demonstrations
that occurred around the country (including those in
Charlottesville and Richmond), as well as the postelection
storming of the U.S. Capitol. While the issues motivating these
demonstrations varied from one site to another, collectively
they reflected a common circumstance: a world that has
become more volatile and less happy because increasing
numbers of citizens perceive that they do not have realistic
opportunities for upward mobility.
With this as prologue, let us focus on ODU, where Brian O. Hemphill, Ph.D.,
has just assumed the role of president. We begin by examining measures of
the University’s size and then discuss its performance.

Enrollment
Graph 1 reveals that Old Dominion’s headcount enrollment ended the previous
decade just about where it was when the decade started – between 24,000
and 25,000 students. Since the University always has enrolled many parttime students, the conversion of headcount enrollment to full-time equivalents
(FTEs) is important because state funding is substantially connected to FTEs.
According to the U.S. Department of Education, ODU’s 12-month FTE
enrollment in 2018-19 was 19,291, which constituted 79.8% of its headcount
enrollment. Interestingly, this percentage has not changed significantly in recent
years despite the University’s commitment to instruction via the internet.
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Counter to expectations, and despite the COVID-19 pandemic, ODU’s
fall 2020 headcount enrollment grew more than 2%, even though college
headcount enrollments nationally were declining by 2.5%. This was the ninth
consecutive year that national higher education enrollments had deteriorated.
The mix of ODU’s students has changed gradually. Between 2010 and 2020,
the University lost approximately 1,000 graduate students, but this was
counterbalanced by a gain of about 1,000 undergraduate students.8 This
shift reflected a variety of factors, including the opening of new on-campus
housing for undergraduates and a thriving economy that diminished the desire
of some to pursue graduate degrees. The University’s undergraduate student
body progressively has become more female. In fall 2004, 52.31% of ODU
undergraduates were women. By fall 2018, this percentage had climbed to
59.05%.9
The student body also has become substantially more diverse in terms of race.
Over an approximate quarter-century (1994 to 2018), the percentage of
self-identified Black (non-Hispanic) students doubled. Graph 2 highlights the
year 2012 because this was the first year in which ODU enrolled more Black
students than NSU. With respect to Black students, ODU’s student body now
roughly reflects the Black population in Hampton Roads.
The phenomenon of increasing diversity has not been confined to Black
students. The percentage of Hispanic/Latino students at the University more
than quadrupled over the same period (Graph 3). The same cannot be said for
students who self-identify as Asian, however, as Graph 4 illustrates. Although
the percentage representation of Asian and Asian American students on the
ODU campus has been edging upward in recent years, it remains below its
2003 level (Graph 4). Various reasons have been posed as explanations for
this and most relate to the perceived levels of comfort of Asian and Asian
American students at ODU. More persuasive, perhaps, is the paucity of people
living in Hampton Roads who self-identify as Asian or Asian American – it is
only 3.5%, well below the Commonwealth’s 6.9%.10
18 International undergraduate students were not part of this expansion, however. During the first decade of this
century, ODU enrolled an average of 35 new undergraduate international students per year. This number
has fallen to about 20 in recent years, U.S. Department of Education, Integrated Postsecondary Education
Data System (IPEDS), “Fall Enrollment: Residence and Migration of First-Time Freshmen,” https://nces.
ed.gov/ipeds.
19 IPEDS.
10 U.S. Census, Quick Facts, www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/VA,US/PST045219.
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GRAPH
GRAPH 11
Headcount
Enrollments: Old Dominion University,
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FALL2010-Fall
2010-FALL 2020
Fall
2020

28,000
24,466

24,233

Enrollments

23,000

18,000

19,655

18,965

13,000

8,000

5,501

4,578

3,000
2010

2011

2012

2013

- Total

2014

2015

Undergraduate

-

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

Graduate

Source: IPEDS, the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System, https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds. Undergraduate and graduate data were estimated for 2014.

Source: IPEDS, the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System, https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds. Undergraduate and graduate data were estimated for 2014

1

WHITHER OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY?

111

GRAPH 2
GRAPH 2

Percent of Black (Non-Hispanic Students):

PERCENT OF BLACK (NON-HISPANIC) STUDENTS:
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Percent of Hispanic and Latino Students:

PERCENT OF HISPANIC AND LATINO STUDENTS:
OLD Dominion
DOMINION University,
UNIVERSITY, 1994-2018
Old
1994-2018

9%
8.0%

8%
7%

Percent

6%
4.8%

5%
4%
3%

1.6%

2%

I

1.9%

1%

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

0%

Source:
Education Data
Data System,
System,https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds
https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds
Source:IPEDS,
IPEDS,the
theIntegrated
Integrated Postsecondary
Postsecondary Education

3

WHITHER OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY?

113

GRAPH 4
GRAPH
4 American Students:
Percent of Asian and
Asian
PERCENT OF ASIAN AND ASIAN AMERICAN STUDENTS:
Old Dominion University, 2003-2019
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Faculty And Administrators
In 2020, Old Dominion’s faculty numbered 901, and it had 546 administrators
and administrative professionals. In addition, the University employed 1,053
classified staff and 562 part-time workers. It ranked as the 17th-largest
employer in Hampton Roads.11

DIVERSITY
Asians and Asian Americans are more heavily represented among the
University’s faculty than in its student body. In 2020, almost 13% of faculty
were Asian or Asian American. Approximately 37% of the faculty members
were non-white.12
ODU enjoys the distinction of having had the first woman president of a fouryear public university in Virginia. JoAnn Gora, who was the provost for nine
years, served as acting president in 1995. Subsequently, Roseann Runte served
as president between 2001 and 2007.

FACULTY RECOGNITION
Stanford University recently compiled a world listing of faculty members whose
work has been most frequently cited by others. Stanford limited the group to
the Top 2% in that regard in 22 scientific fields and 176 subfields. It is notable
that 53 ODU faculty members were recognized by Stanford as members of this
prestigious academic club.13 Not bad for an institution that began in 1930 as
a two-year division of the College of William & Mary. This achievement has
received only sparse recognition in the media, however. Rodney Dangerfield
would have understood this.

11 “Facts and Figures,” Old Dominion University, www.odu.edu/about/facts-and-figures. Data are as of
December 2020.
12 Faculty Demographics, www.odu.edu/acadaffairs/faculty-diversity/faculty-demographics. Data are as of
December 2020.
13 John P.A. Ioannidis, Kevin W. Boyack and Jeroen Bass, “Updated Science-Wide Author Databases of
Standardized Citation Indicators,” PLOS Biology, 18(10), 2020, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.
pbio.3000918.
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INSTITUTIONAL MISSION
A tension sometimes emerges on campus between those who see ODU
as a research institution and those who view it as an institution that offers
opportunity and upward mobility in society to students who often come to
it from lower-income households. “ODU is attempting to ride two horses at
once,” was the pungent observation of a former president, “and the two horses
aren’t going the same direction.” Opined another external observer, “You can
excel at one but seldom at both.”
It is not the function of the State of the Region Report to determine ODU’s
mission or the goals that are placed in front of its faculty and staff. It is
appropriate, however, for us to note that no higher education institution can
be all things to all people. Given limited resources, choice-making cannot
be avoided. Better that ODU (or any organization) understand the choices
confronting it than to evolve unknowingly into an amorphous entity that reflects
accident rather than design. Are the University’s undergraduate admission
practices consistent with its role as a research institution?

Conventional Institutional
Performance Measures
Were one to ask a random citizen or legislator to identify the metrics that
best measure university performance, likely they would mention retention,
graduation rates and the ability of graduates to obtain good-paying jobs after
receiving their diploma. Research institutions might add the amount of each
institution’s externally funded research to this list.14
Consensus deteriorates when one attempts to add metrics to the previous list.
Because the missions of institutions differ, metrics designed to illuminate the
performance of a flagship land-grant institution should not be the same as
those constructed to evaluate the activities of a historically black college or
university (HBCU), a metropolitan institution such as Old Dominion or
14 “ University Performance Metrics,” Strategy2Act, www.strategy2act.com/solutions/university-performancemetrics.htm.
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a regional baccalaureate institution such as the University of Virginia’s College
at Wise.

was 52.8% in 2019 (Graph 6). Reflecting national trends, the graduation rate
for ODU men (48.3%) was substantially below that for ODU women (57.0%).

However, it is not easy to convince citizens, legislators and especially the
media not to evaluate all institutions using the same criteria. Applying the same
metrics to all institutions at first glance might seem reasonable and proper,
but often this results in apples-and-oranges comparisons. Nevertheless, let us
consider how ODU performs with respect to three conventional criteria: student
retention rates, graduation rates and the subsequent employment success of
graduates.

Once again, graduation rates at GMU (71%) and VCU (61%) were higher
than that at ODU. With respect to its retention and graduation rates, ODU
can point out that it serves a less wealthy student body than the other two
institutions and that the SAT/ACT scores of its students are not as high as those
at the other two. The average household income national percentile of ODU
students was the 61.4th, while it was the 69.3rd at GMU and the 70.8th at
VCU.16 Meanwhile, for freshmen who entered these institutions in fall 2019, the
median SAT score in mathematics was 520 at ODU, but 560 at VCU and 600
at GMU. Thus, the average undergraduate attending ODU is less wealthy and
less academically prepared than the average student at either GMU or VCU,
and this is reflected in graduation rates.17

RETENTION
College students who drop out are expensive, both to institutions and to
themselves. Job markets pay large salary premiums to individuals who have
earned a baccalaureate degree compared to those who dropped out prior to
graduation.15
Graph 5 reports the retention rate from freshman to sophomore year for firsttime, full-time undergraduate students at ODU. The national average rate
at four-year public institutions was 81% between 2018 and 2019. ODU’s
retention rate was 80%, not bad given the nontraditional nature of its student
body.
Nonetheless, institutions in Virginia that perhaps are comparable exhibit
higher retention rates – George Mason University retains 86% and Virginia
Commonwealth University retains 83%. These data represent a chink in ODU’s
armor when “How well are you doing?” discussions occur among citizens and
decision makers.

Table 1 summarizes the simple correlation coefficients between retention rates,
graduation rates, the incomes of the households from which students come,
students’ SAT/ACT scores and the percentage of undergraduates receiving Pell
Grants. The data are paired observations for the 2018-19 academic year from
a sample of 235 four-year public colleges and universities. It is apparent that
both retention and graduation rates are strongly associated with household
incomes and standardized test scores. Many national studies have concluded
that cause-and-effect relationships exist among these variables.
These data suggest that it would be wise for the State Council of Higher
Education for Virginia (SCHEV) to publish statistically adjusted retention and
graduation rates for each institution, controlling for their respective household
family incomes and standardized test scores. One could then obtain a better
idea of how well each institution is performing, given its student body.18

GRADUATION
Students who drop out of college between their freshman and sophomore
years are unlikely to ultimately graduate from college. Therefore, given its
retention rate, it is predictable that ODU’s graduation rate is not impressive.
The University’s six-year graduation rate for all first-time, full-time freshmen
15 In 2017, individuals ages 25-29 earned an average of $19,034 more annually than those who completed
some college but did not graduate: Wesley Whistle, “Ripple Effect: The Cost of the College Dropout Rate,”
Third Way (Jan. 28, 2019), www.thirdway.org/report/ripple-effect-the-cost-of-the-college-dropout-rate.
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16 R
 aj Chetty, John Friedman, Emmanuel Saez, Nicholas Turner and Danny Yagan, “Mobility Report Cards: The
Role of Colleges in Intergenerational Mobility,” https://opportunityinsights.org.
17 “ Admissions: First Time Freshman Profile,” State Council of Higher Education for Virginia, https://research.
schev.edu//enrollment/B10_FreshmenProfile.asp.
18 T here could be some “moral hazard” attached to such a policy. Institutions might perceive a reduced need to
recruit and admit qualified students.

GRAPH 5
GRAPH 5

First-Time, Full-Time Retention Rates:

FIRST-TIME, FULL-TIME RETENTION RATES:
OLD Dominion
DOMINION University,
UNIVERSITY, FALL
Old
Fall 2006-FALL
2006-Fall2019
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84%
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82%
80%

80%

80%

Percent
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76%
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70%
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68%

Source:
Education Data
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System,https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds
https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds
Source:IPEDS,
IPEDS,the
theIntegrated
Integrated Postsecondary
Postsecondary Education
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GRAPH 6
GRAPH 6

Six-Year Graduation Rates:

SIX-YEAR GRADUATION RATES:
OLD DOMINION
Old
Dominion UNIVERSITY,
University,2007-2019
2007-2009

60%

59.6%
57.0%

58%
56%
54%

53.3%

52.8%

Percent

52%
50%
48%
46%

48.3%

43.6%

44%
42%

42.7%

Men

Women

Source: IPEDS, the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System, https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds

Source: IPEDS, the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System, https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds
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Overall

2019

2017

-

2015

- -

2013

2011

2009

2007

40%

TABLE 1
SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN SELECTED VARIABLES:
235 FOUR-YEAR PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS, 2018-2019
Retention Rate

Graduation Rate

Household Income

SAT/ACT

Undergraduate
Pell Percent

Full-Time Retention Rate

1.00

.893

.699

.782

.077

Six-Year Graduation Rate

.893

1.00

.753

.061

.086

Median Household
Income of Students

.699

.770

1.00

.941

-.899

Brookings SAT/ACT

.782

.839

.941

1.00

-.908

Undergraduate Pell
Percent

.077

.071

-.899

-.908

1.00

Variable
First-Time

Sources: IPEDS for graduation rates, retention rates and Pell Grant percentages; Opportunity Insights for median household incomes; and the Brookings Institution for the hybrid SAT/ACT score, which is the normalized institutional
statistic that reflects both ACT and SAT scores. The 235 four-year public university sample is described in James V. Koch and Richard J. Cebula, “Runaway College Costs: How College Governing Boards Fail to Protect Their Students”
(Johns Hopkins University Press, 2020).

Two public policy questions emerge from these data. First, should the
Commonwealth recognize the challenges associated with serving students
who may not be as well prepared for the rigors of higher education? If so,
should the General Assembly allocate funding to colleges and universities and
increase financial aid to these students? Virginia’s 2020 legislative session
witnessed an important change in legislative behavior – one that did take into
account the makeup of most of today’s public university student bodies. ODU
received a special $5 million General Fund allocation to address its distinctive
needs as well as a healthy upward bump in the allocation it received for
student financial aid. The ascendancy of several Black legislators to positions
of power and influence has made the General Assembly more sensitive to
issues relating to lower-income students and student bodies that do not fit the
traditional mold.19

19 The state of Oregon recently changed its higher education funding formulas to provide greater financial
support to institutions with more racially diverse and lower-income student bodies: Jordyn Brown, “Oregon
universities will see a shift in funding under new model,” The Register-Guard (Feb. 16, 2021), www.
registerguard.com/story/news/2021/02/16/oregon-universities-see-shift-funding-under-new-statemodel/6729930002. Colorado has been doing so for some time.
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A second policy consideration relates to whether Virginia should direct lessprepared students to community colleges rather than four-year institutions.
The answer to this question is not clear. While it is less expensive for the
Commonwealth to educate a student on one of its community college
campuses, that same student is less likely to eventually obtain a baccalaureate
degree if he or she does go the community college route. Much depends upon
the student’s major course of study, however.

INSTITUTIONAL CONTRIBUTION TO LABOR MARKET SUCCESS
Many citizens believe the most important thing colleges and universities do
is prepare their students for employment after graduation. In this view, the
success of our higher education institutions should be measured by jobs
filled and incomes earned. For several years, SCHEV has been collecting
data on the postgraduation jobs and income earned by the students who
complete their baccalaureate degrees at a Virginia public institution of higher
education. These data are interesting but less useful than some might believe.
For one, more than half of graduates from a typical college or university
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do not participate in the survey and it seems likely they do not constitute a
random sample of all graduates. Second, the incomes earned by graduates
are quite sensitive to the locations where they are working. In May 2019,
average weekly wages in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan region were
63.4% higher than in Lynchburg and 33.4% higher than in Hampton Roads.20
Third, much depends on a student’s major course of study. The Bureau of
Labor Statistics reported in May 2019 that the average weekly wage for
computer systems analysts in Hampton Roads was 56.9% higher than that for
educational guidance counselors.21
Thus, comparing the wages of graduates can be a fraught enterprise. The
Brookings Institution, however, has developed an interesting method to
estimate the “value-added” of specific institutions of higher education to
their graduates’ incomes, whatever those incomes are. Brookings’ valueadded measure is an estimate of how much a specific institution contributed
to a student’s postgraduate income over and above what that student would
have earned had he or she majored in the same discipline at the typical
institution nationally. Table 2 records Brookings’ estimates of the value-added
contributions of selected Virginia public institutions in 2015.

TABLE 2
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION ESTIMATES OF INSTITUTIONAL
VALUE-ADDED FOR BACCALAUREATE RECIPIENTS AT VIRGINIA
FOUR-YEAR PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS COMPARED TO THE
AVERAGE INSTITUTION
Institution

Brookings Value-Added Estimate

Christopher Newport University

-1%

George Mason University

20%

James Madison University

13%

Norfolk State University

NA

Old Dominion University

14%

Radford University

-4%

University of Mary Washington

5%

University of Virginia

22%

Virginia Tech

27%

Virginia Commonwealth
University

7%

Virginia State University

1%

William & Mary

18%

Source: Jonathan Rothwell and Siddharth Kulkarni, “Beyond College Rankings: A Value-Added Approach to
Assessing Two-Year and Four-Year Schools” (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2015)

EXTERNALLY FUNDED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES
Is the glass half full or half empty when we discuss ODU’s funded research
activities? Graph 7 reports the University’s research and development
expenditures over the past decade. Note that the sharp reduction after FY
2013 reflects a change in how ODU reported its own contributions to these
expenditures rather than a dramatic decline in funding from external sources
such as the National Science Foundation or the Department of Defense.22

20 Bureau of Labor Statistics, “May 2019 National, State, Metropolitan and Nonmetropolitan Area
Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates,” www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes_abo.htm.
21 Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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What should we make of the data presented in Graph 7? The glass is half full
if one considers that ODU opened its doors in 1930 as a two-year division
22 O
 ld Dominion’s new methods of reporting its research and development expenditures put it in conformance
with National Science Foundation guidelines.

of the College of William & Mary with a total budget of only several hundred
thousand dollars. Few people would have forecast that 90 years later the
University would be expending more than $67 million from all sources to fund
its research and development activities. However, the glass may be half empty
if one compares ODU’s performance in this arena with similar institutions.
Total research expenditures are sensitive to institutional scale (the number of
students and faculty) and whether or not an institution has a medical school.
Graph 8 reports research expenditures per full-time equivalent (FTE) student
at several Virginia institutions in FY 2019. UVA, VCU and Virginia Tech have
medical schools. (FTE faculty numbers were not available.)
National Science Foundation data ranked ODU only 185th nationally among
all U.S. institutions of higher education in terms of the size of its research and
development expenditures in FY 2019. ODU ranked fifth among Virginia
institutions in this regard, but fell to sixth when the computation was performed
on a per-FTE student basis.23
The only topical research and development area where ODU cracked the top
100 nationally was physics (97th). The University’s best performance in terms
of funding sources was with NASA, where it ranked 83rd.24
These are acceptable performances, but ODU must improve if it intends to
increase its economic impact on Hampton Roads and expects to augment its
roles in public health and the medical sciences. Improved performance will
not occur magically, however. Careful attention must be given to faculty hiring
decisions, the expectations placed in front of faculty, compensation, and
promotion and tenure decisions.

23 The research and development expenditures come from the National Science Foundation, Higher Education
Research and Development: fiscal year 2019, https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsf21314#data-tables. FTE
student numbers come from the State Council of Higher Education for Virginia, https://research.schev.edu/
info/reports.
24 National Science Foundation.
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GRAPH 7
GRAPH 7

University Expenditures on Research and Development:

UNIVERSITY EXPENDITURES ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT:
OLD Dominion
DOMINION University,
UNIVERSITY, FISCAL
YEAR
2019
Old
Fiscal YEAR
Year2011-FISCAL
2011-Fiscal
Year
2019

$120,000
$102,192

$99,138

$65,092

$67,990

$67,425

FY 2019

$80,000

FY 2017

Thousands of Dollars

$100,000

$60,000

$40,000

$20,000

FY 2015

FY 2013

FY 2011

$0

Source: National Science Foundation

Source: National Science Foundation
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GRAPH 8
Research and Development
Expenditures Per Student FTE,
GRAPH 8
Fiscal Year
2019 PER STUDENT FTE,
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
EXPENDITURES
FISCAL YEAR 2019

$30,000

$24,226

R&D Per Student FTE

$25,000

$20,000
$15,149

$15,000

$9,136

$10,000

$7,584
$5,884

$5,000

$3,431
$410

$0
GMU

JMU

ODU

W&M

UVA

VCU

VA Tech

Sources: Research and development expenditures are from the National Science Foundation, Table 20, Higher Education R&D Expenditures, Ranked by FY 2019 R&D Expenditures: FYs 2010-2019,
https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsf21314#data-tables. FTE student numbers are from the State Council of Higher Education for Virginia, https://research.schev.edu/info/reports.

Sources: Research and development expenditures are from the National Science Foundation, Table 20, Higher Education R&D Expenditures, Ranked by FY 2019 R&D Expenditures: FYs 2010-2019, https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/
nsf21314#data-tables. FTE student numbers are from the State Council of Higher Education for Virginia, https://research.schev.edu/info/reports.
8
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The Commonwealth’s
Financial Support
Virtually every state agency believes it deserves more support from Virginia’s
General Fund, and Old Dominion University is no exception. However,
before assessing ODU’s case in this regard, it is appropriate to provide some
background. The Commonwealth’s respected Joint Legislative Audit and Review
Commission (JLARC) has noted that Virginia is a high-tuition, low-tax-support
state insofar as higher education is concerned.25 This view has been confirmed
by the similarly respected State Higher Education Executive Officers (SHEEO)
organization, which notes that in FY 2017, the average state devoted 5.8% of
its tax and lottery revenues to higher education, while in Virginia only 5% was
allocated for the same purpose.26
Virginia’s state appropriations per full-time equivalent (FTE) college student
were only $5,805 in FY 2019, well below the national average of $8,196. On
the other hand, tuition and fee revenues were above average at $9,786 per
FTE, compared to the national average of $6,902. Virginia seals its situational
fate by also being a below-average student financial aid state – the national
average amount of student financial aid provided in FY 2019 was $808 per
FTE, but Virginia supplied only $716.27
Thus, it is true that Virginia provides less tax support and financial aid to its
public college students than the typical state, and those students pay higher
than average levels of tuition and fees. The reasons for this are complex, but
it is fair to observe that in times of fiscal stress, legislators often regard public
higher education budgets as a bank account upon which they can draw for
funds needed in other agencies. When cornered, legislators typically assert
that most, if not all, Virginia colleges and universities can raise tuition and
fees in order to avoid severe financial problems. If they have the University
of Virginia in mind, then this likely is true. In the 10 years between the 200809 academic year (when the Great Recession began) and 2018-19, UVA
25 J oint Legislative Audit and Review Commission, “Addressing the Cost of Public Higher Education in Virginia,”
(November 2014), http://jlarc.virginia.gov/pdfs/reports/Rpt461.pdf.
26 State Higher Education Executive Officers, State Higher Education Finance, 2019, https://shef.sheeo.org/
wp-content/uploads/2020/04/SHEEO_SHEF_FY19_Report.pdf.
27 State Higher Education Executive Officers, State Higher Education Finance, 2019.
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increased its “sticker price” tuition and fees 84.8%, while the consumer price
index rose only 19.2%.28 However, it is not clear that the same logic applies to
institutions such as ODU (where the comparable increase was only 48.6%).29
How has ODU fared? Between FY 2005 and FY 2019, the
University’s general fund appropriation per full-time equivalent
student rose 41.09%, one of the highest percentage increases
of any higher education institution in Virginia (Table 3). This is
an outstanding performance and credit is largely due to former
President John R. Broderick and his staff.
Of course, in absolute terms, this still left ODU well behind institutions such as
NSU and VCU, but ahead of UVA and Virginia Tech. Broderick performed
exquisitely well in terms of enhancing ODU’s financial support from the
General Assembly during his presidency. Further, these data do not include
the results of the most recent (2021) General Assembly session, when the
University emerged with significant additional funding.
Thus, even though ODU’s mission and institutional positioning are not highly
valued by external ratings agencies, and often not by Virginia media and
opinion leaders either, this has not prevented the General Assembly from doing
well by the institution – at least in recent years. As one legislator put it to us,
“None of my children really considered attending Old Dominion when they
were high school seniors, but I think it has been doing a great job.”

28 U
 VA’s published tuition and fees come from The Chronicle of Higher Education, “Tuition and Fees,
1998-99 Through 2019-20” (Dec. 30, 2019), www.chronicle.com/article/tuition-and-fees-1998-99through-2018-19. The CPI data represent the midpoint of each academic year (January) and come from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, www.bls.gov/regions/mid-atlantic/data/consumerpriceindexhistorical_us_table.
htm.
29 “ Tuition and Fees 1998-99 Through 2019-20,” The Chronicle of Higher Education.

TABLE 3
GENERAL FUND SUPPORT FROM THE COMMONWEALTH PER FULL-TIME EQUIVALENT STUDENT:
SELECTED VIRGINIA INSTITUTIONS, FY 2005 TO FY 2019
FY 2005

FY 2008

FY 2012

FY 2015

FY 2018

FY 2019

Percent Change
FY 2005 to
FY 2019

GMU

$4,933

$6,815

$4,692

$5,011

$5,258

$5,392

+7.98%

JMU

$3,910

$4,680

$3,531

$3,889

$4,183

$4,445

+13.68%

NSU

$8,833

$10,177

$7,550

$9,284

$12,142

$12,364

+39.97%

ODU

$5,578

$7,387

$5,551

$6,374

$7,471

$7,689

+41.09%

UVA

$6,006

$7,615

$4,994

$5,972

$6,382

$6,297

+4.85%

VCU

$7,445

$8,624

$6,387

$7,320

$8,298

$8,717

+17.09%

VA Tech

$5,824

$6,647

$4,984

$5,445

$5,412

$5,527

-5.11%

W&M

$5,955

$7,281

$5,221

$5,504

$5,683

$6,060

+1.76%

Institution

Sources: General fund support numbers are from Old Dominion University; calendar year full-time equivalent enrollment data are from IPEDS.

Student Debt

borrow to finance their education. Compare ODU’s $7,426 average student
borrowing level in 2018-19 to that of $8,323 at GMU and $8,367 at VCU.31

The high-tuition, low-state-support model of financing higher education
adopted by Virginia has had predictable effects on the volume of debt incurred
by students to finance their education. The U.S. Department of Education’s
College Navigator website reports that the 65% of full-time, beginning
undergraduate students at Old Dominion who took out loans to finance their
education did so to the tune of $7,426 in 2018-19.30 Extrapolated over four
years, this suggests the typical graduate incurs student debt of almost $30,000,
which is slightly above the national average.

Loans must be paid back. A total of 5,668 former ODU students began to
repay their loans in 2016. Three years later, 6.9% of these students had
defaulted on their loans. The national average default rate was 9.3%.32
Student loan default rates were lower at GMU (2.1%) and VCU (4.1%), but
higher at NSU (11.3%).

The relatively modest median household incomes of ODU students (at least
compared to most other Virginia four-year public universities) increase the
amount they borrow. However, ODU’s status as a lower-cost institution within
Virginia has the opposite effect and reduces the amounts students need to
30 College Navigator.
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It is not difficult to see why the increased allocation of student financial aid
grant funds that ODU received from the 2020 General Assembly was so
welcome.

31 C
 ollege Navigator.
32 “ Debt and Loan Default Rates,” College Factual, www.collegefactual.com/colleges/old-dominion-university/
paying-for-college/student-loan-debt/.
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A Measure Of
Operating Efficiency
It is not easy to assess the operating efficiency of a college or university
because many campus activities generate costs but no revenue. Further,
efficiency usually is measured with respect to some type of output. But what is
the “output” of an institution such as Old Dominion University? It is more than
the number of graduates or credit hours generated, and includes activities
ranging from intercollegiate athletics and free lectures to the provision of
preschool and free or low-cost dental hygiene services. In addition, crosssubsidies and below-cost activities abound at a modern university. Vital, but
complex, public-private partnership arrangements (ODU’s University Village is
one example) complicate things, as does the existence of foundations. Thus, it
is difficult to measure university efficiency unless one can agree upon what the
universities are supposed to be doing.
With these caveats, we will peek at the services that often are termed
“administrative.” These include the activities and expenditures of offices
ranging from the registrar to public safety. Our measure of the efficiency of
these offices is each institution’s average “institutional support cost” per FTE
student, which is reported by institutions to the U.S. Office of Education.33 We
adjust these magnitudes for changes in the consumer price index over time so
that the numbers in one year are comparable to those in another year.
The University of Virginia, William & Mary and Norfolk State University easily
report the highest “real” (price-adjusted) instructional support costs per FTE
student. W&M witnessed a dramatic 94.94% increase in what most would
label administrative overhead (Graphs 9 and 10). Someone must pay for
such expenditures and since the Commonwealth’s General Fund support has
declined in real terms, this means that institutions have relied substantially upon
increases in their tuition and fees to fund their increased expenditures.

33 Another caveat is in order. Institutions retain some flexibility in terms of how they report their expenditures to
the U.S. Office of Education, and therefore, one should not regard these data as beyond reproach.
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How does ODU rate on this efficiency scale? Rather well. The
University’s institutional support expenditures per FTE put it
with GMU and JMU in a category much lower than that of
the other five institutions. In addition, ODU’s percentage rate
of increase in these expenditures, FY 2005 to FY 2019, was
second-lowest among the eight institutions. A professor asked
to assign a grade to this performance likely would say it
merits at least a B, if not a B+ or A-.

GRAPH 9
GRAPH 9

Real Institutional Support Expenditures Per FTE Student:
REAL INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT EXPENDITURES PER FTE STUDENT:
SELECTEDVirginia
VIRGINIA Institutions,
INSTITUTIONS,FY
FY 2005
2005 AND
Selected
andFY
FY2019
2019

2,829

W&M
$1,869

VA Tech

$2,637
$2,525

VCU

$3,744
3,549

UVA
ODU

$1,553

$6,700
$2,105
$3,309

NSU
JMU
GMU
$1,000

$5,514

$1,181

$4,539

$2,026
$1,724
$2,032
$2,000

$3,000

$4,000

$5,000

$6,000

$7,000

Dollars per FTE
■ FY 2005

FY 2019

Source: IPEDS, the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System, https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds

Source: IPEDS, the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System, https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds
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GRAPH 10
GRAPH
10
Percent Increase in Real Institutional
Support
Expenditures Per FTE Student:
PERCENT INCREASE IN REAL INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT EXPENDITURES PER FTE STUDENT:
Selected
FYFY2005
and FY
FY2019
2019
SELECTEDVirginia
VIRGINIAInstitutions,
INSTITUTIONS,
2005 AND

100%

94.9%

88.8%

90%
80%

71.6%

Percent Increase
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40%
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10%
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Source: IPEDS, the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System, https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds

Source: IPEDS, the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System, https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds
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UVA

VCU

VA Tech

W&M

Areas Of Distinction
Every academic program at Old Dominion University that is eligible for
external disciplinary accreditation holds that status. It is fair to say that
educational quality is present across the length and breadth of the institution.
Nevertheless, institutions with merely adequate or good
academic programs seldom achieve distinction. It is only when
multiple programs of significance achieve consistent national
recognition as excellent or path-breaking that what might be
termed a “halo effect” spreads across and benefits the entire
institution. When this halo effect exists, it improves the reputations of
programs throughout the institution.
The consensus of external senior academic leaders is that it takes at least three,
and more likely five or six, nationally recognized programs to generate a halo
effect. Their view is that ODU currently does not meet this threshold but has the
potential to do so.
External authorities have high regard for the University’s program in nuclear
physics but note that because it does not generate easily recognizable
commercialized innovations and products, it is not as potent or visible as other
academic programs. In terms of raw academic power and prestige, however, it
is one of the best in the nation, boasts some very accomplished faculty and has
invaluable connections to the Jefferson Lab in Newport News.
The academic areas with the greatest potential for ODU to gain legitimate
national distinction focus on societal problems and needs. Rising sea levels
and resiliency provide a cogent example of an academic thrust that clearly
addresses local, regional and national needs and builds on existing University
strengths in areas such as oceanography. The ever-expanding roles of health
and medical care in the United States strongly suggest that the incipient School
of Public Health must be a major point of emphasis when additional funds are
allocated. What is required now is a combination of well-designed faculty
additions; active pursuit of foundation and grant funds; more rigorous and
focused salary, promotion and tenure decisions; and political acumen. ODU
can achieve these goals if it recognizes what can be accomplished and acts
accordingly.

WHITHER OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY?

There was a time at the turn of the century when ODU occupied a national
leadership position in distance learning. The University’s Teletechnet
programs were both well known and highly regarded. A variety of external
circumstances and some self-inflicted wounds resulted in decreased emphasis
on distance learning at ODU, and today the University no longer can claim
national leadership in this important arena. Other institutions now enroll
100,000 or more distance learning students annually, while as one can infer
from Tables 4 and 5, ODU’s number now ranges between 10,000 and 15,000
in a typical semester. While the University remains very capable in distance
learning and produces programs of high quality, the rapidly changing distance
learning world has, in some ways, passed it by.
It remains the case, however, that ODU is more heavily immersed in distance
learning than any other Virginia public institution. Tables 3 and 4 collectively
disclose that more than 49% of ODU students either are taking exclusively
distance learning courses or taking some distance learning courses. It seems
likely that this is a reason why the University’s headcount enrollment increased
in fall 2020 when it was declining nationally and on a majority of Virginia
public and private campuses. Thus, national leader or not, distance learning
has had salutary effects on ODU.
Is it too late for the University to regain national leadership? The answer is
“no” if the focus is to be upon the provision of specific academic programs
in well-defined areas such as nursing or engineering management. The
distance learning market is highly partitioned and therefore amenable to the
development and growth of specific, well-orchestrated academic programs.
Because it is easier to enter distance learning markets not already dominated
by an existing competitor, attention ought to be given to offering online some
of the University’s newest programs. Cryptology, perhaps, presents such an
opportunity.
However, if ODU’s ambition is to offer most of its current stable of academic
programs to customers around the world, it would do well to recognize that
this train already has departed. Significant economies of scale exist in the
provision of distance learning programs, and those that entered the market
early and expanded now enjoy visibly lower costs per unit because they can
spread their fixed costs over much larger student bodies.
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Regardless, distance learning has become critically important
to the University’s future, and the onset of COVID-19
underlined this reality. Even prior to the pandemic, about half
of all ODU students were taking at least one distance learning
course. This proportion seems likely to increase. Therefore,
whether the University stakes out a viable national presence
in distance learning or not, it must ensure that it continues to
offer high-quality distance learning opportunities to its regular
student body. It is apparent from Tables 4 and 5 that Virginia’s public
university students are interested in distance learning courses.

TABLE 4
PERCENT OF VIRGINIA PUBLIC COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY
STUDENTS TAKING SOME DISTANCE LEARNING COURSES
Institution

FY 2013

FY 2015

FY 2017

FY 2019

CNU

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

GMU

15.17

19.94

25.67

35.19

JMU

9.92

9.57

8.95

4.59

LU

3.05

2.65

2.70

2.34

NSU

36.12

42.33

41.46

59.06

ODU

14.97

17.71

24.19

29.85

RU

12.08

18.65

22.08

29.46

UVA Wise

13.39

5.63

56.51

4.02

UMW

2.90

3.46

5.83

6.28

UVA

1.55

1.36

2.01

7.62

VCU

17.26

23.74

25.40

30.86

VMI

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

VA Tech

23.32

27.35

32.90

28.80

VSU

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

W&M

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.17

Source: College Navigator
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Fundraising

TABLE 5
PERCENT OF VIRGINIA PUBLIC COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY
STUDENTS TAKING ONLY DISTANCE LEARNING COURSES
Institution

FY 2013

FY 2015

FY 2017

FY 2019

CNU

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

GMU

1.32

1.86

2.06

2.54

JMU

0.27

0.73

0.81

1.18

LU

3.05

0.04

0.00

5.83

NSU

2.37

2.82

3.48

3.48

ODU

12.00

13.97

16.92

19.29

RU

0.57

0.97

0.93

1.61

UVA Wise

22.77

41.32

19.94

35.69

UMW

0.07

0.00

0.28

2.36

UVA

1.09

0.86

1.82

2.05

VCU

0.98

2.07

1.90

2.41

VMI

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

VA Tech

0.23

0.24

0.19

0.19

VSU

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

W&M

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.09

Source: College Navigator

The Old Dominion University Educational Foundation holds nearly all
University endowment assets. As Graph 11 demonstrates, the foundation’s
values have increased nicely over time. Thus, in 2000, the Educational
Foundation’s assets ranked ODU 341st among colleges and universities
nationally in terms of size; this ranking improved to 310th in 2010 and 288th
in 2019. Not a bad achievement for a foundation that was established only in
1955.
National rankings of foundations in terms of their size are not a pure measure
of success because some gifts immediately are spent to achieve a specific
purpose, for example, the generous gift of Richard and Carolyn Barry to
construct the Barry Art Museum at ODU. Such gifts do not increase the value
of the endowment although in the case of the Barrys, their generosity also
extended to gifts that did enter the foundation’s endowment.
Alonzo Brandon, ODU’s vice president for university
advancement, and recently retired President John R. Broderick
proved to be adept fundraisers. ODU reported $325.4 million
in new gifts and commitments between 2008 and 2020. This
success reflects hard work and dedication to the university, but also the reality
that in 2020, ODU, in contrast to many other institutions, was not riven
by discord and divisive issues. Broderick deserves considerable praise for
nurturing this milieu.
There is one financial issue relating to the Educational Foundation (and
analogous college foundations nationally) that merits exploration. It has to do
with how foundations manage and invest the funds entrusted to them. Most
academic foundations pay for the active management of their asset portfolios
by financial professionals. This seems a reasonable approach until one learns
that actively managed funds (some of which are referred to as hedge funds)
have not performed as well as indexed, low-cost equity funds that are not
actively managed and whose asset distributions replicate entire large market
segments. Each year, 60% to 80% of actively managed funds typically do not
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fare as well as low-cost, indexed funds that reflect the entire equity market.34
A 2019 compilation by economist Mark Perry found that over the previous 15
years, 88.97% of all actively managed equity funds did not perform as well as
the S&P Composite 1500 Index.35
Why is this so? First, active managers believe they know more than the
collective wisdom of the entire equity market and conclude they can “beat it.”
Second, their active management and trading practices drive up transaction
costs. Third, active managers themselves usually command high salaries, which
end up being paid for by the college foundations.
The ODU Educational Foundation appropriately diversifies its investments
and on June 30, 2020, stocks (both domestic and foreign) accounted for
45.9% of its holdings. Given the data we have presented concerning indexed
investments, we believe it would be wise for the foundation to increase its
use of low-cost indexed equity funds. The remainder of the corpus of the
foundation is invested in fixed income assets, hedge funds, tangible real
assets and private equity. Indexed funds exist for some of these asset types (for
example, fixed-income vehicles such as bonds) and the lessons of indexing
should be applied to these asset segments as well.
Our recommendation does not imply that all active asset managers do not
“beat the market.” Some do, but most do not. The foundation should consider
the weight of this evidence and see how it measures up.
The point to be taken here is that the ODU Educational
Foundation’s general performance represents a success story
that many similarly situated foundations would, if they could,
gladly emulate.

34 This is a point famously made in 1973 by Burton G. Malkiel in his classic, A Random Walk Down Wall Street
(New York: W.W. Norton). Vanguard’s VTSMX, which indexes all segments of American equity markets,
represents an excellent example. Yahoo Finance (www.yahoofinance.com) says VTSMX carries an enviable,
very low expense ratio of only 0.14%, providing it with an approximate .5% head start over most actively
managed funds.
35 Mark J. Perry, “More Evidence That It’s Really Hard to ‘Beat the Market’ Over Time,” Carpe Diem Blog
(March 19, 2019), www.aei.org/carpe-diem/more-evidence-that-its-really-hard-to-beat-the-market-overtime-92-of-finance-professionals-cant-do-it-2.
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GRAPH 11
GRAPH 11

Valuation of Old Dominion University Education Foundation Endowment

VALUATION OF OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION ENDOWMENT
AS of
OF July
JULY 1,
1, 2003-2020
as
2003-2020

$300,000,000
$272,107,688
$250,000,000

$177,885,000

Dollars

$200,000,000

$195,039,000
$150,000,000

$100,000,000
$104,923,000

2020

2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

$50,000,000

Source: National Association of College and University Business Officers, “Historic Endowment Study Data,” www.nacubo.org/Research/2020/Historic%20Endowment%20Study%20Data

Source: National Association of College and University Business Officers, “Historic Endowment Study Data,” www.nacubo.org/Research/2020/Historic%20Endowment%20Study%20Data
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Intercollegiate Athletics
Old Dominion University has assembled an enviable history of success in
intercollegiate athletic competition. Its men’s basketball teams have won more
than 59% of their contests and almost 77% of those played at Chartway Arena.
The women’s basketball teams have emerged victorious in more than 70%
of their games and have won more than 74% of contests at home. ODU has
captured 28 team and five individual national championships in sports ranging
from sailing and field hockey to women’s and men’s basketball.
ODU teams consistently attract large numbers of fans, and it is not unusual
for both the men’s and women’s basketball teams to lead Conference USA
(C-USA) in attendance. However, intercollegiate athletic success nearly
always is accompanied by substantial financial investments in facilities,
coaches and financial aid for athletes. So also, it has been at ODU. Table
6 reports intercollegiate athletic revenues and expenditures
at the University from FY 2003 to FY 2019. Both revenues
and expenditures quadrupled during this period, and the
compound average growth rate in expenditures was a
hefty 8.68% annually. The primary reason for the increased
costs was the advent of football at ODU and the University’s
membership in C-USA.
The modern-era Monarch footballers (the “Division” played football as the
William & Mary Norfolk Braves from 1930 to 1940) played and won their first
game in 2009 against Chowan University, 36-21. ODU competed successfully
in the Colonial Athletic Association in 2011 and 2012, and in 2013 joined
C-USA, a diverse collection of mostly public Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS)
institutions sprinkled geographically from Miami to El Paso, Texas. The
Monarchs spent 2013 as an independent and began to compete for the
C-USA football title in 2014. The team won the Bahamas Bowl in 2016 against
Eastern Michigan University and currently boasts seven alumni who play in the
National Football League.
Along the way, the Monarch football program generated excitement. Until
recently, the teams typically played before sellout crowds, and contests were
preceded by lively pregame festivities. Quarterback Taylor Heinicke set
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Football Championship Subdivision (FCS) records for the most passing yards
in a single season as well as for the most completions in a season and in 2012
won what is considered the Heisman Trophy of the FCS, the Walter Payton
Award. In the otherwise down season of 2018, the Monarchs stunned No. 13
Virginia Tech, beating the Hokies 49-35.
Those are some of the highlights. Losing seasons, including a 1-11 finish in
2019, have taken the shine off ODU football, and attendance at games has
fallen significantly. COVID-19 forced the cancellation of the 2020 season and
eliminated an important revenue stream. However, this did not eliminate the
need to service the bonds sold to finance newly constructed and attractively
renovated S.B. Ballard Stadium.
It is worth noting that Central Florida, Western Kentucky, Coastal Carolina,
Florida Atlantic and Georgia Southern all suffered losing seasons after moving
up to the FBS. But they hired prominent coaches, prospered and played in
nationally televised games because of the success they experienced in the
FCS. ODU recently hired a new head coach in Ricky Rahne, a former Penn
State offensive coordinator, who has made a promising start in rebuilding the
program. Acquiring the offensive coordinator from one of the nation’s most
storied football programs constitutes a visible boost for the football program.
While attendance has fallen in recent years, revenue has not.
Since moving to FBS, ticket revenue has increased an average
of 2.5% annually (though it has suffered recently) and ODU’s
fundraising has increased significantly. In calendar year
2010, the Old Dominion Athletic Foundation (ODAF) raised
$4,220,550. In 2018, annual fundraising rose to $16,755,345,
a 297% increase. Even in 2020, when the pandemic reduced
the University’s revenues, ODAF still raised $10,464,240.
In 2019, ODU received $1.57 million in guarantees for playing
football games on the road. Additionally, C-USA shares in
revenue from the College Football Playoff, of which ODU
receives about $1 million annually. Three road games have
been scheduled in the next few years with Southeastern
Conference programs that will pay ODU between $1.5 million

and $2 million per game. These revenues would decline,
though not disappear, if ODU were playing in the FCS. A good
payday when an FCS school plays an ACC or SEC opponent is
$500,000 to $700,000.

Field into S.B. Ballard Stadium. Attractive though it clearly is, S.B. Ballard is
a 21,000-seat stadium that appears to suit the needs of an FCS-level team
rather than an FBS-level program. Absent the appearance of a financial angel,
however, the critical dimensions of the stadium are unlikely to change.

Students have proven to be diffident concerning Monarch football, and their
attendance has been disappointing. Nevertheless, in 2019-20, a fulltime undergraduate student paid a mandatory $1,935.38
per academic year athletic fee to finance ODU intercollegiate
athletics. For a full-time undergraduate who takes 30 semester
hours in an academic year, this translates to $64.51 per credit
hour, or $193.54 per three-hour course. These data come from
SCHEV.36

While ODU’s athletic expenses have increased, productive
fundraising has mitigated the impact on students and student
fees. Between the 2012-13 athletic season (the University’s
last in the CAA) and 2018-19, athletic expenditures financed
by student athletic fees rose only from $27,089,358 to
$28,784,075, according to the Virginia Auditor of Public
Accounts. This reflects the impact of a state statute enacted
in 2015 that limits ODU to funding no more than 55% of its
athletic budget from student fees.

One will search in vain on the ODU website for specific data relating to the
athletic fee. The website diplomatically notes: “The University term ‘tuition’
refers to a per-credit-hour comprehensive rate that includes payment for
instructional programs, academic services and activities, recreational
sports, and intercollegiate athletics which includes a student activity fee
of $125.69 per credit hour for Norfolk campus courses, $109.55 per credit
hour for Higher Education Centers, Distance Learning, and online courses not
at designated distance learning locations.”37 However, despite the size of the
fee, the University’s 2020-21 Schedule of Tuition, Fees, and Service Charges
does not mention it by name.38 This schedule did, however, find room to list
hundreds of other obscure fees, including a diaper provision fee ($6 per week)
and a paraffin bath fee ($30).
Note in Table 6 that in the year when ODU began to play football (2009),
annual intercollegiate athletic expenditures rose about $7.5 million, and when
the University moved up to FBS football in 2012, annual expenditures rose
another $7 million. These expenditures were deemed necessary to pay for the
accoutrements of bigger-time football, including the transformation of Foreman
36 “2019-2020 Tuition and Fees Report,” Appendix D-1, State Council of Higher Education for Virginia,
https://schev.edu/docs/default-source/Reports-and-Studies/2019/201920tuitionandfeereport.pdf. Note
that six institutions (W&M, CNU, UVA Wise, JMU, LU and VMI) assessed their undergraduate student
athletic fees even higher than Old Dominion. Strong reliance upon student fees to fund intercollegiate athletic
programs is distinctive to Virginia.
37 Old Dominion University, 2020-2021 tuition rates, https://odu.edu/tuition-aid/costs-tuition/tuition/tuitionrates.
38 Old Dominion University, “2020-2021 Schedule of Tuition, Fees, and Service Charges,” file:///H:/AEA%20
Journals/tuition-fee-schedule.pdf.
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The Commonwealth’s restrictions are far less cumbersome
for FCS programs, which can fund up to 70% of their athletic
budgets with student fees. James Madison University, for
instance, spent $27,011,357 in student fees in 2012-13, but
unrestrained by the 55% FBS limit, expended $41,576,716 in
2019.
It is no secret that ODU’s membership in C-USA has presented
challenges. Yes, it enabled the Monarchs to move their football
program into the FBS but failed to offer the University any
natural geographic rivals. Fans may yawn when the Monarchs play
Middle Tennessee State University or the University of Texas at San Antonio.39
It is not that these institutions are not capable of producing strong teams; they
are. But, fan interest in, say, a matchup between ODU and the University
of Southern Mississippi (another C-USA member) is low compared to what
it would be if the opponent were JMU, William & Mary or the University of
Richmond. Fans would attend games against these latter opponents even if they
believed the Monarchs were likely to lose. Not so for C-USA contests.
However, moving to FBS has allowed ODU to play a much more attractive
nonconference schedule that has included home games with North Carolina,
39 W
 e suspect much the same attitudes hold true in Tennessee and Texas with respect to Old Dominion.
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N.C. State and Virginia Tech. The Monarchs’ 2018 victory over Tech gave the
University a week’s worth of national publicity that reached tens of millions of
people. Defeating the Hokies in Norfolk was one of the biggest moments in
ODU athletic history.
Beginning in 2022, Virginia Tech will visit ODU five times over the ensuing 10
seasons. Virginia and Wake Forest also will come to Norfolk, as will Army and
East Carolina. None of these home games would have been possible had ODU
not moved up to the FBS.
Modest fan interest in the C-USA has translated into low revenue from
television contracts. Television contracts reflect the number of people who watch
contests. Realistically, this number is small for most C-USA athletic events.
C-USA membership also brought with it vastly increased travel costs. As
the crow flies, it is 1,755 miles from Norfolk to El Paso, the home of C-USA
member the University of Texas at El Paso. It is expensive to take teams to such
locations, to say nothing of the class time the student-athletes forfeit. C-USA
has massaged its scheduling to reduce travel distances and travel times, but in
the end, reality is that C-USA members are geographically dispersed.
The C-USA has evolved into a different league than the one
ODU initially joined, while the CAA similarly is a far different
league from the one the University left. East Carolina, Tulsa
and Tulane were C-USA league members in 2013; ECU almost
surely would have become a major rival for the Monarchs.
However, those schools left for the American Athletic
Conference. One of the primary reasons for leaving the CAA
was the impending loss of traditional rivals GMU and VCU, as
their transition to the A-10 Conference was imminent.
Given ODU’s attractive but smallish football stadium, the general lack of fan
interest in C-USA opponents, the absence of a lucrative C-USA television
arrangement, the costs associated with being a member of that conference
and the costs of playing FBS football rather than FCS football, many external
observers who do not have a horse in the race believe it would be in the
University’s best interests to move Monarch football back to the FCS (which
would mean returning to the CAA in football). Other sports, especially men’s
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and women’s basketball, could conceivably join a conference such as the
Atlantic 10, where traditional opponents such as GMU, Richmond and VCU
compete.
The conference movements just described might not be easy to accomplish.
Some “hat in hand” approaches, apologies and even payments might be
required. Nevertheless, this could well be the beginning of a viable path to
long-term financial stability and increased fan interest in ODU intercollegiate
athletics.
There are other scenarios. Moving ODU out of C-USA, playing
football as an FBS independent and moving other sports to
the A-10 is another possible path forward. Liberty University
and the University of Connecticut recently became football
independents at the FBS level and have had no problem
scheduling quality games or signing TV contracts with
national networks. FBS independents such as Brigham Young
University, Notre Dame, Army and others are eligible for bowl
games, have the flexibility to schedule regional opponents
and multiple guarantee games in a season, and benefit
from the exposure of playing at the highest level of college
football. Additionally, UConn has seen a significant increase in
fundraising because it moved basketball and other sports back
into the Big East. Liberty finished the shortened 2020 football
season in the Top 25.
Another potential option that has been gaining momentum
would see C-USA and the Sun Belt Conference exchange
members to create an East-based league, of which ODU would
be a part. This would address the issues of travel costs, missed
class time and undesirable league opponents, among other
things. While long considered, discussions on this proposal
have become more serious as of late.
All three of the possibilities just described would be challenging
to implement but are worth exploring and possibly pursuing.
The inherent obstacle to moving to another conference is that

it would require many other universities and commissioners
involved to agree. It is fair to say this is an unstable
environment subject to rapid change. ODU should continually
evaluate its circumstances and be prepared to act if and when
more favorable options become available.
TABLE 6
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS REVENUES AND EXPENSES:
OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY, FY 2003-FY 2019
Fiscal Year

Old Dominion
Revenues

Old Dominion
Expenses

2003

$10,350,457

$9,805,977

2004

$12,223,951

$11,019,044

2005

$15,035,087

$13,990,585

2006

$15,729,516

$14,954,947

2007

$19,276,659

$17,974,306

2008

$27,219,527

$25,520,288

2009

$26,721,859

$23,346,192

2010

$29,021,652

$27,308,713

2011

$35,247,421

$34,375,037

2012

$36,929,483

$35,561,455

2013

$37,504,701

$37,504,701

2014

$39,538,893

$38,273,927

2015

$39,933,872

$39,431,561

2016

$42,086,525

$41,855,635

2017

$40,827,956

$40,827,956

2018

$43,996,643

$43,996,643

2019

$42,629,922

$42,629,922

Source: U.S. Department of Education, “Equity in Athletics Data Analysis,” https://ope.ed.gov/athletics/#/
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A Few Missteps
Fortunately, Old Dominion has avoided many of the mistakes
that have waylaid the prosperity of other institutions, though
as already noted, one exception was the institution’s failure to
capitalize upon its enviable position in distance learning. Even
so, perfect foresight never will exist, and dozens of real and
bogus opportunities compete for the attention of presidents,
administrators and faculty members. Hence, we should not
expect flawless performances year after year.
In the 1990s, under the leadership of Provost JoAnn Gora, the University
moved to guarantee every undergraduate student a practicum connected to his
or her course of study. Of course, many practicums already existed in the form
of student teaching, the training of nurses and physical therapists, internships
and the like. The aims of the practicum guarantee, an idea that originated with
Northeastern University in Boston, were twofold. First, it would improve the
undergraduate experience and connect classroom instruction to the real world.
Second, it would constitute an attractive recruiting device. Somewhere along
the way, this initiative withered and disappeared.
Less than optimal decisions also include the financial arrangements that ODU,
via its Real Estate Foundation, negotiated in its University Village development
on the east side of Hampton Boulevard. The University committed itself to a
60-year leasing arrangement that includes a 3% annual escalation in lease
payments. Although this agreement has floated under the radar, it has proven
to be expensive.
As this is being written, consideration is being given within the region to ways
in which three of the area’s major health/medical players – Sentara, ODU and
Eastern Virginia Medical School – might join forces to improve the provision
of health care and (not to be ignored) spur the region’s long-term economic
development. With respect to this latter point, one of the obvious differences
between Hampton Roads and other mid-Atlantic metropolitan regions that are
growing faster than ours is the comparative absence of a vigorous “ed-med”
complex in our area. Several opportunities to achieve a blending or merger
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of ODU and EVMS existed in the past but either were ignored, fumbled or
opposed by members of the regional power structure.

Covid-19 And “The Cliff”

In late 2020, EVMS staked out a position of public opposition to anything that
involved merger and mounted a public relations blitz to amplify its objections.
The Virginian-Pilot did not react favorably to those efforts,40 however.
Significant members of the regional power structure, including Sentara, believe
the merger notion has some merit. There are economies of scale to be realized
and possibilities for the sharing of resources, especially where faculty are
concerned and with respect to ODU’s distance learning capabilities as they
might apply to telemedicine. Sentara wields immense influence; it employs
more than 30,000 people at 12 hospitals and earned revenues of $3.9 billion
even in the first six pandemic-affected months of 2020.41

The COVID-19 pandemic has changed higher education in a variety of
ways, good and bad, but its impact on enrollments represents an existential
threat to colleges and universities. Headcount enrollments declined once
again in fall 2020, making it the ninth consecutive year that such enrollments
have declined in American higher education. We should expect to see some
institutions shutter their doors over the next year, even if effective vaccines are
deployed, because of their already parlous financial condition, deteriorating
demographic prospects (which we cite subsequently) and changing student
tastes.

Taking a longer view, when the Virginia General Assembly decided in the late
1960s to merge the Medical College of Virginia into the Richmond Professional
Institute, leading to the creation of Virginia Commonwealth University in 1969,
this idea met with strident opposition from MCV-related individuals, who said
the combination would never work and would do serious damage to MCV’s
reputation.42 Lawsuits were filed and attempts made in the General Assembly
to reverse the merger, but all came to naught.
Fifty years later, it is apparent that the MCV/RPI merger into VCU was one of
the smartest things ever done by the Richmond metropolitan region. Today’s
VCU Health is a leader in health care and a massive contributor to the
economic dynamism of the Richmond area. It seems reasonable to expect a
similar evolution were ODU and EVMS to merge, accompanied by significant
financial support from Sentara.

40 “Editorial: Time for a Discussion About the Future of EVMS,” The Virginian-Pilot (Dec. 3, 2020), www.
pilotonline.com/opinion/vp-ed-editorial-evms-future-1204-20201203-pjnojurupvayfeabv6t5g4rhpu-story.
html.
41 Ayla Ellison, “Sentara’s Health Plan Revenue Helps Offset COVID-19s Financial Damage,” Becker’s Health
Care Hospital CFO Report (Aug. 17, 2020), www.beckershospitalreview.com/finance/sentara-s-health-planrevenue-helps-offset-covid-19-financial-damage.html.
42 See one example: “Warren Brandt, VCU’s President in a Time of Transition and Turmoil, Dies at 93,” VCU
News (Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.news.vcu.edu/article/.
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As already noted, Old Dominion was a welcome exception to the continuing
trend of declining enrollments. The University’s ability to offer quality
distance learning courses plus one of the lowest COVID-19 infection rates
on any Virginia public campus proved to be attractive to students. It does
seem possible that vaccines and adjustments in behavior will overcome the
challenges thrust on ODU by COVID-19, but some of the habits students and
faculty have acquired during recent restrictions are not going to disappear.
Increased use of distance learning will remain with us, as will versions of less
centralized, locationally distributed administrative models.
It will be challenging in the coming years for ODU to maintain its current
headcount enrollment unless it develops new markets and/or implements new
enrollment approaches and strategies. Table 7 reports the number
of high school graduates the Western Interstate Commission
for Higher Education (WICHE) projects for Virginia between
2020-21 and 2036-37. The projections are uniformly negative
– WICHE foresees a 4.60% decline in high school graduates in
Virginia, 9.69% in the mid-Atlantic region and 6.18% in the
United States. Some now refer to this anticipated decline as a
cliff.43 Whatever the label, this phenomenon must be a matter
of concern for ODU.

43 E
 ric Hoover, “The Demographic Cliff: 5 Findings from New Projections of High School Graduates,” The
Chronicle of Higher Education (Dec. 15, 2020), www.chronicle.com/article/the-demographic-cliff-5findings-from-new-projections-of-high-school-graduates.

Since the University already has drifted in the direction of becoming an
open-admission institution at the undergraduate level (ODU admitted 89% of
undergraduate applicants in fall 2019),44 there is little room for downward
adjustment in terms of admission standards, a traditional remedy for
enrollment-pressed institutions. If the University is going to maintain its current
headcount, it must develop new admission markets and/or become more
effective in existing markets.
TABLE 7
PROJECTED NUMBER OF HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES IN
VIRGINIA, THE MID-ATLANTIC REGION AND THE
UNITED STATES, 2020-21 AND 2036-37
Geographic
Area
Virginia
Mid-Atlantic
Region
United States

Year

Projected
High School
Graduates

2020-2021

94,760

2036-2037

90,400

2020-2021

467,890

2036-2037

422,540

2020-2021

3,750,170

2036-2037

3,518,410

Percent
Change

-4.60%

-9.69%
-6.18%

Source: “Knocking at the College Door: Projections of High School Graduates,” Western Interstate Commission
for Higher Education, 2020, www.knocking.wiche.edu

The population growth nexus of Virginia is banana-shaped, with the tip of the
banana starting in Northern Virginia, extending south through the Richmond
metropolitan area and ending with the tail of the banana at the oceanfront in
Virginia Beach. With a few exceptions, such as Charlottesville and Blacksburg,
population in the rest of Virginia will decline over the next two decades.
Admission efforts need to focus intently on Northern Virginia, where ODU’s
image is hazy, and its recognition currently is not high. Retrospectively, it
was a mistake for the University not to nurture the superbly
located center it opened in Loudoun County in the 1990s. Not

only could that center have enrolled significant numbers of students, but also it
would have given ODU badly needed visibility in Northern Virginia and made
it much more of a player in the region and statewide.
Today, any intelligent ODU admission strategy must include
a dramatically increased emphasis on Northern Virginia.
Pragmatically, this is where the students are, and the
University’s admission efforts and resource allocations must
recognize this.
Historically, institutions often have turned to international students to fill
their ranks. However, both the actions of the Trump administration and the
effects of COVID-19 have reduced the flow of international students into the
United States. The Biden administration’s approach to international students
differs, and we all hope that vaccines and other preventive measures will put
COVID-19 in our proverbial rearview mirror. International student recruitment
is not inexpensive, however, and international students require extra attention
when they arrive on campus. They add positively to the campus milieu in many
ways, but more so than domestic students, require additional resources. The
potential to increase international student enrollment over the
next two decades is significant, and the University’s internal
resource allocations should reflect this.
Several counties in North Carolina are included in the Hampton Roads
metropolitan region by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget, which
defines such things. Students from these North Carolina collar counties,
however, pay out-of-state tuition to attend ODU. The University should pursue
legislative approval to grant in-state tuition to any student coming to it from
within this larger Virginia Beach/Norfolk/Newport News metropolitan region.
Finally, ODU should discuss openly its enrollment strategies
and admission standards. Simply put, Virginia is not a state that
historically has valued institutions with minimal admission standards. Thus,
while the evolution of ODU toward providing greater access and controlling
cost increases may have immense social value, it is not a strategy that is likely
to result either in editorial kudos or parents bragging that their son or daughter

44 National Center for Education Statistics, College Navigator, https://nces.ed.gov/collegenavigator/?q=old+d
ominion&s=all&id=232982#admsns.
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just gained entrance. It certainly will not result in higher U.S. New & World
Report rankings.

Final Observations

As recently as 2005, the University admitted only 69.4% of its undergraduate
admission applicants;45 it now admits almost 90% of applicants, approximately
40% of whom are Pell Grant recipients. This is a step in the direction of helping
make Virginia a more opportunity-oriented, equitable place to live. However,
as we have noted, this is not viewed as a propitious development – at least in
the realm of higher education – by many influential Virginians, whose views
reflect the historically restrictive character of Virginia society and the state’s
public higher education system.

Old Dominion University as an entity is now 91 years old. More innovative
than most institutions of higher education in Virginia, it has on several
occasions chosen paths that set it apart from other four-year public universities,
especially those designated research institutions, as is ODU.

Any set of admission standards involves tradeoffs between societal equity (as
evidenced by access and affordability) and prestige (external rankings and
restrictive admissions are the primary indicators). More of one often means less
of the other. There are both benefits and costs attached to ODU’s admission
evolution, which has focused on equity rather than prestige.
Query what the best admission policy is for ODU to pursue as it faces a
decline in the number of high school graduates throughout the nation. Ours is
not to tell the University what its admission standards should be, but instead
to suggest that the costs and benefits of various sets of admission standards
should be discussed in appropriate offices on campus so that those affected
understand the tradeoffs.

Two examples will suffice. Early in the 1990s, ODU began to make a serious
commitment to distance learning. This effort was greeted with warm approval
by students and elected officials but pooh-poohed by a significant number of
its counterpart institutions in the Commonwealth. Time has a way of fashioning
judgments and more than 25 years later, other institutions strive to come within
shouting distance of what ODU has accomplished in the distance learning
arena.
The jury is still out with respect to the other departure from conventional
higher education wisdom in Virginia, namely, ODU evolving into an institution
that places a high value on being both accessible and affordable. This is a
departure from the restricted-entry, high-cost model that historically has been
the coin of the realm in Virginia higher education. Plaudits and prestige always
have gone to the institutions that have evinced high admission standards and
enrolled small proportions of lower-income and minority students.
In recent years, ODU has emphasized the provision of opportunities to a wide
range of students and has recorded the lowest increase in its sticker price
tuition and fees of any four-year public Virginia university between 2000-01
and 2020-21.46 It has assembled a racially diverse student body, and 45%
of its first-time, full-time undergraduate students in 2018-19 were Pell Grant
recipients, well above the Virginia four-year public institution average.
The 2020 and 2021 sessions of the General Assembly, after dealing with the
complications of COVID-19, gave ODU special General Fund additions to
help it deal with its challenges, and at the same time recognized the extensive
financial need of its student body by means of larger student financial aid
allocations. These represented the first significant occasions when the governor

45 IPEDS, the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System, National Center for Education Statistics,
https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds.
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46 T hese ranged from Old Dominion’s 173.9% increase to the stratospheric increases of Christopher Newport
University (379.65%), William & Mary (394.3%) and the University of Virginia (345.2%).

and the General Assembly have acknowledged the distinctive nature of ODU
among the state’s research institutions. There is more to be done in this regard.
John R. Broderick concluded a very successful presidency in
summer 2021 – one marked by record-setting performances
in a variety of critical areas, including prodigious campus
construction and expansion, highly productive fundraising and
unprecedented legislative success. He left the institution in far
better shape than the one he inherited.
Challenges remain, however, for example, the University’s relationships
with EVMS and Sentara Healthcare. Helping supercharge Hampton Roads
out of its decade-long pattern of modest economic growth must be a high-

WHITHER OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY?

priority undertaking for the University. Improving retention and graduationrate performances is also a top-drawer goal. Despite conspicuous success,
redefining the institution’s intercollegiate athletic future may be required. And,
as previously noted, there is an enrollment “cliff” looming just over the horizon.
This list could go on, but to lengthen it would imply that ODU is beset by
problems. It is not. Even so, Rodney Dangerfield’s “I don’t get no respect”
calling card often does apply to the University. It will take high-quality,
visionary leadership combined with sterling faculty and staff performances to
alter this reality.
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BAD NEWS: THE DECLINE OF LOCAL JOURNALISM
The lowest form of popular culture – lack of information, misinformation, disinformation, and a contempt for the truth
or the reality of most people’s lives – has overrun real journalism. Today, ordinary Americans are being stuffed with
garbage.
– Carl Bernstein, American investigative journalist and author

L

ocal journalism is in peril. Newspapers all over the country are reducing coverage, cutting back staff, abandoning physical newsrooms or shuttering
operations altogether at a breathtaking pace. The United States has lost fully one-fourth of its newspapers since 2004, including 70 dailies and more than
2,000 weeklies or other nondaily papers. Weekday circulation of the remaining newspapers has fallen even more sharply in the same time period – from
nearly 55 million in 2004 to 24 million in 2020 (Table 1). Correspondingly, there are now fewer reporters covering news in our local communities. The Pew

Research Center reports that U.S. newspapers have lost 57% of their newsroom employees since 2008.1

This chapter examines how these worrisome trends have affected local1
journalism in Hampton Roads. Newspapers – whether print or online – have
long provided the vast majority of “iron core” news, a term we borrow from
the distinguished journalist Alex S. Jones. The iron core is fact-based, serious
reporting; it includes bearing witness at crime scenes, protests and school
board meetings, but also digging deeper to provide context and explain
complex stories, to shine a light on corruption and injustice, and to hold those
in power accountable.2 Columnists, pundits, news aggregators, your neighbors
who post on social media and talking heads on cable television all depend
on the iron core, although they generally contribute little to it themselves.
The breadth and depth of local coverage in our region’s
newspapers has shrunk dramatically in the past two decades,
but no similarly comprehensive, critical source of news and
information has emerged to fill the gap. The newspaper crisis points
to a deeper crisis in the functioning of our civic institutions. Without a robust,
1 P enelope Muse Abernathy, “News Deserts and Ghost Newspapers: Will Local News Survive?” (2020), pg. 11,
at: https://www.usnewsdeserts.com/reports/news-deserts-and-ghost-newspapers-will-local-news-survive/;
Pew Research Center, Newspapers Fact Sheet (July 9, 2019), at: https://www.journalism.org/fact-sheet/
newspapers/; and Elizabeth Grieco, “U.S. newspapers have shed half of their newsroom employees since
2008” (April 20, 2020), at: https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/04/20/u-s-newsroom-employment-hasdropped-by-a-quarter-since-2008/.
2 Alex S. Jones, Losing the News: The Future of the News That Feeds Democracy (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2009), 1-6.
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reliable and independent source of fact-based news, there can be no common
basis for understanding, discussing or enhancing the state of our region.
The initial trigger for the crisis in local journalism was the digital revolution.
In the early years of the 21st century, newspapers lost their near-monopoly as
a comprehensive source for up-to-date information about local communities
and beyond. Readers and advertisers increasingly turned to various internet
sites instead. Consumers were (and are) reluctant to pay for digital content,
and media enterprises that had thrived for decades suddenly struggled to find
a viable model for producing and delivering the news. The Great Recession of
2007-2009 coincided with the widespread adoption of the smartphone and
social media, and advertising dollars for traditional news outlets plummeted.
Between 2004 and 2020, annual advertising revenue in the U.S. newspaper
industry sank from $48 billion to $8 billion, a staggering decrease of 82%
(Table 2).

TABLE 1

TABLE 2

TOTAL ESTIMATED CIRCULATION
OF U.S. DAILY NEWSPAPERS, SELECTED YEARS

ESTIMATED ADVERTISING AND CIRCULATION REVENUE OF
THE U.S. NEWSPAPER INDUSTRY, SELECTED YEARS

Year

Weekday

Sunday

Year

Advertising Revenue

Circulation Revenue

1968

62,535,000

49,693,000

1968

$5,232,000,000

$2,288,215,000

1972

62,510,000

50,001,000

1972

$6,939,000,000

$2,929,233,000

1976

60,977,000

51,565,000

1976

$9,618,000,000

$4,087,303,000

1980

62,202,000

54,676,000

1980

$14,794,000,000

$5,469,589,000

1984

63,340,000

57,574,000

1984

$23,522,000,000

$7,368,158,000

1988

62,695,000

61,474,000

1988

$31,197,000,000

$8,046,287,000

1992

60,164,000

62,160,000

1992

$30,639,000,000

$9,163,534,000

1996

56,983,000

60,798,000

1996

$38,075,000,000

$9,969,240,000

2000

55,773,000

59,421,000

2000

$48,670,000,000

$10,540,643,000

2004

54,626,000

57,754,000

2004

$48,244,000,000

$10,988,651,000

2008

48,597,000

49,115,000

2008

$37,848,257,630

$10,086,956,940

2012

43,433,000

44,821,000

2012

$25,316,461,215

$10,448,561,493

2016

34,657,199

37,801,888

2016

$18,274,943,567

$10,910,460,499

2020

24,299,333

25,785,036

2020

$8,833,842,400

$11,091,733,928

Sources: Pew Research Center Newspapers Fact Sheet (June 29, 2021), at https://www.journalism.org/
fact-sheet/newspapers/, and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University.
Figures after 2004 take both print and online readership into consideration.

Source: Pew Research Center Newspapers Fact Sheet (June 29, 2021), at https://www.journalism.org/factsheet/newspapers/

The collapse of the for-profit business model that sustained newspapers
in the 20th century has been accompanied by an unprecedented wave of
buying and selling, resulting in the massive consolidation of the 21st-century
newspaper industry. A handful of very large publicly traded chains that are
dominated by various investment entities now “control the fate of more than
1,000 papers, including a third of the nation’s dailies, and more than half of
total circulation.”3 These include Hampton Roads’ two daily newspapers, The
Virginian-Pilot and Daily Press, both owned by Tribune Publishing Co. Earlier
this year, Tribune was fully acquired by its largest shareholder, the hedge fund

Alden Global Capital LLC. Privately held regional chains, including Boone
Newspapers Inc. and Landmark Media Enterprises LLC, own or manage many
of the remaining U.S. newspapers. (Table 3)

3 Abernathy, “News Deserts and Ghost Newspapers,” 21 and 33.
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The coronavirus pandemic has placed local journalism under further stress.
Steven Waldman, an astute observer of the crisis, notes that “even before
COVID-19, the local media system was a strong breeze away from collapsing.
A hurricane is now blowing through the local news landscape.”4 The Pew
4 S
 teven Waldman, “A Replanting Strategy: Saving Local Newspapers Squeezed by Hedge Funds,” Center
for Journalism & Liberty (Sept. 28, 2020), 4, at: https://www.journalismliberty.org/publications/replantingstrategy-saving-local-newspapers-squeezed-by-hedge-fund.
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Research Center has tracked how the advertising revenue of publicly traded
newspaper companies – already at a historic low – fell precipitously in the
first quarter of 2020. The companies responded by slashing payrolls, selling
property and closing newsrooms, reducing print days or stopping production
of some papers altogether.
Hampton Roads is immune to none of these trends. In fact,
our region provides both an exemplary case study and a
cautionary tale of the decline of local journalism. This decline
merits our attention no less than our region’s economic
recovery or ability to create high-paying jobs. The wellbeing of Hampton Roads depends on reliable information,
community dialogue, accountable leadership and wellfunctioning institutions – all of which are fostered by highquality local journalism. Conversely, regions without a
thriving press have been shown to have lower levels of voter
participation and civic engagement, higher rates of municipal
borrowing and government inefficiency, and a diminished
sense of community. Residents of communities without a
newspaper are more likely to view local affairs through a
national political lens, or to get their information from bogus
or overtly partisan news sources.
This chapter provides an overview of the local press in Hampton Roads,
and how it has evolved over time. We show how the fate of our regional
news media reflects broader developments around the country, including the
transformation of longstanding publications into “ghost newspapers” and the
ominous spread of “news deserts.” These terms were coined by Penelope Muse
Abernathy, visiting professor at Northwestern University’s Medill School of
Journalism (formerly at the University of North Carolina’s Center for Innovation
and Sustainability in Local Media). Her work provides an essential resource for
this chapter. Finally, we underscore the importance of local journalism, even (or
especially) in the changed media landscape of the 21st century, and we point
to potential models for its economic sustainability in the years ahead.
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TABLE 3
LARGEST 10 NEWSPAPER OWNERS, RANKED BY
NUMBER OF PAPERS OWNED, 2019
Rank

Owner name

Total papers

Daily papers

1

Gannett/
Gatehouse

613

262

2

Digital First/
Tribune

207

70

3

Lee/BH Media

170

84

4

Adams Publishing
Group

158

40

5

CNHI

112

71

6

Ogden
Newspapers

84

49

7

Paxton Media
Group

75

42

8

Boone
Newspapers

65

29

9

Community
Media Group

57

14

10

Landmark Media
Enterprises

55

3

Source: “News Deserts and Ghost Newspapers: Will Local News Survive?”, https://www.usnewsdeserts.
com/reports/news-deserts-and-ghost-newspapers-will-local-news-survive/
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Employment in Newspaper Newsrooms
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The Newspaper Business
In Hampton Roads: How We
Got Here
Hampton Roads’ oldest newspapers have a long history. The Colonial-era
Virginia Gazette (Williamsburg) first appeared in 1736, and numerous
papers have adopted that name since, including the modern weekly that was
founded in 1930 – and still operates today, publishing two issues a week. The
Virginian-Pilot traces its roots back to 1865. The Suffolk News-Herald was
established in 1873, the Daily Press (Newport News) in 1896, the Journal and
Guide (Norfolk) in 1900 (known as the New Journal and Guide since 1991)
and The Tidewater News (Franklin) in 1905. Over time, our region has been
home to dozens of daily and weekly newspapers. Many were short-lived, but
others circulated for years before going out of print or merging with other
papers.
Like nearly all other businesses, newspapers in the American South were once
strictly segregated by race. With the exception of the New Journal and Guide,
all of the aforementioned papers were originally produced by and for white
readers. Many years ago, the Journal and Guide was one of numerous Black
papers in our region, although it quickly became the most influential. By the
1930s, the weekly publication had become the most widely distributed Black
newspaper in the South and even introduced a national edition.
Newspapers became big business in the late 19th century. Technical advances
enabled cheaper and faster printing, and publishers sought to attract a mass
audience with exciting headlines, illustrations, puzzles and other popular
features. A circulation war between the big-city newspapers of William
Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer infamously gave rise to an era of
sensational “yellow journalism.”
In towns all over the country, however, a different model of journalism
ultimately took hold, governed by emerging professional standards of
accuracy, fairness and public accountability. Penelope Muse Abernathy notes
that general-interest newspapers “were largely owned by local residents.
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These publishers and their editors often had political clout in their states and
cities, but – whether conservative or liberal – they had cultural and economic
restraints. If they did not serve the interests of their readers and advertisers,
they risked losing business to a competing paper.” The early newspaper barons
– including Samuel Slover and his nephew Frank Batten Sr. at The VirginianPilot and its related newspapers, and P.B. Young Sr. at the Journal and Guide
– “established the modern, multi-subject newspaper and became the dominant
advertising option for most local businesses.”5
As the 20th century progressed, these local newspapers reflected and were
shaped by the following key trends:
• A business model that balanced profit seeking with civic responsibility.
Local newspapers were not charitable enterprises; the most successful owners
became quite wealthy and established family dynasties. At the same time,
however, most took their civic responsibility seriously. They influenced their
communities not only as businessmen, but also as philanthropists, board
members and informal power brokers. They sometimes challenged political
leaders or took controversial stands (witness The Virginian-Pilot’s Pulitzer
Prize-winning editorials against lynching in the 1920s, and against massive
resistance to racially integrated schools in the 1950s), which ultimately
enhanced the papers’ reputation as independent truth-tellers.
• Consolidation and the rise of big newspaper chains. As radio and later
television vied for consumers’ attention, entrepreneurial newspaper owners
purchased additional media outlets in order to stay competitive. Samuel
Slover’s purchase of the Portsmouth Star in 1955 led to the establishment of
Norfolk-Portsmouth Newspapers Inc., which grew to become the diversified
media company Landmark Communications Inc. in 1967. In Newport News,
the Daily Press became part of the Tribune media chain in 1986. In all but
the largest cities, competing newspapers and morning/afternoon editions
merged or went out of business. In Hampton Roads, The Virginian-Pilot’s
former afternoon publication, The Ledger-Star, ceased operations in 1995.
The desegregation of formerly white newspapers ultimately diminished the
influence of the independent Black press, which was no longer an exclusive
source of news and information for Black communities.
5 P enelope Muse Abernathy, “The Rise of a New Media Baron and the Emerging Threat of News Deserts”
(2016), 20, at: http://newspaperownership.com/newspaper-ownership-report/.

• De facto monopolies. By the century’s end, most U.S. metropolitan areas
were served by a single daily newspaper. This was also true in Hampton
Roads, if we consider Southside and the Peninsula two separate metro areas.
The Virginian-Pilot and Daily Press covered different localities and largely
avoided direct competition. Warren Buffett (whose Berkshire Hathaway
conglomerate once included dozens of local papers) described such marketdominant newspapers as “unregulated toll bridges” because their owners “had
the relative freedom to increase rates” when and as much as they pleased.6
Local employers seeking new talent, movie theaters announcing show times
and anyone selling almost anything locally relied on newspaper advertising.
Profit margins ranged not uncommonly between 20% and 40%. The “public
service of publishing iron core news”7 rarely paid for itself, but it didn’t have
to; it was heavily subsidized by more profitable aspects of the newspaper
business.

Local Journalism Today: Are
We Losing The News?

the news media and all other businesses, large and small, to compete for the
rest. Most Hampton Roads newspapers have turned to paywalls, which allow
readers a limited number of page views before they must pay for an online
subscription.
Since 2004, the United States has lost approximately 2,100
newspapers. A growing number of cities and counties
have become “news deserts” – that is, they have no local
newspaper and/or “very limited access to the sort of
credible and comprehensive news and information that feeds
democracy at the grassroots level.”9 Most news deserts are
in rural, economically struggling localities, particularly in
the South; their residents tend to be older, poorer and less
educated than the U.S. population at large. The University of
North Carolina’s Center for Innovation and Sustainability in
Local Media identifies our region’s North Carolina localities
(Currituck, Camden and Gates counties) as three of 225 U.S.
counties without a local newspaper. The weekly Yorktown
Crier-Poquoson Post, which was still listed on the UNC site last
year, folded in 2019.

This business model came crashing down in the first decade of the 21st century.
A very small circle of newspapers with national or even global audiences
(The New York Times, The Washington Post and The Wall Street Journal) have
successfully reinvented themselves in the digital era, but most other papers are
struggling. As Penelope Muse Abernathy notes, “There is simply not enough
digital or print revenue to pay for the public service journalism that local
newspapers have historically provided.”8
This dilemma is driven in part by the loss of readers, but even more by the
business of digital advertising, which now accounts for more than half of all
U.S. advertising spending. Just three companies – Facebook, Amazon and
Google – receive nearly two-thirds of all digital advertising dollars, leaving
6 M
 argaret Sullivan, Ghosting the News: Local Journalism and the Crisis of American Democracy (New York:
Columbia Global Reports, 2020), 36.
7 Jones, Losing the News, 15.
8 Penelope Muse Abernathy, “The Expanding News Desert” (2018), 8, at: https://www.cislm.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/10/The-Expanding-News-Desert-10_14-Web.pdf; and Keach Hagey, Lukas Alpert and
Yaryna Serkez, “Local News Fades Out: A Divide between Newspaper Haves and Have-Nots,” The Wall
Street Journal (May 4, 2019), at: https://www.wsj.com/graphics/local-newspapers-stark-divide/.
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9 A
 bernathy, “News Deserts and Ghost Newspapers,” 18-20.
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The absence of reliable local news is troubling enough, but it has also provided an opening for “imposter” local news websites
that promote an ideological agenda. Such sites often have titles that resemble legacy newspapers (Outer Banks Times, South
Tidewater News), but their stories are algorithmically generated or repurposed from other sources. They typically have no local
address, and most, though not all, have a partisan bent. Hundreds of such sites sprang up in 2020, with “a sharp acceleration in
activity in the lead-up to the November elections.”10 Unsurprisingly, this activity was greatest in swing states; one study found
that North Carolina had more partisan local sites than any other U.S. state except Iowa, while Virginia had almost none.

Mexico
Source: NiemanLab (2020). “Hundreds of hyperpartisan sites are masquerading as local news. This map shows if there’s one near you.”

10 P riyanjana Bengani, “As election looms, a network of mysterious ‘pink slime’ local news outlets nearly triples in size,” Columbia Journalism Review (Aug. 4, 2020), at: https://www.cjr.org/analysis/as-election-looms-a-network-ofmysterious-pink-slime-local-news-outlets-nearly-triples-in-size.php; and Jessica Mahone and Philip Napoli, “Hundreds of hyperpartisan sites are masquerading as local news,” NiemanLab (July 13, 2020), at:
https://www.niemanlab.org/2020/07/hundreds-of-hyperpartisan-sites-are-masquerading-as-local-news-this-map-shows-if-theres-one-near-you/.
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A variety of traditional news sources persist in our Virginia localities. Hampton
Roads’ two daily newspapers, The Virginian-Pilot and Daily Press, have long
been key sources of iron core news, particularly in our urban centers. In
addition, there are several general-interest newspapers (publishing less than
daily) that cover smaller localities. The New Journal and Guide delivers news
for Black readers throughout Hampton Roads.
The number and diversity of these sources bode well for the greater
Hampton Roads region. However, this comparatively bright news landscape
harbors two darker phenomena for the future of regional journalism: first,
the transformation of longstanding publications into “ghost newspapers”
characterized by less original content, fewer publication days and greatly
reduced news teams; and second, these newspapers’ acquisition by larger
entities with an uncertain commitment to our region. These phenomena are
interrelated and driven by the greater economic crisis of the newspaper
industry.
When the valuation of newspaper companies plummeted in the early 2000s,
independent owners all over the country declared bankruptcy or sold their
papers to chains. Many of these chains were themselves acquired by larger
chains or various investment entities. Penelope Muse Abernathy estimates that
roughly half of all U.S. newspapers changed ownership between 2003 and
2018. In Hampton Roads, almost every legacy newspaper has a different
owner now than at the start of 2000: the publicly traded Tribune Publishing
(acquired by Alden Global Capital) or one of three smaller LLCs affiliated
with Boone Newspapers. (The Daily Press and Virginia Gazette were already
Tribune papers.) The Gloucester-Mathews Gazette-Journal and The New
Journal and Guide are the last independent legacy papers in our region.
The Princess Anne Independent News, established in 2015, serves southern
Virginia Beach and the Oceanfront.

Tribune Publishing And
Our Regional Dailies:
The Virginian-Pilot And
Daily Press
The seismic changes in the newspaper industry surely became apparent
to Hampton Roads readers no later than January 2008, when Landmark
Communications chairman Frank Batten Jr. announced his decision to sell the
company. The Slover and Batten families had been at the helm of newspapers
in our region for over a century. Soon after Batten’s announcement, NBC
Universal purchased The Weather Channel, Landmark’s most lucrative asset,
for $3.5 billion. The private company has since sold most, but not all, of its
media holdings. Today, Landmark Media Enterprises is still the 10th-largest
newspaper owner in the country, although it owns none in Hampton Roads.
Most of its properties are smaller community papers in Kentucky, Florida and
other states.
The sale of The Virginian-Pilot, including its downtown Norfolk headquarters
and Virginia Beach printing plant, was finalized in May 2018. (The paper had
already downsized substantially under Landmark. Between 2003 and 2009
alone, its newsroom staff shrank from 272 to 193 employees.11) The sale price
of The Pilot was $34 million. Decades earlier, Batten commented, the paper
might have been worth “10 or 15 times” more. Indeed, Hampton Roads’ other,
smaller regional newspaper, the Daily Press, had sold for $200 million in
1986.
Now both newspapers are owned by the same entity, Tribune Publishing
(briefly known as Tronc at the time of sale). In November 2019, Alden
Global Capital acquired a 32% stake in Tribune Publishing, becoming its
largest shareholder. In February of this year, Alden announced its intent to
purchase all remaining Tribune shares. Despite a dramatic, 11th-hour effort
spearheaded by Maryland hotel executive Stewart Bainum Jr. to assemble the
11 R
 oger Chesley, “Alden sets its sights on Tribune and a shudder runs through what’s left of two Virginia
newspapers,” Virginia Mercury (Jan. 22, 2021), at: https://www.virginiamercury.com/2021/01/12/
alden-sets-its-sights-on-tribune-and-a-shudder-runs-through-whats-left-of-two-virginia-newspapers/.
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funding for a counteroffer, Tribune shareholders approved the $633 million
sale to Alden on May 21.
Alden Global Capital is a New York City-based hedge fund that was founded
in 2007. It began acquiring stakes in the newspaper industry two years later,
and it is now the country’s second-largest newspaper owner. The financial
twists and turns that have informed the recent history of Tribune Publishing
and Alden Global Capital are too byzantine to describe here. More important
in this context is that both entities are foremost examples of the “new media
barons” that have come to dominate the 21st-century newspaper industry.
Penelope Muse Abernathy identifies several defining characteristics of the new
media barons, including: emphasis on maximizing short-term shareholder
return over longer-term investment in local journalism, majority control by a
small number of institutional investors (often a private equity company, hedge
fund or pension fund), multiple financial restructurings and diverse portfolios
with much movement among individual newspapers.
Alden has been called the “ultimate cash flow mercenary,” the “grim reaper
of American newspapers,” and “one of the most ruthless of the corporate
strip miners seemingly intent on destroying local journalism.”12 The fund’s
president, Heath Freeman, asserts that it is rescuing newspapers that would
otherwise have folded, although media watchers suspect that it has instead set
its sights on a dying industry, calculating that “a lot of money can be made
on the way down.”13 According to the Financial Times, Alden’s MediaNews
Group achieved “about 20-25 percent operating margins in 2019 … more

12 Jonathan O’Connell and Emma Brown, “A hedge fund’s ‘mercenary’ strategy: Buy newspapers, slash jobs,
sell the buildings,” The Washington Post (Feb. 11, 2019), at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
economy/a-hedge-funds-mercenary-strategy-buy-newspapers-slash-jobs-sell-the-buildings/2019/02/11/
f2c0c78a-1f59-11e9-8e21-59a09ff1e2a1_story.html; Joe Pompeo, “The hedge fund vampire that bleeds
newspapers dry now has the Chicago Tribune by the throat,” Vanity Fair (Feb. 5, 2020), at: https://www.
vanityfair.com/news/2020/02/hedge-fund-vampire-alden-global-capital-that-bleeds-newspapers-dry-haschicago-tribune-by-the-throat; and Margaret Sullivan, “Is this strip mining or journalism?” The Washington
Post (March 5, 2018), at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/is-this-strip-mining-or-journalismsobs-gasps-expletives-over-latest-denver-post-layoffs/2018/03/15/d05abc5a-287e-11e8-874bd517e912f125_story.html.
13 Sarah Ellison, “Heath Freeman is the hedge fund guy who says he wants to save local news. Somehow no
one’s buying it,” The Washington Post (June 11, 2020), at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/
media/heath-freeman-is-the-hedge-fund-guy-who-says-he-wants-to-save-local-news-somehow-noones-buying-it/2020/06/11/9850a15c-884a-11ea-8ac1-bfb250876b7a_story.html; and Savannah
Jacobson, “The most feared owner in American journalism looks set to take some of its greatest assets,”
Columbia Journalism Review (June 29, 2020), at: https://www.cjr.org/special_report/alden-global-capitalmedianews-tribune-company.php.
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than double that of peers such as Gannett or even The New York Times.”14
Its business model for newspapers is no secret: dramatic cost-cutting through
staff layoffs and buyouts, selling off real estate assets such as newsrooms and
printing plants, and wringing out profits wherever it can.
This strategy should sound familiar to Hampton Roads
residents. In January 2020, The Virginian-Pilot headquarters
in downtown Norfolk was sold to an apartment developer
for $9.5 million. All newsroom operations moved to the Daily
Press’ leased office space in Newport News’ City Center –
until it, too, closed in September 2020. In June, the landlord
had filed a lawsuit against the paper for $110,000 in unpaid
rent. (That same quarter, Tribune Publishing reported a profit
of $1.55 million). This February, editor Kris Worrell told us
there are no immediate plans to reopen a newsroom after
the pandemic, although the company is still considering what
arrangements will make the most sense. The Pilot’s Virginia
Beach printing plant closed in July 2020. All of Tribune’s
Virginia publications are now printed in Richmond.
The news staff at the Tribune papers has continued to grow leaner. In February
2020, the company accepted a new round of buyouts from employees with at
least eight years of work history in its Virginia news operations. A few months
later, reporters making more than $40,000 a year were required to take
three weeks of unpaid furloughs due to the economic effects of COVID-19. In
January 2021, former Virginian-Pilot columnist Roger Chesley reported that
the blended news team of Tribune’s four Virginia papers (including the Virginia
Gazette and Tidewater Review, which serves localities north of Hampton
Roads) numbered about 70.
Kris Worrell, the papers’ shared editor, and Shaun Fogarty, executive director
of sales, had a wide-ranging conversation with us in early February, before
the announcement of the Alden sale. We spoke about their intent to create
a unified news operation, bridging the stubborn divide between Southside
Hampton Roads and the Peninsula that has long been a stumbling block for
regional cooperation and economic development. We agreed that The Pilot
14 A
 nna Nicolaou and James Fontanella-Khan, “The fight for the future of America’s local newspapers,”
Financial Times (Jan. 21, 2021), at: https://www.ft.com/content/5c22075c-f1af-431d-bf39-becf9c54758b.

and Daily Press are an unparalleled resource for regional news and in-depth
reporting – more essential than ever in an era of misinformation, as a growing
number of citizens and even elected leaders have begun to choose their own
“facts.” No other news organization in Hampton Roads has the capacity to
produce such consistently high-caliber journalism. Stories about the unjust
application of Virginia’s “three strikes” law (Tim Eberly, a Pulitzer Prize finalist
for his reporting), strip searches at Virginia prisons (Gary Harki) and an
ongoing series on Norfolk’s racial divides (Sara Gregory and Ryan Murphy)
are a few recent outstanding examples.
Nevertheless, we would be remiss not to state the obvious – the ability of
The Pilot and Daily Press to pursue such in-depth stories, and their everyday
coverage throughout our region, has grown much thinner since their
operations merged. Under only a few months of full ownership by Alden
Global Capital, local reporting has grown thinner still. Two days after the
May 21 acquisition, the new owners offered yet another buyout to newsroom
employees at all of the Tribune papers. This round has been especially costly
for The Pilot and Daily Press. According to NewsGuild statistics, newsroom
union staff at the two papers decreased from 46 to 38, a loss of 17.4%, after
six weeks of Alden ownership (including two of the reporters mentioned in the
previous paragraph).
Three years ago, we had two daily papers. Now we essentially have one that
covers a wider region with a smaller and less experienced news staff. The
great challenge faced by the Tribune papers is perhaps not only encouraging
readers to think regionally but also persuading these readers to pay more for
less coverage within their immediate communities.

Boone Community
Newspapers In Western
Hampton Roads
Hampton Roads’ western localities are not only served by The Pilot and Daily
Press, but also by community newspapers that have been in print as long –
or longer – than the two larger dailies. Many decades ago, The Tidewater
News, The Smithfield Times and Suffolk News-Herald may have looked not all
that different from their counterparts in Norfolk and Newport News. Today,
these much smaller papers fill a distinct niche in our regional news ecosystem,
providing hyperlocal coverage outside our urban core.
The three papers are affiliates of Boone Newspapers, and thus embody a
separate ownership trend that has emerged alongside the rise of the new
media barons. “As the economy began to recover from the recession in 2013
and 2014,” Penelope Muse Abernathy writes, “Some of the smaller privately
owned national and regional chains, which were largely debt-free, began
quietly and selectively purchasing papers.”15 These smaller chains (Adams,
Boone, Hearst, Ogden, and Paxton) are family businesses and in some ways
resemble the newspaper chains of an earlier era. Jim Boone, current chairman
of Boone Newspapers, succeeded his father as the publisher of the Tuscaloosa
News in 1968. (Coincidentally, he had also served as the publisher of the
Suffolk News-Herald before returning to Tuscaloosa.)
Abernathy observes that the smaller media chains “operate their newspapers
as small businesses, with a singular focus on the bottom line and cash flow.
In contrast to the mega-chains, they have lean corporate staffs and tend to
keep low levels of debt. So, when hard times hit, they do not have to worry
about paying off loans on ‘underwater’ properties. As a result, they tend to
buy and hold properties, instead of trading them.”16 Many of their properties
are community newspapers that publish less than daily and appeal to local
advertisers within their smaller coverage areas.

15 A
 bernathy, “News Deserts and Ghost Newspapers,” 34.
16 A
 bernathy, “News Deserts and Ghost Newspapers,” 35.
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When Boone Newspapers began managing the Suffolk News-Herald in 2000,
the company presided over 34 newspapers. Its network has since nearly
doubled in size, to include 65 newspapers by 2019. The Tidewater News,
owned and published by Hanes Byerly for 46 years (1960-2006), joined
the Boone newspaper group in 2006. John and Anne Edwards owned The
Smithfield Times for 33 years before selling the paper in 2019. Today, these
three community papers are owned by separate limited-liability corporations
with various ties to Boone Newspapers. Members of the Boone family are the
majority owners of Suffolk Publications LLC, while Tidewater Publications LLC is
part of Carpenter Newsmedia (which is owned by Todd Carpenter, president
and CEO of Boone Newspapers). Steve Stewart, a Boone vice president (and
former publisher of the Suffolk News-Herald), is the new majority owner of
Smithfield Newsmedia LLC. When we spoke to Stewart this February, he was
in the process of relocating from Frankfort, Kentucky, to Smithfield, Virginia,
where he intends to put down roots.
Stewart explained to us that the LLCs pay a management fee to Boone
Newspapers, and that the papers share accounting services, health insurance
and numerous back-end functions (similar to the efficiencies enjoyed by the
Tribune papers). He said that the community papers try to “be smart about how
we share content,” with each maintaining its own point of view and distinct
area of coverage. Each newspaper has its own physical workspace, although
some staff members are shared. The Suffolk News-Herald and a new startup,
the Windsor Weekly, are available for free at various locations, while the other
two papers have a traditional newsstand price; all can be obtained through
online or paper subscriptions.
These newspapers are lean operations, and they have grown leaner in the
past few years. A spike in the cost of newsprint following the introduction of a
tariff on Canadian paper and the loss of advertisers during the pandemic have
posed particular challenges to the small newsrooms. The Suffolk News-Herald
reduced publication from six to five days a week in 2018, and again to two
days a week in 2020. The Tidewater News became a weekly (down from two
days a week) in 2020. A young Boone startup elsewhere in our region, the
Yorktown Independent, and the older Gates County Index have recently ceased
publication.
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The Boone newspapers do not seek to compete with the regional or larger
stories that The Virginian-Pilot and Daily Press regularly produce. However,
as the two daily newspapers have reduced their footprint in western Hampton
Roads, their smaller counterparts have become more essential. Steve Stewart
pointed us to two recent stories by writer Stephen Faleski – about a Franklin
wood-pellet producer’s longstanding air-quality violations, and a mismanaged
decision to end curbside recycling in Smithfield – that might not have attracted
public attention without the community papers.

The Hard Road For
Independent Papers

about what the school board or the county supervisors are doing, the exploits
of our young people when they excel in school and on the sports field, and
when a resident does something noteworthy.”

Stand-alone newspaper ownership in the year 2021 is hard, but not
impossible. Hampton Roads is home to three independent newspapers that
have persisted against the odds.

THE PRINCESS ANNE INDEPENDENT NEWS

NEW JOURNAL AND GUIDE
Brenda Andrews joined the staff of our region’s prominent Black newspaper in
1982, and she is now its publisher and editor-in-chief. She has shepherded it
through numerous storms – including Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the late 1980s,
and an unprecedented six-week publishing hiatus in the spring of 2020 due
to the upheavals of the coronavirus pandemic. The weekly New Journal and
Guide is once again available at sites throughout Hampton Roads and via
USPS delivery; it maintains a minimal online presence. When we spoke with
Andrews in February, she underscored the important role the revitalized paper
has played in disseminating information about COVID-19 and vaccinations
and in covering ongoing racial disparities that have been widened by the
pandemic. Environmental racism, food deserts in Black neighborhoods and
the redevelopment of St. Paul’s Quadrant in Norfolk are among the issues
the paper actively follows. Advocacy for the Black community is central to its
mission.

Editor and publisher John-Henry Doucette jokes that he founded The Princess
Anne Independent News in 2015 because it’s “the sort of thing middle-aged
people fall into when they cannot afford a hot rod and are scared of buying
marijuana.”17 In truth, he is a seasoned journalist who cares deeply about
local news, and he was concerned about the dearth of coverage in his home
community of Pungo and other parts of southern Virginia Beach. The Princess
Anne Independent News is now distributed for free at more than 300 locations
throughout Virginia Beach and Currituck County. The bimonthly newspaper
specializes in stories about local government, rural life and agriculture,
occasionally tackling larger issues that have gone uncovered by other news
outlets. Its past reporting has shone a light on the campaign-related spending
of political action committees and nonprofit organizations in Virginia Beach.

GAZETTE-JOURNAL

GLOUCESTER-MATHEWS GAZETTE-JOURNAL
Formed by a merger of the Gloucester Gazette and Mathews Journal in 1937,
this weekly newspaper has covered news in the two counties for more than 80
years. Its longtime president and publisher was the late John Warren Cooke,
who also was a speaker in the Virginia House of Delegates. His daughter Elsa
Verbyla succeeded him in 2009. The Gazette-Journal is now the only Hampton
Roads paper that still owns its own press; the newspaper’s printing business
provides a steady source of additional revenue. Editor Charlie Koenig told
us by email that “while TV stations and large daily newspapers only seem to
find Gloucester and Mathews on the map when something major (and usually
horrendous) happens, we are there week in and week out covering stories

BAD NEWS: THE DECLINE OF LOCAL JOURNALISM

[fHE P'RINCESS ANINE INDEPENDENT NEWS
~ iOf..tfltrn · r,&vu Ue-kf'l

and II

~

17 J ohn-Henry Doucette, “From the Editor: Toward a Virginia Beach Task Force on Local Journalism,” The
Princess Anne Independent News (Feb. 1, 2021), at: http://princessanneindy.com/2021/02/01/from-theeditor-2/.
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Can Local Journalism
Survive? Models For
The Future
The current local journalism crisis presents us with an opportunity to rethink
how news operations are organized and how they might function better. Here,
we highlight some of the proposals that have gained the most traction. None
are mutually exclusive. Elements of all of these proposals can and should play
a role in shaping our regional news landscape in the years ahead.

PUBLIC SUPPORT
The desperate situation faced by many local newspapers has reinvigorated
discussions about public funding for public-interest journalism. The federally
funded Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB) already provides grants to
local public media stations, which in turn purchase national news and other
programming from the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) and National Public
Radio (NPR). CPB funding in the future could conceivably play a larger role
in supporting local news, whether broadcast or online. NPR launched a small
team earlier this year to assist local stations with investigative reporting.
Hampton Roads’ public broadcaster, WHRO Public Media, established its
own local news team in 2020, covering the core costs of the new initiative
by leasing out parts of its broadcast spectrum. Its five-person news team now
produces original local reporting that punctuates the station’s broadcasts.
Longer stories are available on the WHRO website. Given its expansive
broadcast area, WHRO has wisely chosen to focus less on breaking news than
on contextual, explanatory reporting, with special emphasis on three areas:
sea level rise and the environment, inequity and social justice, and military
and veterans affairs. President and CEO Bert Schmidt tells us that WHRO is
fundraising and exploring ways to grow the young program.
Public support for local journalism can take many forms. One widely discussed
federal legislative proposal, the Local Journalism Sustainability Act, would
provide tax credits to local news subscribers, relieve employers of some payroll
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taxes for the journalists they employ and subsidize small business advertising
with local news outlets. The bill has more than 70 congressional co-sponsors
from both political parties. Other proposals seek to address the imbalance of
power between tech giants Google and Facebook and local news providers.
A “safe harbor” antitrust exemption, for example, would allow newspapers to
“come together to bargain with platform companies like Google and Facebook
to get paid for the use of their news content.”18 In short, if we as a society
agree that local journalism is essential to the functioning of democracy and
our civic institutions, there is no shortage of public policy options that could be
employed to sustain it.

NEW COMMERCIAL MODELS
Can local newspapers still make money? The answer seems to be yes, but
their operations will look quite different from those of generations past. Most
observers agree that newspapers must depend less on traditional advertising
and more on reader subscriptions and other kinds of revenue. Penelope Muse
Abernathy has suggested that commercial newspapers can remain viable in
communities with “average or growing economies or population,” as long as
these papers are finely attuned to local needs – and thus, most likely, locally
owned.19
Successful business models will necessarily vary from place to place. The
Arkansas Democrat-Gazette moved readers from paper to digital subscriptions
by lending them iPads, “smothering” them with customer service and keeping
its local coverage as robust as possible; it now delivers a print newspaper
only on Sunday. Other newspaper companies have created new revenue
streams by holding in-person events, such as interviews with journalists, or
panels and roundtables that discuss current topics; operating complementary
businesses; or publishing lifestyle and business magazines.20 We note that
under the banner of Virginia Media, Tribune not only presides over an array
18 R
 ick Edmonds, “How many plans to save local journalism are too many?” Poynter (Oct. 27, 2020), at:
https://www.poynter.org/locally/2020/how-many-plans-to-save-local-journalism-are-too-many/. See also
Anya Schiffrin, “Saving Journalism: A Vision for the Post-Covid World,” Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (January
2021), 11-14 and 24-25, at: https://www.kas.de/en/web/usa/single-title/-/content/saving-journalism.
19 W
 aldman, “A Replanting Strategy,” 14.
20 M
 ark Jacob, “The Arkansas Gamble: Can a Tablet and a Print Replica Rescue Local News?” Medill Local
News Initiative (Jan. 13, 2020), at: https://localnewsinitiative.northwestern.edu/posts/2020/01/13/
arkansas-democrat-gazette-tablet/; and Lauren Harris, “The context for the crisis: A Q&A with Penny
Abernathy,” Columbia Journalism Review (Aug. 19, 2020), at: https://www.cjr.org/business_of_news/thecontext-for-the-crisis-a-qa-with-penny-abernathy.php.

of specialized publications (including Inside Business, The Flagship military
newspaper and niche publications in Richmond and the Outer Banks), but
also offers website development, marketing research and other digital services
to clients. The Boone newspapers in our region publish three accompanying
lifestyle magazines: Suffolk Living, Western Tidewater Living and A Slice of
Smithfield.
Owners of successful newspapers must be willing to make tough decisions,
such as cutting back print days or laying off staff – but they also must be
prepared to invest in their papers’ future. Tribune Publishing sold off its legacy
newspapers’ valuable real estate assets and radically cut staff expenses, but
the proceeds appear to have flowed largely to nonlocal shareholders. Had
this money been reinvested in Hampton Roads newsrooms or expanding local
coverage, our two daily papers would surely be in a better place today.

“BIG HEARTS AND BIG WALLETS”
Can struggling newspapers be saved? Jim Friedlich of The Lenfest Institute for
Journalism answers bluntly: “Where local interests have successfully retaken
control of major regional news properties from newspaper-group or hedgefund owners, it has invariably been a single, monied individual offering an
aggressive price and surety of closing the deal, rather than a community group
passing the hat. These buyers have two things in common: Big hearts and big
wallets.”21
Jeff Bezos, who purchased The Washington Post in 2013, is surely the most
famous billionaire newspaper owner. Glen Taylor, a former Minnesota
state senator and owner of two professional basketball teams, bought the
Minneapolis Star Tribune in 2014. Earlier this year, hotel magnate Stewart
Bainum Jr. first sought to acquire The Baltimore Sun and other Tribune-owned
papers in Maryland in a side arrangement with Alden that subsequently broke
down. Not every billionaire newspaper owner succeeds (witness Equity Group
Investments chairman Sam Zell’s ill-fated tenure at the Tribune Co.). However,
Bezos, Taylor and a small circle of other very wealthy individuals now own
commercial newspapers that have become at least moderately profitable
(before COVID-19, anyway) through creative digital strategy and thoughtful
21 Jim Friedlich, “Tribune Blues,” Columbia Journalism Review (Jan. 12, 2021), at: https://www.cjr.org/
first_person/tribune-blues.php.
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investment. Media entrepreneur Gerry Lenfest purchased The Philadelphia
Inquirer from Alden and another investor in 2014, and later gifted the paper
to The Lenfest Institute for Journalism, a nonprofit organization (that he
established) dedicated to promoting new models of sustainable journalism.
“Big hearts and big wallets” can also take the form of philanthropy. The
people of Hampton Roads have benefited immensely from gifts to our
region’s hospitals, colleges and universities, fine arts institutions and various
charitable causes by generous leaders of our region. Some of the very largest
of these gifts have come from the Batten family, who made their fortune in
the newspaper business. Journalism has not traditionally been considered a
charitable cause. Steven Waldman notes that U.S. donors “increased their
commitment to journalism from $123 million in 2009 to $370 million in
2018,”22 but this is still a tiny fraction of the hundreds of billions that are given
charitably each year. The Hampton Roads Community Foundation and other
grant-giving organizations and donors should consider if and how supporting
local journalism could enhance the well-being of our region. This kind of
philanthropy need not occur on a massive scale; underwriting even a single
journalist could make a tremendous difference at a small newspaper.

NONPROFIT JOURNALISM
A small but growing number of nonprofit organizations such as The Lenfest
Institute explicitly support local journalism. Other examples include The
GroundTruth Project, which supports journalists in underserved areas, most
notably through the national service program Report for America and the
American Journalism Project, a “venture philanthropy organization” that
seeks “to inject one billion new dollars on an annual basis that goes directly
toward supporting local news gathering,” using an impact investment model
that has previously been adopted in fields such as education and international
development.23
Some legacy newspapers have reinvented themselves as nonprofit
organizations. The Salt Lake Tribune is perhaps the most prominent example.
22 S
 teven Waldman, “The Coming Era of ‘Civic News,’” Washington Monthly (November/December 2020), at:
https://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/november-december-2020/the-coming-era-of-civic-news/.
23 “ Losing the News: The Decimation of Local Journalism and the Search for Solutions,” PEN America (Nov.
20, 2019), 56-60, at: https://pen.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Losing-the-News-The-Decimation-ofLocal-Journalism-and-the-Search-for-Solutions-Report.pdf.
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The Philadelphia Inquirer is now a Public Benefit Corporation (owned by The
Lenfest Institute). Earlier this year, the nonprofit Corporation for New Jersey
Local Media (CNJLM) announced that it would work together with the New
Jersey Hills Media Group to convert 14 weekly newspapers to nonprofit
ownership. In the aftermath of the Tribune shareholders’ vote on May 21
to accept the Alden deal, Stewart Bainum announced that he was “busy
evaluating various options, all in the pursuit of creating locally-supported,
not-for-profit newsrooms that place stakeholders above shareholders and
journalistic integrity above all.”24 Steven Waldman has outlined an ambitious,
two-part strategy for transforming commercial newspapers into nonprofit
organizations – first, by establishing a private, nonprofit “replanting fund” that
would identify and support likely candidates, and second, by instituting public
policy changes “to make replanting more likely and to curb the deleterious
effects of local news consolidation in general.”25
More than 300 digital-first, nonprofit local news websites have been
established throughout the U.S. These organizations have much lower
expenses than legacy newspapers, although they do not have the advantages
of a longstanding subscriber base and must vie for readers’ attention. The
Institute for Nonprofit News provides a helpful support network; its members
must be “transparent about funding sources” and committed to independent,
nonpartisan “investigative and/or public-service reporting.” Its three member
organizations dedicated to local journalism in Virginia are Charlottesville
Tomorrow, Foothills Forum (based in Rappahannock County) and the Virginia
Center for Investigative Journalism (VCIJ). Founded by Virginian-Pilot alumni
Chris Tyree and Louis Hansen, VCIJ produces in-depth, investigative stories and
offers them to local news outlets free of charge. The reporting is currently done
on a contract basis; VCIJ has no office or full-time staff. Tyree told us that an
initial goal is to produce “one good story a month.” The first VCIJ story, which
appeared in September 2019, revealed that the U.S. Navy had been dumping
toxic firefighting chemicals into tributaries of the Chesapeake Bay for decades,
contaminating wells on and near Hampton Roads military bases.

24 Robert Channick, “Hedge fund Alden’s bid to buy Chicago Tribune, other papers approved by Tribune
Publishing shareholders” (May 21, 2021), at: https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-chicagotribune-publishing-alden-shareholders-approve-20210521-2awcpedkfrervox7gfsqpm45ua-story.html.
25 Waldman, “A Replanting Strategy,” 2-3.
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Virginia Mercury, which covers state government and policy, is another notable
news nonprofit. It fills the gap that arose after daily newspapers closed their
Richmond bureaus and reduced their General Assembly coverage. Virginia
Mercury maintains a robust, user-friendly website and offers its stories to
other news outlets free of charge. Its core funding for five full-time journalists
and additional freelancers is provided by States Newsroom, a national
nonprofit that oversees a growing network of similar state-based outlets. In
2020, NiemanLab initially included States Newsroom affiliates on its map
of “hyperpartisan sites masquerading as local news” because the nonprofit
“previously received backing from the liberal Hopewell Fund and did not begin
disclosing its donors until this year.” NiemanLab has since issued a correction,
noting that sites such as Virginia Mercury are run by journalists with longtime
newspaper experience and distinguished professional records.26 Nevertheless,
the incident is a useful reminder that readers should approach all news outlets
critically, particularly those online, and consider their funding sources and
professional ethics.

26 S
 ee Mahone and Napoli, “Hundreds of hyperpartisan sites.” A list of all States Newsroom donors who have
contributed more than $500 is available here: https://statesnewsroom.com/support/.

Final Thoughts
Our local news organizations are doing very good work, but there is
much less of it than just a few years ago. A flood of information (and
misinformation) is available at our fingertips, but we know less about the
local issues and institutions that directly affect our quality of life. In 2021,
we may no longer need newspapers to perform many of the functions they
once did – such as providing weather reports, sport scores, movie times and
so forth. However, we urgently need fact-checked, contextual reporting that
can dispel misinformation, shine a light on corruption and injustice, and help
us better understand our own communities. We agree with Penelope Muse
Abernathy that, “Ultimately, it doesn’t matter whether local news is delivered
through ink-on-paper or over a mobile phone. What matters is that a local
news organization reports on important issues and provides context and
analysis so citizens can make informed decisions and hold their public officials
accountable.”27

news to continue into the future. As citizens of Hampton Roads, we all have a
stake in this challenge. Unexamined institutions and the absence of a common
basis for dialogue diminish us all. The better informed we are, the better we
will be at making decisions that improve our quality of life and the state of
Hampton Roads.

We are accustomed to thinking about the news as a purely commercial
enterprise. However, events of the past two decades – and the more recent
tide of misinformation and conspiracy theories surrounding the COVID-19
pandemic and the insurrectionist violence of Jan. 6, 2021 – have shown
us that public-interest journalism should also be considered a public good.
Focused, investigative journalism produces benefits to the public by shining
the proverbial spotlight on the misdeeds of public and private actors. Without
journalists asking hard questions and persisting in getting answers from
politicians and others who prefer to obfuscate or remain silent, the big question
is: Who will do the work? We have ample evidence that social media is illequipped to step into this role and often misinforms rather than informs.
The old model of commercial journalism that long sustained general-interest
newspapers and provided a reliable source of iron core news is no longer
viable. The challenge for regional and community newspapers today is not
merely “going digital” – although successful news organizations must certainly
maintain a robust and thoughtful online presence – but also finding a new
economic model that will allow the reporting and delivery of high-quality local
27 Abernathy, “The Rise of a New Media Baron,” 39.
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Securing Release:
Cash Bail in Hampton Roads

SECURING RELEASE: CASH BAIL IN HAMPTON ROADS
Virginia’s current system of cash bail too often determines who has money, not who is dangerous, and we can’t have
a justice system that determines fairness and freedom based on wealth and means.
- Virginia Attorney General Mark Herring, October 2018

I

n 2018, Virginia Attorney General Mark Herring called for cash bail reform in a letter to the Virginia State Crime Commission (VSCC). He argued that the current
bail system too often leaves low-risk defendants in jail based solely on their inability to pay. Following Herring’s letter, at least five Virginia commonwealth’s
attorneys, including Norfolk’s Greg Underwood, changed local policies with the intent of reducing or eliminating cash bail. In January 2021, commonwealth’s
attorneys from Newport News, Portsmouth, Norfolk and Hampton joined eight other Virginia prosecutors in calling for an end to cash bail.1

Cash bail, also known as secured bonds, is a form of pretrial release where
defendants must secure bonds with cash or property in order to be released
from jail while awaiting trial. Cash bail provides an incentive for defendants
to return for their court appearance, since the surety is not reimbursed unless
the defendants return to court in accordance with the terms of their release.
Proponents of the cash bail system argue that it provides a financial incentive
for defendants to appear, lowers jail populations and increases accountability.1

Critics, however, contend that the cash bail system often leaves low-risk
defendants in jail for unduly long periods of time. The ability to pay determines
whether one remains in confinement or is released into society. A 2013 study
by the Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) found that 11%
of defendants were still in jail seven days from their first appearance, simply
because they could not afford to post a secured bond. Of those defendants,
92% were held on bonds valued at $5,000 or less. Opponents contend that
cash bail exacerbates racial disparities, as Black defendants are more likely to
be denied bail and face higher bond amounts.2 Advocates for reform also note
that cash bail raises constitutional concerns, since the unequal burden placed
on indigent defendants is inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal
1 A
 PDF copy of the letter is available at: https://www.pilotonline.com/news/crime/vp-nw-progressiveprosecutors-20210104-i3zgfbrvqjag5nxzkuaalu52ny-story.html.
2 David Arnold, Will Dobbie and Crystal S Yang, “Racial Bias in Bail Decisions,” The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, vol. 133, issue 4, November 2018, pages 1885-1932, https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjy012.
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protection clause. From this viewpoint, the arbitrary nature of bail decisions
runs against the right to due process.
In October 2020, Corey Hunter was held in a Fairfax jail for almost a week on
a $2,500 secured bond for a DUI - a first offense that would not likely result
in additional jail time. Unable to afford the bond, Hunter appealed the court’s
decision. Fairfax Circuit Court Judge David Bernhard ruled that the use of cash
bail in this case “would only be the product of resort to custom, instinct and
arbitrary action and thus would be an unconstitutional application of Virginia’s
statutory bail bond scheme and in derogation of the Due Process Clause of the
United States Constitution.” Bernhard appeared to be the first Virginia judge to
issue an opinion opposing the practice of cash bail.
Recent research has found that pretrial detention for as little as two days can
disrupt employment, child care and housing.3 Pretrial detention is associated
with an increased likelihood of conviction, as detained defendants face
additional pressure to accept an unfavorable plea bargain in order to be
released with time served. Pretrial detention may also lead to higher rates
of recidivism; research has found that detaining low- and moderate-risk
defendants for a short time can increase their likelihood to reoffend during the
3 W
 ill Dobbie, Jacob Goldin and Crystal S. Yang, 2018, “The Effects of Pre-trial Detention on Conviction, Future
Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges,” American Economic Review, 108 (2):
201-40.

pretrial and post-trial periods.4 Indigent defendants are less likely to secure
release and are therefore more likely to face the negative consequences of
pretrial detention.

relatively high rates of incarceration in the United States and
taxpayers concerned about the cost of housing, feeding and
supervising the incarcerated.

There appears to be a growing movement questioning the need for cash
bail and seeking ways to reform the cash bail system without compromising
public safety. Since 2017, New York, New Jersey, Alaska and Maryland,
among other states, have passed legislation, and in some cases, constitutional
amendments, with the intent of reducing the reliance on cash bail. On Feb.
22, 2021, Gov. J.B. Pritzker of Illinois signed legislation making Illinois the first
state to eliminate cash bail. In Virginia, and in particular, Hampton Roads,
a number of commonwealth’s attorneys have publicly signaled a desire to
significantly reduce (if not eliminate entirely in most cases) the use of cash bail.

We estimate that if Virginia were to enact cash bail reform, the
average daily pretrial population in Hampton Roads would
decline between 5% and 20%. Incarceration costs for cities and
counties in Hampton Roads would decline between $5 million
and $21 million a year. Cash bail reform would also reduce
costs for those awaiting trial, not only in terms of having to
pay for bail bond services, but also increasing defendants’
ability to work while awaiting trial. Every day in confinement
is a potential day of lost wages for those who have not yet
been convicted of a crime. We estimate that the economic
impact of cash bail reform, assuming that those awaiting
trial are released, could approach $80 million annually for
Hampton Roads.

On any given day in 2019, there were over 3,154 pretrial
inmates in Hampton Roads local and regional jails. While
some of these inmates were not released due to the severity
of their crimes or risks posed to the public, others languished
in pretrial detention, unable to find enough collateral to gain
release through a secured bond. Even though violent and
property crimes have decreased since 1990, incarceration rates
have increased in Hampton Roads, Virginia and the United
States. From 2000 to 2018, the Hampton Roads pretrial inmate
population rose by approximately 1.6% per year. In some
cities and counties in our region, the pretrial population grew
by more than 3% per year.
The most recent national data on pretrial detainees provide
comparisons among Hampton Roads, Virginia and the United
States. In 2019, on average, there were more pretrial inmates
per 100,000 residents in Hampton Roads (183.5) than Virginia
(135.9) or the United States (146.4).5 The conversation about
how to reduce the pretrial population includes advocates
of equity in the justice system, those concerned about the
4 C
 hristopher T. Lowenkamp, Marie VanNostrand and Alexander Holsinger, “The Hidden Costs of Pre-trial
Detention,” National Institute of Corrections, November 2013.
5 We use data from the Virginia State Compensation Board Local Inmate Data System for Hampton Roads and
Virginia and data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics for the United States.
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In this chapter, we look at the use of cash bail, its prevalence in bail conditions,
average bond amounts and cash bail’s impact on pretrial detention. We cite
statistics on the number of people in pretrial detention in Hampton Roads and
consider who among them might be affected by bail reform. We examine the
cost of pretrial detention to taxpayers in the region and determine whether
there would be significant savings if cash bail were eliminated.

History Of The Cash Bail
System
While the origins of cash bail can be traced back to the Romans, America’s
notion of bail primarily has English roots.6 The early American bail system
embraced most of England’s bail practices, including the protection against
excessive bail. In 1789, Congress passed the Judiciary Act, requiring
defendants for all noncapital federal offenses to be considered for bail. The
6 T imothy R. Schnacke, Michael R. Jones and Claire M.B. Brooker (2010), “The History of Bail and Pre-trial
Release,” Pretrial Justice Institute.

163

right to bail under the Judiciary Act and the protection against excessive bail
as laid forth in the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution became two of
the central principles of the U.S. bail system.
America’s early cash bail system also adopted the English bail practice of
personal sureties.7 What would be considered an unsecured bond today, a
personal surety is a promise by a family member or associate of the defendant
to pay the debt in the event of default. The practice of personal sureties
declined in the 1800s as fewer people wanted to take on the obligation of
defendants without payment. In the absence of personal sureties, judges began
utilizing secured bonds as a means of ensuring court appearance. The use of
secured bonds changed the traditional American bail practice from release
conditional on a promise to pay if default occurs, to release conditional on
payment. The shift led to the rise of the commercial bail bond industry in the
early 20th century.

Bail statutes in the Commonwealth have since set forth a general presumption
to grant bail unless the defendant poses a risk to public safety or court
appearance. The Virginia General Assembly amended its bail statutes in
1996 to require a presumption against bail for certain felony offenses and
circumstances. In 2000, the General Assembly required the use of secured
bonds in certain circumstances. Virginia Code 19.2-123 states: “Any person
arrested for a felony who has previously been convicted of a felony, or who
is presently on bond for an unrelated arrest in any jurisdiction, or who is on
probation or parole, may be released only upon a secure bond.” The provision
can only be waived with the approval of both the presiding judge and local
commonwealth’s attorney.

The Pretrial Process

Criticism of the cash bail system began as early as the 1920s with rising
concern about the impact of secured bonds on low-income defendants.8
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, research highlighted the disproportionate
share of low-income defendants in jail awaiting trial. The 1966 Bail Reform
Act was the first legal revision to bail since the Judiciary Act of 1789.9 This
act instructed judges to favor the least restrictive form of bail conditions for
noncapital federal defendants and to use bail only if release on recognizance
was not feasible.

Bail conditions are one part of the entire pretrial process, which encompasses
the various stages of a criminal case from arrest to trial and/or sentencing. If
an arresting officer has probable cause to believe that someone has broken
the law, the officer can issue a summons or take the person into custody.10 A
summons is simply a written promise to appear in court. Once signed, the
accused is free to go. If taken into custody and brought to jail, the defendant
first receives a bail hearing. In Virginia, the local magistrate conducts bail
hearings.

The 1984 Bail Reform Act required judges to consider the degree of danger
defendants posed to public safety when determining bail. The U.S. Supreme
Court, in U.S. v. Salerno (1987), upheld the constitutionality of this decision,
resulting in a shift in bail practices. Before U.S. v. Salerno, the purpose of bail
was to ensure a defendant’s court appearance. Following this ruling, most
states, including Virginia, amended their bail statutes to instruct judges to use
two main criteria when determining bail conditions: court appearance and
public safety.

At the end of the bail hearing, the magistrate can deny bail (finding the
defendant to be too high a risk to public safety or court appearance) or grant
bail based on specified terms and conditions. There are three main forms of
pretrial release. Release on personal recognizance requires a written promise
to appear and compliance with any bail conditions imposed by the court. In
the case of unsecured bonds, where a bond is issued in exchange for bail but
does not need to be secured before release, the judge can forfeit the bond and
enter judgment if the defendant fails to appear in court.

7 M
 uhammad B. Sardar (2019), “Give Me Liberty or Give Me . . . Alternatives? Ending Cash Bail and Its Impact
on Pretrial Incarceration,” Brooklyn Law Review, vol. 84, issue 4.
8 Timothy R. Schnacke (2014), “Fundamentals of Bail: A Resource Guide for Pre-trial Practitioners and a
Framework for American Pre-trial Reform,” National Institute of Corrections, https://s3.amazonaws.com/
static.nicic.gov/Library/028360.pdf.
9 Hayley E. Miller (2016), “Taming the Wild West: Using Unsecured Bail Bonds in Nevada’s Pretrial-Release
Program,” Nevada Law Journal, https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1688&context=nlj.
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The final form, secured bonds, or “cash bail,” requires the bond amount to be
secured with either a cash deposit or solvent surety. If defendants do not have
10 “ Criminal Case Procedures,” General District Court Manual, http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/gd/
resources/manuals/gdman/chapter03.pdf.

sufficient cash or collateral, they can use a third party. A third-party surety can
be either a private surety who owns real property, such as a family member or
friend, or a bail bondsman. Bail bondsmen guarantee the bond amount and
charge the defendant a nonrefundable fee. The Virginia Code requires that the
fee be no less than 10% and no more than 15% of the bond amount. In 2018,
there were 375 actively licensed bail bondsmen in Virginia.11

Risk Assessment Tools
Other than the presumptions against bail for some offenses and the
requirement of secured bonds for certain circumstances, magistrates have wide
discretion in determining bail. At a bail hearing, the job of a magistrate is to
conduct a risk assessment of the defendant. Judges in the Commonwealth are
required to consider a list of factors when making this assessment, such as the
character of the accused, the nature of the offense and the defendant’s ability
to pay the bond. The weight of these factors in determining bail, however, is
left to the judge’s calculation. With no standardized system, judges must use
their discretion to predict and mitigate a defendant’s risk with the right release
conditions. The result of such a system not only creates disparate outcomes, but
also relies on wealth to mitigate risk.
Risk-assessment tools are used to replace the subjective nature of bail with a
data-driven empirical system based on risk. These tools measure a defendant’s
risk of pretrial failure (new arrest and court appearance) based on a series of
risk factors. The goal of risk instruments is to reduce pretrial detention rates by
properly identifying low-risk defendants for release, while also detaining fewer
defendants based solely on their inability to pay by “replacing wealth with
risk.”12
In a 2019 national survey, 2 in 3 cities and counties used a risk-assessment
tool, and more than half reported implementing an instrument over the last five
years.13 Virginia was the first in the country to implement a statewide research11 The Virginia State Crime Commission’s 2018 Annual Report, http://vscc.virginia.gov/2019/VSCC%20
2018%20Annual%20Report.pdf
12 “Making Sense of Pretrial Risk Assessments,” National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, https://
www.nacdl.org/Article/June2018-MakingSenseofPre-trialRiskAsses.
13 University of Pretrial, Pretrial Justice Institute, 2019, https://university.pre-trial.org/viewdocument/scan-ofpre-trial-practices-pji-20.
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based, pretrial risk-assessment tool in 2005. Known nationally as the Virginia
Model, the Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument (VPRAI) has since been
implemented in jurisdictions in 10 states and statewide in Maine. The VPRAI
examines eight risk factors that are weighted to create a risk score. Results
from the VPRAI are shared with the judge, prosecutor and defense attorneys.
In 2017, the VPRAI was revised and supplemented with Praxis, a decision tool
that incorporates the revised VPRAI and the defendant’s current charges to
provide a recommendation of whether to deny or admit bail and, in the case of
pretrial release, the level of supervision needed for the defendant.14 Where the
VPRAI measures the risk of pretrial failure, the Praxis tool manages that risk by
recommending the most efficient bail conditions.

Risk Factors Scored on VPRAI-Revised15
1.

Active community criminal justice supervision

2. Current charge is felony drug, felony theft or felony fraud
3. Pending charge at time of arrest
4. One or more adult criminal convictions
5. Two or more failures to appear
6. Two or more violent convictions
7.

Unemployed at the time of arrest

8. History of drug abuse

In recent years, some criminal-justice advocates who once supported the use
of risk-assessment tools have argued that the tools themselves can perpetuate
racial disparities.16 Critics argue that the data and methodology used to derive
risk scores, such as a defendant’s criminal history, reflect the structural and
institutional racism inherent and only exacerbate existing disparities. Pretrial
14 Virginia State Crime Commission, 2017 Annual Report, https://rga.lis.virginia.gov/Published/2018/
RD207/PDF.
15 V
 irginia State Crime Commission, 2017 Annual Report, https://rga.lis.virginia.gov/Published/2018/
RD207/PDF.
16 “ Making Sense of Pre-trial Risk Assessments,” National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, https://
www.nacdl.org/Article/June2018-MakingSenseofPre-trialRiskAsses.
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risk-assessment tools have been around for some time, yet there is a lack of
consensus on their efficacy in reducing cash bail and pretrial detention.17
New Jersey implemented a risk-assessment tool as part of its cash bail reform
legislation in 2017. While the jail population in New Jersey declined, racial
disparities persisted. Jail data for Virginia from the Vera Institute for Justice
show that, on average, there were 1,388 Black or African American and 283
white jail inmates for every 100,000 residents in 2005.18 In 2015, 10 years
after the implementation of the VPRAI, the jail population rates for Black or
African American and white individuals were 1,115 and 352, respectively.
Relative to 2005, there was improvement in the incarceration rates for Black
inmates relative to the Black population in Virginia. Yet, significant disparities
in incarceration rates persist, as there were still roughly three times more Black
inmates than white inmates per 100,000 residents in the Commonwealth.

Pretrial Services Agencies
In Virginia, pretrial services agencies (PSAs) serve two main functions: to
collect and deliver information to assist judges in determining bail, and
to supervise defendants on pretrial release to monitor compliance with
bail conditions such as electronic monitoring, drug testing or maintaining
employment. Established in the 1990s, PSAs are locality-based agencies,
administered and funded by the Virginia Department of Criminal Justice
Services and localities. As of 2019, 75% of Virginia’s cities and counties
had a PSA. Only 4 of the 16 Hampton Roads cities and counties – Franklin,
Southampton, Isle of Wight County and Suffolk – do not have one.
Pretrial supervision is touted as a possible alternative to cash
bail and pretrial detention for defendants deemed too highrisk for a personal recognizance bond. However, data from
the Virginia Pre-trial Data Project (VPDP) show that in fiscal
year 2019, approximately 53% of all defendants placed on
17 Evan Lowder, Carmen Diaz, Eric Grommon and Bradley Ray, “Effects of Pre-trial Risk Assessments
on Release Decisions and Misconduct Outcomes Relative to Practice as Usual” (2021), Journal of
Criminal Justice, vol. 73, March-April 2021, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/
S0047235220302488?dgcid=rss_sd_all.
18 “Virginia Incarceration Trends,” Vera Institute for Justice, https://trends.vera.org/rates/virginia.
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pretrial supervision were also ordered to post a secured bond.
The data do, however, show a high pretrial success rate. In
2019, 93% of defendants on pretrial supervision returned for
their scheduled court appearance and did not have their bail
revoked due to a new arrest.
The Commonwealth has long been recognized as a leader in bail system
reform. States such as Illinois and New Jersey, which in recent years passed
comprehensive legislative reforms aimed at eliminating cash bail, have made
risk tools and pretrial supervision a central part of reform. These tools have
been in place in Virginia for more than a decade. Nevertheless, as we show
in the next few sections, cash bail remains a common form of pretrial release
in the Commonwealth, and pretrial detention rates in Virginia and Hampton
Roads are not far from the national average. The answer as to why cash bail
persists as a method of pretrial detention comes down to judicial discretion, not
enough oversight on the effectiveness and take-up rate of these reform tools,
and statutory requirements that in some cases require secured bonds for bail.

Pretrial Detention
From 1990 to 2018, property and violent crimes in the United States trended
down, while incarceration rates increased (1990-2008) and then declined
back to levels observed near the turn of the century (Graph 1). From 1990 to
2018, the rate of violent and property crimes per 100,000 Americans declined
52.5% and 43.6%, respectively, while the jail incarceration rate increased by
36.9%. As of May 2021, the United States had one of the highest reported
incarceration rates in the world, with 639 inmates per 100,000 residents.19
Americans not yet convicted of a crime make up an increasing
proportion of the jail population. From 1990 to 2019, the
number of convicted inmates in local jails increased by almost
30% (Graph 2). Over the same period, the number of pretrial
inmates increased by approximately 132%. Pretrial inmates
accounted for 66% of the U.S. jail population in 2019. The U.S.
19 “ Countries with the most prisoners per 100,000 inhabitants, as of May 2021,” Statista Research Department,
June 2, 2021.

leads the world in terms of the number of pretrial detainees,
with nearly twice as many as any other country in the world.
On an average day in 2019, more than 480,000 Americans
confined in local jails had not yet been convicted of a crime.
While some were deemed a flight risk or threat to public
safety, other pretrial inmates remained in jail due to their
inability to post bail.
Virginia mirrors national trends in the pretrial population. While the share
of pretrial inmates in the total jail population in Virginia in 2018 (52%)
was below that of the nation (65%), the rate of increase was faster in the
Commonwealth than for the nation (Graph 3). For Hampton Roads in 2018,
almost half of the inmates were pretrial detainees, a lower rate than that
of Virginia or the nation. This share remained relatively constant over the
previous decade.
On an average day in 2019, half of the 11,600 inmates in Virginia jails had
yet to be convicted of a crime. Of these 11,600 inmates, 3,154 were confined
in Hampton Roads jails. To better understand the types of charges for those
held pretrial, we can look to statistics provided by Virginia’s Department of
Criminal Justice Services (DCJS). These data capture the most serious offense
types for the 170,000 pretrial commitments to Virginia jails in 2019.20 In half
of these, the most serious charge was a misdemeanor. Approximately 12%
were detained for a violent felony (Graph 4). In misdemeanor cases especially,
pretrial detention can pose a significant problem, as defendants are more likely
to plead guilty to gain release from jail.21

20 Pretrial commitments reflect the number of pretrial commitment events. This is not a count of unique people,
as some individuals may be committed multiple times for the same or different offenses, if they were released
and then returned to jail. The average daily pretrial population totaled 11,587 in 2019.
21 Paul Heaton, Sandra G. Mayson and Megan Stevenson, “The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor
Pre-trial Detention,” 69 Stanford Law Review 711 (2017).
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Change in Violent Crime, Property Crime and Jail Incarceration Rates:
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Jail Inmate Population by Conviction Status:
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GRAPH 3
GRAPH 3Jail Inmate Population:
Share of Unconvicted
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Share of Pretrial Commitments by Most Serious Offense Type:
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The Use Of Cash Bail
Unfortunately, data on pretrial release conditions at the national, state and
local level are sparse at best. In a 2009 Bureau of Justice Statistics survey (the
latest national data available), of the country’s 40 most populous counties,
more than 40% of felony defendants were assigned monetary bail conditions,
up 11% since 1990. Over the same period, the share of defendants released
on recognizance declined 13%. Fortunately for the Commonwealth, a 2021
study by the Virginia State Crime Commission (VSCC) provided insight on
the use of different pretrial release mechanisms. We draw on this work in this
section.
The Virginia Pre-Trial Data Project (VPDP) tracked a cohort of defendants
who were arrested and charged with an offense in October 2017 to the final
disposition of their case. The purpose of the project, which will be replicated on
an annual basis, was to address the lack of statewide data on bail conditions
and pretrial outcomes in Virginia. Graph 5 shows the final pretrial mechanism
for the 15,653 defendants in the 2017 VPDP cohort.22
Of these 15,653 defendants, 4,227 received a summons
and were released on their own recognizance and 11,426
were taken into custody. Graph 6 shows the final bail type
or detainment status for the 11,426 defendants taken into
custody. Almost half (47%) were released on personal
recognizance or an unsecured bond. Over a third (36%) were
released on a secured bond. Almost 15% were denied bail,
while 2% of the defendants were held with a secured bond
the entire pretrial period. In other words, out of the 11,426
defendants, 226 were unable to scrape together enough
resources to secure a bond to obtain release from confinement
for the entire pretrial period.

22 The study cohort consisted of 22,933 defendants. Descriptive statistics are available only on the 15,715
defendants whose October 2017 arrest was the result of a new arrest, not related to a prior charge. Sixtytwo of these defendants were excluded from the analysis, as the information could not be verified.
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GRAPH 5
GRAPH 5

VSCC Virginia Pre-trial Data Project: Statewide Descriptive Statistics of Defendant Cohort,
VSCC VIRGINIA PRE-TRIAL DATA PROJECT: STATEWIDE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF DEFENDANT COHORT,
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GRAPH 6
GRAPH 6

VSCC Virginia Pre-trial Data Project: Statewide Descriptive Statistics of Defendant Cohort,
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with
pretrial
(PSA)
supervision.
Source:
Virginia
State
Crime Commission’s Virginia Pre-trial Data Project (2021), statewide descriptive findings. Statistics reflect the outcomes of 15,715 total defendants charged with a new arrest in the study cohort, excluding 4,277
defendants released on a summons and 62 defendants whose bond type could not be determined. Released on personal recognizance (PR) or unsecured bond and released on secured bond includes unsupervised release and release with
pretrial (PSA) supervision.

6

174

THE STATE OF THE REGION | HAMPTON ROADS 2021

Pretrial Release
Conditions May Change

recognizance or unsecured bond followed by 27% released on a secured
bond. A secured bond was the most common bail type for defendants charged
with at least one felony.

Where defendants start in the pretrial release process does not necessarily
define where they will end up. A magistrate may hold a defendant without
bond or with a secured bond, or determine that a personal-recognizance or
unsecured bond is appropriate. However, the decision can be (and often is)
revisited, and the bail conditions modified, in due course. Turning again to the
VPDP data, we note that of the 15,715 defendants shown in Graphs 5 and 6,
4,227 were released at the time of arrest through the issuance of a summons,
and 334 had incomplete data on initial or final bond or release status.
We turn our attention now to the 11,154 defendants whose initial and final
status was known (Graph 7). Of the 3,591 defendants who were initially held
without bond, 1,696 (47.2%) remained in custody, 1,379 (38.4%) were later
released on a secured bond, and 516 (14.4%) were released on personal
recognizance or unsecured bond. For the 3,180 held initially on a secured
bond, only 226 (7.1%) were not released, 2,665 (83.8%) were released on
a secured bond and 289 (9.1%) were released on personal recognizance or
unsecured bond. Of the 4,383 defendants held on personal recognizance or
unsecured bond, almost all (99.7%) were released under the same conditions.
A majority of defendants (52.8%) who were initially held
without bond were later released on bond. For defendants
held initially on a secured bond, 92.9% were released on
bond at some point. Of the 11,154 defendants in the VPDP
sample, 82.7% were released on some type of bond, and the
remainder (17.3%) were held without bond until their trial.
A defendant’s charge is one of the most significant factors in deciding bail.
The most serious offense for roughly half of the defendants in the cohort
was a jailable nonfelony charge. If judges are employing the least restrictive
conditions, we should expect those charged with less serious, nonfelony
offenses to be more likely to be issued personal recognizance or unsecured
bonds. This distribution is illustrated in Graph 8. Among defendants in the
cohort charged with a jailable nonfelony, 65% were released on a personal-
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GRAPH 7
GRAPH 7

VSCC Virginia Pre-trial Data Project: Statewide Descriptive Statistics of Defendant Cohort,
VSCC VIRGINIA PRE-TRIAL DATA PROJECT: STATEWIDE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF DEFENDANT COHORT,
Ultimate
ReleaseOR
orDETENTION
DetentionTYPE
Type
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ULTIMATE RELEASE
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0.1%

0%
Held without Bond
■ Not Released

Held on Secured Bond

Released on Secured Bond

Source: Virginia State Crime Commission’s Virginia Pre-trial Data Project (2021), statewide descriptive findings for 11,154 defendants. (PR is personal recognizance.)
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PR or Unsecured Bond

Released on PR or Unsecured Bond

Source: Virginia State Crime Commission’s Virginia Pre-trial Data Project (2021), statewide descriptive findings for 11,154 defendants. (PR is personal recognizance.)
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VSCC Virginia Pre-trial Data Project: Statewide Descriptive Statistics of Defendant Cohort,
GRAPH 8

Most Serious Charge Classification by Ultimate Release or Detention Type

VSCC VIRGINIA PRE-TRIAL DATA PROJECT: STATEWIDE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF DEFENDANT COHORT,
MOST SERIOUS CHARGE CLASSIFICATION BY ULTIMATE RELEASE OR DETENTION TYPE
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Source: Virginia State Crime Commission's Virginia Pre-trial Data Project (2021), statewide descriptive findings, Table 3. Excludes 19 defendants with undetermined charge classification, and defendants released on a summons. (PR is
personal recognizance.)

Source: Virginia State Crime Commission’s Virginia Pre-trial Data Project (2021), statewide descriptive findings, Table 3. Excludes 19 defendants with undetermined charge classification and defendants released on a summons. (PR is
personal recognizance.)
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How Many Days Does
Someone Spend In
Jail Pretrial?
Graph 9 shows the number of days in pretrial detention for the 9,406
defendants released on bond.23 Over 8 in 10 defendants released on personal
recognizance or unsecured bond were released on the same day of their
arrest. Only 44% released on a secured bond were released on the same
day as their arrest. Approximately 4.3% of defendants ultimately released on
personal recognizance or unsecured bond remained in jail more than 10 days.
For those ultimately released via a secured bond, this climbed to 18.1%.
Recent research has shown that even a day or two of pretrial detention
can disrupt employment, housing and child care.24 Approximately 39% of
defendants released on a secured bond were detained at least two days, and
more than 1 in 4 secured-bond defendants were still in custody six days after
the initial arrest. The longer time secured-bond defendants spend in jail, either
scraping together the money or appealing for lighter bail conditions, lies at the
heart of the cash bail debate.

23 Of the 11,426 defendants in Graphs 5 and 6, 98 had missing information, 1,696 were held without bond
and 226 were held the entire period with a secured bond. Removing these defendants from the analysis
reduced the sample size to 9,406 defendants.
24 Will Dobbie, Jacob Godin and Crystal S. Yang, “The Effects of Pre-trial Detention on Conviction, Future
Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges,” 2018, American Economic Review,
vol. 108, no. 2, available at: https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/aer.20161503.
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VSCC Virginia Pre-trial Data Project: Statewide Descriptive Statistics of Defendant Cohort
GRAPH 9

Days from Arrest to Release: Percentage of Total Defendants by Bond Type

VSCC VIRGINIA PRE-TRIAL DATA PROJECT: STATEWIDE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF DEFENDANT COHORT
DAYS FROM ARREST TO RELEASE, PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL DEFENDANTS BY BOND TYPE
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Share of Defendants
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Source: Virginia State Crime Commission’s Virginia Pre-trial Data Project (2021), statewide descriptive findings. Released on personal recognizance (PR) or unsecured bond and released on secured bond includes unsupervised release
and release with PSA supervision.

Source: Virginia State Crime Commission’s Virginia Pre-trial Data Project (2021), statewide descriptive findings. Released on personal recognizance (PR) or unsecured bond and released on secured bond includes unsupervised release and
release with PSA supervision.
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Bond Amounts:
Are They Affordable?
While more than 1 in 3 defendants released on a secured bond spent at least
two days in jail, the average bond amount was less than $5,200. As illustrated
in Graph 10, the average secured bond amount for nonfelony defendants in
the sample was $2,928 and $5,182 for felony defendants. Bond amounts
ranged from $100 to $200,000. Among defendants issued a secured bond,
the average bond amount for those held the entire pretrial period was lower
than for released defendants. This suggests that detention for the entire period
was, in part, a function of income rather than risk to the community or the
likelihood to appear in court.
A defendant issued a secured bond has two main options to post bond:
pay the entire bond amount in cash or use a solvent surety such as a family
member, friend or bail bondsman. Defendants with the financial means to
post the bond outright are fully refunded at the end of their case. Defendants
without sufficient means could use a bail bondsman, but they must pay a
nonrefundable fee ranging from 10% to 15%. Among the defendants in the
cohort released on secured bond, 89% used a bail bondsman to post bond.
The widespread use of bail bondsmen could be the result of the lower incomes
of defendants and incarcerated people in general, the relative unaffordability
of bonds or maybe even the low savings rate of average Americans.
Given the relationship between crime and socioeconomic status, we would
expect, on average, incarcerated individuals to have lower average incomes
relative to the population. A Prison Policy Initiative (PPI) report in 2015 found
that inmates prior to incarceration had a median annual income of $19,185
in 2014 dollars, 41% less than the nonincarcerated population in a similar age
group.25 The statistics from the Virginia Pre-trial Data Project do not provide us
with income information for defendants. However, as a proxy for income, the
data show that roughly half of all defendants in the sample were represented
by a public defender or court-appointed attorney. The presence of a public
defender was highest among defendants held on a secured bond the entire
25 “ Prisons of Poverty: Uncovering the pre-incarceration incomes of the imprisoned,” Prison Policy Initiative,
2015, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/income.html.
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pretrial period (83.2%), followed by defendants released on secured bonds
(61.8%) and personal recognizance or unsecured bond (50.5%).

BAIL
BOND,S

GRAPH 10
GRAPH 10

VSCC Virginia Pre-trial Data Project: Statewide Descriptive Statistics of Defendant Cohort
VSCC VIRGINIA PRE-TRIAL DATA PROJECT: STATEWIDE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF DEFENDANT COHORT
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Source: Virginia State Crime Commission’s Virginia Pre-trial Data Project (2021), statewide descriptive findings, Table 6. Average bond amounts for defendants released with and without a pretrial service agency. Does not include 235
defendants who were released on a personal recognizance bond only.

Source: Virginia State Crime Commission’s Virginia Pre-trial Data Project (2021), statewide descriptive findings, Table 6. Average bond amounts for defendants released with and without a pretrial service agency. Does not include 235
defendants who were released on a personal recognizance bond only.
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Failure To Appear Or
Flight Risk?
Failure to appear is one of the more contentious issues surrounding the cash
bail reform debate. After cash bail reform in Harris County, Texas, 43% of
defendants who were released without cash bail failed to appear for court
between June and December 2017. In 2018, prosecutors in Atlanta claimed
that bail reform doubled the rate of people failing to appear in court.26
One problem is that the definition of failure to appear differs from state
to state, if not jurisdiction to jurisdiction. If a person misses 10 court
appointments, is this counted once or 10 times? The answer depends on local
rules and preferences. Failure to appear, however, is not just a problem in
the justice system. Estimates suggest that Americans, on average, fail to keep
medical appointments between 15% and 30% of the time.27
Is cash bail meant to encourage court appearance or reduce
flight risk? This is an important question. Court appearance
rates may suffer because defendants cannot take time off
work, are indigent, lack transportation or have health care
issues. Accommodating the needs of these defendants is in the
interests of the defendant, the justice system and taxpayers.
Incarcerating a low-risk defendant because of a missed court
appointment is akin to having your car repossessed because
you missed an appointment at the car dealership.
Flight risk, however, is an attempt to evade justice. These defendants typically
need resources to flee. Flight risk is likely to be positively correlated with
income. Monitoring these individuals is expensive and time-consuming, and
thus identifying who is a flight risk is important. Indiscriminately using cash
bail to prevent flight risk is likely to produce the unintended consequence of
increasing the pretrial detention rates of lower-income defendants. Available
evidence suggests that likelihood of flight risk is low, especially when compared
to the frequency of nonappearance.28
26 https://theappeal.org/the-failure-to-appear-fallacy/.
27 https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/7010402/.
28 Lauryn P. Gouldin, “Defining flight risk,” The University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 85 (2018).
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A Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) report sheds light on the difference between
nonappearance and flight risk (or remaining a fugitive from justice). Surveying
40 of the 75 largest U.S. counties between 1990 and 2004, the BJS found
that approximately 75% of defendants appeared in court on schedule. Of
those defendants that missed at least one court hearing (failing to appear),
94% appeared in court within a year of their missed court date. Only 6%
remained fugitives from justice. This study suggests that the actual risk of flight
is significantly overstated by the use of failure to appear statistics.29
Graph 11 presents data from the Virginia Pre-Trial Data Project regarding
whether defendants were charged with failure to appear or were arrested
for a new in-state offense punishable by incarceration. On average, 13%
of defendants were charged with failure to appear, with the highest rates of
charges being observed among those released with a secured bond only.
However, the more relevant question is whether those released committed
new crimes at different rates. Approximately 1 in 5 defendants released on
personal recognizance or an unsecured bond were charged with a new instate offense that was punishable by incarceration. Among those released on
more stringent types of bonds and supervision, almost 3 in 10 were arrested
for a new in-state jailable offense. The argument that changing bail conditions
would result in increases in criminal activity appears to be undermined by the
data, which suggest that defendants released under some form of supervision
were arrested at approximately the same rate.
From our perspective, cash bail reform would increase the number
of defendants who miss court appointments. One way to address this
potential problem is to divert some portion of savings from incarcerating
low-risk defendants to helping these defendants keep (or reschedule) their
court appearances. Developing tools and support systems to reduce the
administrative burden on these defendants and the courts would be a boon to
taxpayers also. Courts could then more keenly focus on those defendants who
pose risks to public safety or who may flee justice.

29 https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/prfdsc.pdf.

GRAPH 11
VSCC Virginia Pre-trial Data Project,
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Percent of Defendants
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VSCC VIRGINIA PRE-TRIAL DATA PROJECT,
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Cash Bail In Hampton Roads

In April 2021, the Virginia Board of Local and Regional Jails

From 1990 to 2018, violent crimes and property crimes in Hampton Roads
declined by 39.5% and 58.4%, respectively (Graph 12). Over the same
period, the incarceration rate increased 80.3%, well above the national
average of 36.9%. In 2018, an average of 425 inmates per 100,000
Hampton Roads residents were in local jails, almost twice the national average
of 226 per 100,000 Americans. On any given day in 2018, an average of
209 pretrial inmates per 100,000 Hampton Roads residents were in local
jails, a higher rate than that for Virginia (186.5 per 100,000) and the nation
(146.2 per 100,000) (Graph 13).

issued a recommendation to close Hampton Roads Regional

Unfortunately, there are not enough reliable data to examine the use of cash
bail at the local level. We can, however, examine the role of pretrial detention
within Hampton Roads to better understand the potential impact of cash bail
reform. To examine pretrial detention at the local level, we must first discuss
Virginia’s system of local and regional jails. Responsibilities are spread across
state and local agencies. While localities provide a majority of the funding for
jails, the state’s share is not insignificant, accounting for roughly 40% of total
funding for jails in the eastern region in 2019.30 Not all localities have their
own jail, opting to use a regional jail. Other cities and counties have their own
jail but also use a regional jail to house inmates.

The primary purpose of local and regional jails is to house pretrial defendants,
those with a misdemeanor sentence, felony sentence of 12 months or less,
or local ordinance violation. These inmates accounted for 71% of the total
Hampton Roads jail population in 2019. Federal prisoners and stateresponsible inmates comprise the other 29%; they are usually awaiting transfer
to a prison or other state facility. On a typical day in 2019, approximately
6,713 inmates were incarcerated in Hampton Roads local and regional jails,
47% of whom had not yet been convicted of a crime.

Table 1 lists the local and regional jails in Hampton Roads and the
corresponding localities that house inmates at each jail in 2019. Of the
16 cities and counties in the region, eight have their own local jail. For the
most part, the distribution of inmates across jails was representative of the
corresponding localities’ shares of the region’s total population. Virginia Beach
City Jail (20.5%) and Norfolk City Jail (14.7%) housed the largest shares of
Hampton Roads jail inmates.

30 Virginia State Compensation Board, Jail Cost Report (2019). The eastern region includes Hampton Roads
local and regional jails (Table 1) as well as Northampton, Sussex and Accomack county jails and Southside
Regional Jail.
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Jail. The decision followed the deaths of at least 22 inmates
since 2015 and a 2016 U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)
investigation of the jail. The DOJ found the jail’s inadequate
medical care and mental health care, and overuse of solitary
confinement violated the prisoners’ constitutional rights.

As illustrated in Graph 14, the pretrial inmate population in the region’s local
jails ranged from 30.6% in Southampton County Jail to 59.7% in Newport
News City Jail. It also appears that city jails have higher shares of pretrial
inmates relative to county or regional jails. There are several factors, such as
different rates in arrest or criminal activity across jurisdictions or differences in
the use of secured bonds, that could influence the share of pretrial inmates. The
mixing of inmates from multiple jurisdictions, however, makes it difficult to say
much about the differences in pretrial practices across localities in the region.
To examine pretrial detention at the county level, we can look at jurisdictionlevel jail data from the Vera Institute of Justice. On an average day in 2018,
there were approximately 209 pretrial detainees for every 100,000 residents
in the region (Table 2). The highest rate of pretrial detention in 2018 was
in Portsmouth (768.2), followed by Mathews County (308.0) and Norfolk
(259.8). From 2000 to 2018, the pretrial detention rate rose the fastest in
James City County, increasing at an average annual rate of 5%. For the

majority of the region’s counties, the annual growth rate of pretrial detainees
from 2000 to 2018 averaged above 3%, while in several of the region’s largest
cities, pretrial detention declined over the same period.

TABLE 1
HAMPTON ROADS LOCAL AND REGIONAL JAILS, 2019
Jail Member Jurisdiction

Jail Share of Hampton Roads
Inmate Population

Jurisdiction Share of Hampton
Roads Resident Population

Chesapeake

14.0%

14.2%

Gloucester County

0.6%

2.2%

Hampton

4.1%

7.8%

Newport News

7.0%

10.4%

Norfolk

14.7%

14.1%

Portsmouth

3.6%

5.5%

Southampton County

1.1%

1.0%

Virginia Beach

20.5%

26.2%

Hampton Roads Regional*

Chesapeake, Hampton, Newport
News, Norfolk, Portsmouth

14.3%

52.1%

Middle Peninsula Regional

Mathews County

2.4%

0.5%

Virginia Peninsula Regional

James City County, Williamsburg,
Poquoson, York County

6.4%

10.0%

Western Tidewater Regional

Suffolk, Franklin, Isle of Wight County

11.3%

8.0%

Jail Name
Chesapeake City
Gloucester County
Hampton City
Newport News City
Norfolk City
Portsmouth City
Southampton County
Virginia Beach City

Sources: Virginia State Compensation Board, Local Inmate Data Systems, and the U.S. Census Bureau Intercensal Population Estimates, 2019. *As of April 2021, Chesapeake, Norfolk and Portsmouth had pulled their inmates out of the
Hampton Roads Regional Jail.
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Graph 12
GRAPH 12

Growth in Violent Crime, Property Crime and Jail Incarceration Rate:
GROWTH IN VIOLENT CRIME, PROPERTY CRIME AND JAIL INCARCERATION RATE:
HAMPTON ROADS,
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GRAPH 13
GRAPH 13

Pretrial Inmate Population Per 100,000 Residents:
PRETRIAL INMATE POPULATION PER 100,000 RESIDENTS:
HAMPTON
HamptonROADS,
Roads,1990-2018
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Sources: Vera Institute of Justice, Incarceration Trends (2018), FBI Uniform Crime Reporting (2019) and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University
Sources: Vera Institute of Justice, Incarceration Trends (2018), FBI Uniform Crime Reporting (2019) and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University
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GRAPH 14
GRAPH 14

Share of Pretrial Inmate Population:
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TABLE 2
AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH IN PRETRIAL INMATE POPULATION:
HAMPTON ROADS CITIES AND COUNTIES, 2000-2018
2000 Pretrial Population Rate
Per 100,000 Residents

2018 Pretrial Population Rate
Per 100,000 Residents

Average Annual Growth Rate

Chesapeake

137.8

220.1

3.7%

Gloucester County

93.9

155.3

3.2%

Hampton

167.1

149.7

-1.1%

Isle of Wight County

157.8

82.6

-2.4%

James City County

94.9

146.1

5.0%

Mathews County

127.5

308.0

4.8%

Newport News

194.7

172.4

-0.7%

Norfolk

294.9

259.8

-0.5%

Poquoson

99.5

157.0

2.9%

Portsmouth

541.2

768.2

1.6%

Suffolk

154.1

84.6

-1.4%

Virginia Beach

165.8

148.4

-0.3%

Williamsburg

119.6

185.7

3.7%

York County

99.9

161.5

3.7%

201.4

209.0

1.6%

Hampton Roads Total

Sources: Vera Institute of Justice (2020) and Incarceration Trends Dataset, county- and jurisdiction-level jail data (1970-2018). Data for Franklin and Southampton County were not available. Average annual growth represents the
compound annual growth rate.
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Cash Bail Reform: What
Would It Look Like?

Cash Bail Reform: What Are
The Projected Benefits?

Cash bail reform can take many forms. As of April 2021, no state had
implemented legislation to completely strip judges of the ability to issue secured
bonds. Illinois passed legislation to this effect in 2021, but the reform will not
go into effect until 2023. Other states have imposed restrictions on a judge’s
ability to rely on secured bonds. These restrictions include amending court rules
to set forth a presumption in favor of release on the least restrictive conditions,
requiring judges to consider a defendant’s ability to pay, and expanding the
types of offenses eligible for citations or summons. While Virginia already
instructs judges to consider the financial means of the defendant, Attorney
General Mark Herring and the Virginia Department of Criminal Justice
Services have both recommended expanding the use of citations and adding
a presumption favoring the least restrictive conditions as possible reforms to
reduce the reliance on cash bail.

The potential benefits of cash bail reform are alluring. Proponents argue there
is minimal risk to public safety or court appearance and that eliminating cash
bail would lower costs for poor and minority defendants and taxpayers. Cities
and counties in Hampton Roads spend an average of $90.32 per day to house
one inmate. On any given day in 2019, 3,154 inmates were detained pretrial
in the region, an estimated cost to taxpayers of more than $104 million per
year, or about 45% of the $233 million spent on corrections and detentions in
the region.33

New Jersey, for example, enacted similar legislation, largely eliminating cash
bail in 2017. In the year following implementation, less than 1% of Criminal
Justice Reform-eligible defendants31 were issued monetary bail, and 71%
of defendants were issued a summons with or without pretrial monitoring,
without first going to jail.32 New York eliminated cash bail for offenses covering
90% of total arrests in January 2020 but has since expanded the number of
offenses eligible for cash bail after the New York Police Department reported
an increase in criminal activity. Besides putting limits on judicial decisionmaking, another key aspect of recent legislative reforms to end cash bail is
the statewide implementation of a pretrial risk assessment tool and pretrial
services. Both reform tools are already in place in more than two-thirds of
Virginia’s cities and counties.

Advocates point to the potential cost savings of a risk-based system as a key
benefit to reform. Herring noted, “It costs about $3 a day to keep someone on
pretrial services, versus about $85 per day if they are jailed, so if we make
smart reforms, we could be talking about millions in savings while still meeting
our public safety goals.” Yet, with the preponderance of defendants released
within 48 hours of arrest, the question is how much money could cash bail
reform actually save?
The key question in the cash bail reform debate, we argue, is by how much
would the pretrial population in Hampton Roads decline on a daily basis?
When New Jersey reformed its cash bail system, the pretrial population
declined by 19% in the first year of implementation.34 Assuming a similar
impact of a 20% decline in Hampton Roads would reduce the average daily
pretrial population by about 630 inmates. This daily decline in the pretrial
population would save approximately $57,000 a day, or approximately $20
million a year (Table 3). Given that cash bail reform could take a number of
forms, we provide a range of estimates in Table 3.
One might argue that $20 million of savings a year from cash bail reform is
not worth the increased risk to public safety. On the other hand, if the daily
pretrial population were reduced by 630 inmates, there would be benefits

31 A Criminal Justice Reform-eligible defendant is defined in statute as “a person for whom a complaint-warrant
is issued for an initial charge involving an indictable offense or disorderly persons offense.”
32 2018 Report to the Governor and the Legislature, New Jersey Judiciary, submitted by Glenn A. Grant,
acting administrative director of the courts, available at: https://www.njcourts.gov/courts/assets/
criminal/2018cjrannual.pdf.
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33 V
 irginia State Compensation Board, Local Inmate Data Systems and Virginia State Compensation Board, FY
2019 Jail Cost Report. Annual estimate = average daily population X cost of inmate per day X 365.
34 2
 018 Report to Governor and the Legislature, New Jersey Judiciary. https://njcourts.gov/courts/assets/
criminal/2018cjrannual.pdf?c=taP.

in terms of alleviating crowding in local jails and conserving public safety
resources. There are also the direct benefits to people who are not jailed. Every

day in confinement is a potential day of lost wages for those who have not yet
been convicted of a crime.

TABLE 3
HAMPTON ROADS LOCAL AND REGIONAL JAILS:
PRETRIAL DETENTION AND TOTAL EXPENDITURES PER DAY AND ESTIMATED COST SAVINGS PER YEAR, 2019
Savings Per
Savings Per
Savings Per
Year from 5%
Year from 10%
Year from 20%
Decline in Pretrial Decline in Pretrial Decline in Pretrial
Population
Population
Population

Total
Expenditures Per
Inmate Per Day

Average
Daily Pretrial
Population

Total Pretrial
Expenditures
Per Year

Chesapeake City

$90.80

458

$15,179,036

$758,952

$1,517,904

$3,035,807

Gloucester County

$141.06

15

$772,304

$38,615

$77,230

$154,461

Hampton City

$91.92

149

$4,999,069

$249,953

$499,907

$999,814

Newport News City

$78.81

280

$8,054,382

$402,719

$805,438

$1,610,876

Norfolk City

$68.09

466

$11,581,428

$579,071

$1,158,143

$2,316,286

Portsmouth City

$119.71

120

$5,243,298

$262,165

$524,330

$1,048,660

Southampton County

$119.50

22

$959,585

$47,979

$95,959

$191,917

Virginia Beach City

$80.76

731

$21,547,979

$1,077,399

$2,154,798

$4,309,596

Virginia Peninsula
Regional

$58.14

186

$3,947,125

$197,356

$394,712

$789,425

Western Tidewater
Regional

$56.73

235

$4,866,016

$243,301

$486,602

$973,203

Hampton Roads
Regional

$94.79

428

$14,808,094

$740,405

$1,480,809

$2,961,619

Middle Peninsula
Regional Security
Center

$83.92

62

$1,899,110

$94,955

$189,911

$379,822

Hampton Roads Total

$90.35

3,154

$104,011,824

$5,200,591

$10,401,182

$20,802,365

Jail Name

Sources: Virginia State Compensation Board, Local Inmate Data Systems and the Virginia State Compensation Board, FY 2019 Jail Cost Report. Total expenditures per inmate per day represent operating expenditures minus capital
account-operating and other jail indirect expenditures.
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In Table 4, we model the economic impact on Hampton Roads if cash bail
reform were enacted and the daily pretrial population declined by 630
inmates. To examine the potential (maximum) gains from this policy change,
we assume that the defendants are employed in retail trade and estimate the
annual economic impact of adding these jobs to the regional economy. We
find that the potential gain to regional gross domestic product approaches
$51 million annually, and that more than 880 jobs in total would be added
to Hampton Roads. Of course, these benefits might also be reduced if reform
were to result in increased criminal activity. However, we note (again) that
data from the Virginia State Crime Commission support the conclusion that
defendants on more stringent types of release (secured bonds, secured bonds
with supervision) were arrested at the same rate as those released on personal
recognizance or unsecured bond with supervision. In other words, criminals
who are going to commit crimes are going to do so, regardless of how they
obtain release from pretrial detention.
TABLE 4
PROJECTED ECONOMIC IMPACT: EMPLOYMENT GAIN OF 630
INDIVIDUALS, HAMPTON ROADS
Direct

Indirect

Induced

Total

630

129

124

883

Value Added (Millions)

$29.3

$10.8

$10.8

$50.9

Compensation (Millions)

$18.9

$7.1

$5.3

$31.4

Employment

Sources: Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University, and IMPLAN Group.
Estimates may not sum due to rounding.

Final Thoughts
The decision of whether to maintain the status quo, reduce or eliminate
cash bail undoubtedly continues to be debated in Hampton Roads and in
Virginia. Maintaining the status quo is a policy choice under increasing
pressure at the state and local levels. The no cash bail policy implemented by
the commonwealth’s attorney from Norfolk, and the calls from prosecutors
in Newport News, Hampton and Portsmouth to end cash bail statewide, are
signals that, much like marijuana decriminalization and then legalization, cash
bail reform may be on the horizon.
If, as evidenced by the increasing number of states reducing or eliminating
cash bail, change does come to Virginia and Hampton Roads, what would
it mean? First, simply eliminating cash bail would not release
all or even most pretrial inmates. New Jersey is the only state to
successfully implement a policy, in 2017, that largely eliminated cash bail.
After declining 20% in the first year, the number of pretrial inmates in 2020
remained largely unchanged.35 Data show that many of those arrested in
Virginia either receive a summons or, if transported to jail, are released within
24 hours of confinement.
Second, an efficient and just pretrial system would require
more than just eliminating cash bail. Judges must still have an
effective way to ensure court appearance and public safety, while at the same
time identifying defendants eligible for release in a quick and efficient manner.
While Virginia already has much of the necessary framework in place, it
would require more than simply expanding pretrial services. The Virginia Pretrial Data Project review of court practices in pretrial services agency localities
found in many instances that judges do not receive any information from
pretrial services, and that several defendants are placed on pretrial supervision
without first receiving a risk assessment. Any reform should ensure that
sufficient resources are available and properly utilized.
Third, eliminating cash bail would not result in the cost savings
to local governments some might expect. More importantly, while
35 N
 ew Jersey Courts Criminal Justice Reform Statistics, Jan. 1 to Dec. 31, 2020, https://njcourts.gov/courts/
assets/criminal/cjrreport2020.pdf?c=48I.
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the cost of pretrial services is significantly lower than detention, a wider
implementation would almost certainly mean cost increases. The burden on
localities to fund nearly half of the program could also lead to inequities in
funding and outcomes. The state would almost certainly have to increase its
aid to the cities and counties unable to finance the program on their own. Even
the most optimistic estimates suggest the savings would constitute a fraction of
public safety budgets.
Fourth, care must be taken to differentiate between defendants
who do not pose a risk to the community and those who may
engage in criminal behavior or flee justice. More than 3 in 10
defendants released on more stringent conditions (supervision and/or secured
bond) in the 2017 VPDP cohort were arrested on a new charge after being
released from confinement while awaiting trial. Differentiating between these

SECURING RELEASE: CASH BAIL IN HAMPTON ROADS

defendants and those who fail to appear because of scheduling conflicts, lack
of transportation or other issues would be a continuing challenge.
Lastly, shifting the pretrial system from wealth-based to riskbased would likely be a more equitable form of pretrial justice;
but the impact of eliminating cash bail on racial disparities
remains to be determined. A 2019 report on the performance of New
Jersey’s cash bail reform showed that in the two years since implementation,
racial disparities in arrests and the jail population persist. Cash bail reform
is not a panacea for all that ails the criminal justice system,
but taking a risk-based approach that reduces subjectivity and
potential bias, and applying patience and objective analysis, is
a step in the right direction.
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